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INTRODUCTION 
 In this dissertation, I will argue in favor of an alternative approach to the problem 
of global poverty, one that is distinct in significant ways from current approaches 
grounded in utilitarianism, human rights, or an ethic of care.   
When I speak of “global poverty,” I am referring to the conditions under which a 
large percentage of human beings are forced to live.  These conditions in practical terms 
mean that it is extremely difficult, and in some cases practically impossible, for almost 
half of all human beings on the planet to obtain the resources that are required for their 
minimal survival (such as adequate food, clean water, or shelter).  Philosopher Thomas 
Pogge provides some staggering statistics:   
Some 2,800 million or 46 percent of humankind live below the World Bank’s 
$2/day poverty line…Over 1,200 million of them live on less than half, below the 
World Bank’s better-known $1/day poverty line.1 
 
In his 2004 paper “Real World Justice”, Pogge paints an even more startling picture:  
Some 18 million people have died prematurely each year [since the end of the 
Cold War] from poverty-related causes, accounting for fully one third of all 
human deaths.  This 15-year death toll of 270 million is considerably larger than 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 2.  More recently, 
the World Bank has released figures that purport to show that this percentage has dropped somewhat; as of 
2008, 43 percent of humans live below the $2/day poverty line.  Cf. World Bank, “World Bank Sees 
Progress Against Extreme Poverty, But Flags Vulnerabilities,” February 29, 2012, 
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23130032~pagePK:64257043~piPK:43
7376~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 
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the 200-million death toll from all the wars, civil wars, genocides and other 
government repression of the entire 20
th
 century combined.
2
 
 
As a response to the existence of these conditions, many different arguments have been 
constructed, trying to develop an approach that is not only philosophically sound, but one 
which also stirs the moral sensibilities of those people living in affluent countries, and 
compels them to act to try to aid in the eradication of global poverty.   
 Three of the most well-known and widely-appealed-to philosophical approaches 
are as follows: Peter Singer’s broadly utilitarian argument, Thomas Pogge’s appeal to a 
concept of human rights, and Virginia Held’s argument based in a feminist ethic of care.  
These are three different attempts to ground a moral imperative to act to provide aid to 
poor people around the world, through one avenue or another.  While these various 
approaches have their merits, I will argue in this dissertation that they are all insufficient 
(in one way or another) to deal with the problem of global poverty.  Given their 
shortcomings, a new approach is needed.   
 Thus in the first portion of the dissertation I will elaborate, in turn, these three 
arguments, as well as examine the various philosophical and practical objections that they 
face.   
 In Chapter One, I discuss one of the most well-known and provocative 
contemporary responses to global poverty, which comes from the prominent utilitarian 
Peter Singer.  Singer’s argument is an attempt to generate a general moral duty to donate 
                                                 
2
 Thomas Pogge, “Real World Justice,” The Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005): 31.  As impossible as this may be 
to believe, Pogge (in a footnote) does the math to support his claim; this number is current as of 2005, and 
has obviously increased since then. 
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money to the global poor.  While this approach is appealing in its simplicity and 
directness, I will argue that it is beset with internal philosophical problems.  Perhaps even 
more importantly, however, Singer neglects to consider the causes of poverty.  This 
omission undercuts the efficacy of his approach.   
 Chapter Two examines philosopher Thomas Pogge’s argument, which centers 
specifically on the causal question.  Pogge explicitly appeals to a concept of “human 
rights.”  As I will discuss in detail, the human rights approach claims that an individual is 
(or should be) bestowed with rights, meaning that she can make claims on outside 
entities, based on the content of her rights and the goods upon which they are focused.  
Correlative to these rights exist duties, which are the obligations placed on other entities.  
In relation to the issue of poverty, this schema of rights and duties means that if someone 
is impoverished (and thus having her rights to things such as food or shelter unfulfilled), 
another entity has a corresponding duty. 
 Pogge’s argument is that we, the citizens of the Western developed nations, are 
causally implicated in the harms of global poverty by way of our economic and political 
institutions.  Given that the actions of these institutions (which represent us and our 
interests) are actively harming millions of people by impoverishing them, we have a duty 
to stop violating the rights of the poor.  His argument is not that we have a duty to do 
something, but rather than we must stop doing something (what he calls a “negative 
duty”).   
 While I am sympathetic to his claim that we are morally implicated in causing 
harm to the global poor, Pogge’s approach runs up against significant problems.  His 
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answer to the question of what precisely each individual must do to stop causing poverty 
is particularly diffuse; it is not at all clear what I (as an individual) must do in order to 
satisfy my negative duty.  While he offers some specific structural reforms to undercut 
the causes of poverty, I argue that these changes are insufficient to provide the global 
poor with an opportunity to have better lives. 
  Chapter Three looks at another important perspective on the problem of global 
poverty, coming from the work of philosopher Virginia Held.  Drawing heavily upon the 
literature of a feminist ethic of care, Held argues that we have a moral responsibility to 
care for poor individuals around the world, and to work to make sure that their needs are 
met.  She claims that we must reflect on our interdependency as human beings, and 
realize that this shared humanity connects us in a very real way to global poor.  They are 
not merely strangers on the other side of the world, but fellow human beings to whom we 
are connected, and whose lives are affected in various (often negative) ways based on 
how we act. 
 But, as I will argue, Held’s ethic of care argument falls short of providing 
sufficient motivation to act.  The moral force of her argument rests on the premise that 
people should care about poor people being harmed merely in virtue of what it does to 
them (the poor).  While I do not necessarily disagree, this premise does not go far enough 
in establishing a compelling moral motivation that is immune to readily-available 
objections: I can argue that I am in no way connected to people on the other side of the 
earth.  Even if I accept such a connection, I can similarly deny that I have any moral 
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responsibility to provide aid (especially if I do not think that I am implicated in causing 
such poverty). 
 After identifying the unanswered objections that I argue these three approaches 
face, my aim in the second portion of the dissertation is to develop my own alternative 
approach to global poverty, one that overcomes the philosophical, motivational, and 
practical problems of the three arguments previously mentioned.     
 In Chapter Four, I argue that conditions of poverty, whether on our doorstep or 
around the world,  are not just doing something to “them/the poor,” they are doing 
something to “us” (both “them” and “me”): we are forced to engage in what Jean-Paul 
Sartre calls “self-deception.”  When we encounter a poor person, we quickly lie to 
ourselves in order to cover up our human impulse to provide aid to that other person.  
Given that poverty is not only harming the poor, but also every human being, we 
(affluent individuals) have a serious interest in acting to end poverty, insofar as we seek 
to end the harm that the existence of such poverty does to our humanity. 
 In order to avoid the harms of self-deception, we require a new lens through 
which to approach the issue of poverty.  This lens has its genesis in Karl Marx’s 
understanding of our human nature as “species-being.”  Through a detailed discussion 
and interpretation of Marx’s understanding of our human nature present in his early 
writings, I argue that he provide us with a sense that the world need not be one wherein 
we are continually forced to endure the harms of poverty and self-deception; another 
world, a more “fully human world,” is possible.  Thus this positive vision of a fully 
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human world provides a compelling moral motivation to act to end poverty, as it is much 
more than just a “world without poverty.” 
 But what would this fully human world look like, and how can we bring it into 
being?  In Chapter Five, I address this question by examining a key aspect of our human 
nature: our need for meaningful labor.  I claim that this fundamental human need for 
meaningful labor is being denied to the poor of the world through the implementation of 
labor-saving technologies.  Such technology (and its value within our current economic 
system) is a significant causal factor in the continued existence of poverty, a factor 
overlooked by Singer, Pogge, and Held.   
 To attack this root cause of poverty and create a more fully human world, I argue 
that we must revisit the role that labor-saving technology plays in the productive process.  
Because of the overzealous pursuit of monetary cost-efficiency in producing goods, labor 
has been devalued and (often) replaced by a level of technology that, while it produces 
cheaper objects for consumption, degrades and dehumanizes workers in a myriad of 
ways.  This problem has not necessarily been made plain in philosophical examinations 
of poverty.  As philosopher Brian Barry sarcastically remarks:  
Perhaps because academics enjoy a good deal of autonomy and generally find 
their jobs enjoyable on balance, political philosophers are amazingly oblivious to 
the fact that the great majority of paid employment is a form of servitude and that 
those who undertake it are driven into it by sheer economic necessity.
3
 
   
 In essence, the results of such labor-saving technology are that we are wasting 
human beings by sinking them deeper and deeper into squalor, all in an effort to make 
goods faster and cheaper.  These results of labor-saving technology are something that I 
                                                 
3
 Brian Barry, Why Social Justice Matters (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 202. 
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argue must be questioned if we are to formulate an effective approach to combating 
conditions of poverty around the globe.   
 In order to realize a vision of a fully human world, one wherein poverty no longer 
exists and each human being has her needs met (including the need for meaningful 
human labor), we must alter our concepts of efficiency and labor-saving technology by 
focusing on providing what economist and philosopher E.F. Schumacher calls “Good 
Work” through “Intermediate Technology.”  According to Schumacher, we should utilize 
technology not out of the desire to replace labor in production, but rather to enhance the 
labor that we do to make it more meaningful and valuable for human beings.  This may 
mean using more human labor than is technically necessary (given the possible labor-
saving technologies available), but it will importantly allow for more opportunities for 
poor individuals to labor meaningfully.  Through Intermediate Technology, we will be 
able to undercut one of the root causes of poverty: a lack of meaningful labor.  This, I 
argue, can push us towards realizing a fully human world; one wherein each individual 
realizes his human nature as a productive being, and one in which he is able to heed his 
human impulses to help fellow human beings in need, rather than masking these impulses 
through the harms of self-deception. 
 In my conclusion, I examine possible counter-arguments to my thesis, and in 
doing so I provide some examples of practical actions that individuals can take, and 
movements that are worthy of support.  In the end, I argue that our moral motivation to 
provide aid to the global poor should come not from concerns of utility, duties of human 
rights, or considerations of care.  Rather than establishing a strict moral obligation, I 
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argue that we should (and can) be moved to act out of a concern for our human nature as 
species-being, and a desire to avoid the ravages of the self-deception that we are forced to 
put ourselves through when faced with poor people.  We will act not out of a sense of 
duty or guilt, but out of a desire to change our world for everyone’s sake.  This will 
further motivate us to eradicate poverty, as this is the only way in which we can make our 
world a more fully human place for all of us, ourselves and the poorest people of the 
world alike. 
 
9 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
PETER SINGER’S UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO GLOBAL POVERTY 
 One of the most famous and controversial contemporary responses to global 
poverty comes from the Australian philosopher Peter Singer, a prominent utilitarian.  His 
conclusion, first put forth in his 1972 article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” and 
updated more recently in his books One World: The Ethics of Globalization (2002) and 
The Life You Can Save (2009), is that all well-off people in the world have a moral 
obligation to provide monetary aid to the poor.
 1
  Singer’s argument is broadly utilitarian 
in character, insofar as he is making a moral argument for aid on the grounds that the 
sacrifices made by those who donate are not as morally “weighty” as the benefits to those 
who receive aid.  While I find his argument intuitively appealing (and in many ways 
straightforward), it does suffer from some significant philosophical problems.   
 In this chapter I will discuss the argument Singer puts forth in order to combat 
conditions of global poverty.  I will first explain the argument as it originally appeared in 
“Famine, Affluence, and Morality.”  After its publication, the argument generated a great 
deal of response, of which Singer has attempted to take account in his more recent 
formulations of the argument.  I will recount these updated formulations and Singer’s 
attempt to deal with at least four common criticisms.  Lastly, I will discuss some of the 
                                                 
1
 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, no. 3 (Spring 1972): 
229-243, Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 
hereafter abbreviated OW, and Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save (New York: Random House, 2009), 
hereafter abbreviated LYCS. 
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most serious objections to Singer’s argument, to which I do not think he has an adequate 
answer.  I will argue that these objections call into question the plausibility of Singer’s 
argument, and indicate an aspect of the problem of poverty that he neglects to take into 
account.   
 But before examining Singer’s argument itself, I want to trace the development of 
utilitarianism as a moral theory, with specific reference to its origins as a response to 
poverty. 
The Development of Utilitarianism 
 The ethical theory of utilitarianism has at its base a concern for promoting the best 
possible outcomes for the greatest number of people.  Utilitarianism classically involves a 
calculative aspect, where one must weigh out possible alternative courses of action, and 
determine the possible effects such courses of action may have on individuals and their 
happiness.
2
   
 While early utilitarians are often viewed as “progressive reformers,” working to 
remedy problems in regards to representative government, individual liberty, and the 
penal system, their theoretical and historical roots actually developed in response to 
poverty, specifically the widespread poverty that resulted from early versions of a 
capitalist economy.  Faced with such poverty, the utilitarian response was to argue that 
                                                 
2
 This central aspect of utilitarianism is often crudely referred to as being concerned with promoting the 
“greatest happiness for the greatest number.”  The term “happiness” is not used universally by all 
utilitarians; Jeremy Bentham, for instance, uses “pleasure” to signify the primary focus of his version of 
utilitarianism.  While I will discuss this in more detail in the coming pages, I want to note this discrepancy 
here.  Going forward, when describing the utilitarian position in general, I will use “happiness.” 
11 
 
society should not undertake the “obvious” approach of providing the poor with enough 
money to live a decent life, as this ends up causing more disutility in the long run.  
 Beginning in the late 18
th
 century, the massive boom in industry and trade as a 
result of colonialism created vast amounts of wealth for many Europeans, far beyond any 
prior riches.  At the same time, however, conditions of poverty persisted, and in fact 
worsened.  As Karl Polanyi argues in The Great Transformation, while many people 
found success in the burgeoning global marketplace, many others were plunged into 
poverty.
 3
  In response to the continued and worsening impoverishment of this new 
working class, local English justices in the town of Speenhamland (a district of 
Berkshire) enacted the “Speenhamland Law” in 1795.  This was a local law, but quickly 
spread to other areas of the countryside.  While it took on many forms, the common 
factor was to provide subsidies to poor workers.  These subsidies were payments granted 
to workers (made in accordance with a scale dependent upon the price of bread) in 
addition to their wages.  This meant, according to Polanyi, that “a minimum income 
should be assured to the poor irrespective of their earnings.”4   
 While this policy was enacted with beneficent intent in order to try to help the 
poor climb out of poverty, the Speenhamland experiment had disastrous effects in the 
long run.  Freed from the negative consequences of wage fluctuations, workers ceased to 
be concerned with their level of productivity at work.  Similarly, employers saw no 
                                                 
3
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). 
 
4
 Ibid., 82.  At the time and for decades afterwards, according to Polanyi, the Speenhamland Law (and its 
later retraction under the Poor Law Reforms) was regularly cited throughout Europe as the perfect example 
of a failed policy to provide aid to the poor.  Both Bentham and Mill make reference to its failings in 
developing their own proposals for dealing with poverty.  And yet, a few hundred years later, the 
Speenhamland experiment has all but vanished from memory. 
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reason to ever raise wages (and in fact saw more reason to continually lower them), as 
they knew that their workers would receive their subsidies regardless of what they were 
paid in wages.  Consequently, enterprises stopped growing as fast as they had previously; 
less productive workers meant less profits and growth.  As wages became “bottomless,” 
the poor saw the subsidies as more attractive than laboring for a pittance.  Productivity 
fell at an ever-increasing rate, and coupled with the enclosure of common agricultural 
lands, poor people had little choice other than to try to survive on the Speenhamland 
subsidies indefinitely.
5
  Thus the Speenhamland experiment actually made things worse; 
rather than solving the problem, conditions of poverty persisted, and became further 
entrenched in society.   
 In response, Polanyi argues, there came about a shift in the economic and ethical 
philosophies of the time:  
The traditional unity of a Christian society was giving place to a denial of 
responsibility on the part of the well-to-do for the condition of their 
fellows…Scholars proclaimed in unison that a science had been discovered which 
put the laws governing man’s world beyond any doubt.  It was at the behest of 
these laws that compassion was removed from the hearts, and a stoic 
determination to renounce human solidarity in the name of the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number gained the dignity of a secular religion.
6
 
 
This new science was modern political economy, with its law of supply and demand, and 
its focus on competitive markets for labor.  Political economy determined that if business 
                                                 
5
 Polanyi rightly points out that the Speenhamland experiment didn’t happen in a vacuum; workers might 
have been able to form trade unions to push for higher wages and better conditions (thus decreasing the 
need for the subsidies).  However, at the time, Britain had passed the Anti-Combination Laws of 1799-
1800, which barred such labor organization, and therefore workers had no power to push for higher wages.  
Thus the Speenhamland mandates ended up actually depressing wages, and became in essence a subsidy to 
employers, since they were free from having to pay any semblance of a living wage; even while taking 
home only a pittance in wages, workers could receive the Speenhamland subsidies, and thus still survive to 
return to work the next day.  Cf. Ibid., 85-86, 285. 
   
6
 Ibid., 106-107. 
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enterprises wanted to succeed, society could not fall prey to the sentiments of Christian 
charity; aid to the poor should be severely restricted, if not altogether eliminated.  As a 
complement to this science, the moral theory of utilitarianism developed, and held that 
societal rules should be instituted in order to produce the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number of people.  Utilitarianism justified giving aid to the poor only if it could 
be done in such a way that would produce some greater benefit to society as a whole.   
Utilitarianism was developed and championed early on by Jeremy Bentham.  
Bentham and other early utilitarians jettisoned the natural rights approach that came 
down from Locke, Rousseau, and other Enlightenment philosophers.
7
  They focused, not 
on individuals as possessors of rights, but on the greater good (utility) that institutions 
should produce for society as a whole.  This theory offered reasons why society should 
not take the seemingly obvious initiatives to correct poverty, such as simply providing to 
the poor enough money to subsist.      
 Bentham’s utilitarianism is set firmly against the existence of natural rights.  He 
famously claims that “Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible 
rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts,” and that such a concept as rights has no 
bearing outside of a governmental structure.
8
  Rather than individuals as beings bestowed 
with rights, Bentham instead focuses on what he sees as an inherent aspect of human 
beings: the pursuit of pleasure (and the avoidance of pain).  Since all of our actions are 
                                                 
7
 I will detail this concept of natural rights in the beginning of Chapter Two, focusing mainly on the work 
of John Locke. 
   
8
 Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies,” in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 2, Ed. John Bowring 
(New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1843), 501. 
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focused on this dual goal, so our social rules should seek to provide the greatest amount 
of pleasure (and least amount of pain) for the greatest number of people.     
 In accordance with this governing principle, Bentham advocated industrial houses 
for the poor, rather than any kind of “free aid.”  These Industry-Houses, functioning 
along the lines of his famous Panopticon prison plan, would force poor people to work to 
produce commodities.  These Industry-Houses would keep the poor from starving by 
giving them work and shelter, while at the same time creating monetary gain for 
shareholders of such houses (as they would be capitalist enterprises).  While this plan 
offered some minimal level of subsistence for the poor, the overarching aim was borne 
out of a utilitarian calculation that the out-of-work “hands” (as Bentham refers to them) 
could be put to use in order to provide the most benefit to society as a whole.  The poor 
gain the pleasure of food and shelter (avoiding the pain of death), and society gains the 
benefit of cheap labor and more production.
9
   
John Stuart Mill revises Bentham’s utilitarianism; rather than arguing that our 
actions are morally right if they merely produce maximal pleasure for the greatest 
number of people, Mill argues that since human beings are capable of different kinds of 
happiness, “greatest happiness” must be understood in terms of “higher” and “lower” 
pleasures.
10
  Mill applies this theory of utilitarianism to the issue of individual liberty.  
                                                 
9
 Cf. Polanyi, 111-112 where he refers to the pamphlet Pauper Management, published in 1797, which 
Bentham and his brother wrote to detail these proposed Industry-Houses.  The Panopticon was a prison 
house designed along the lines of a utilitarian calculus: a central guard tower surrounded by sectors of 
inmates put to work in manual labor.  This maximized the utility of the project by ensuring that only the 
minimum amount of guards and resources were used, all the while providing the most benefit to society (by 
containing criminals and putting them to use in producing goods). 
    
10
 In his essay Utilitarianism Mill makes this distinction between what he calls “higher” and “lower” 
pleasures.  I will return to this argument in greater detail in the Chapter Four. 
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He argues societal happiness will increase maximally if individuals are allowed broad 
liberty.  Liberty should only be curtailed by a government (or public opinion) in order to 
prevent harm to other people.   
Regarding the issue of widespread poverty, Mill agrees with Bentham in terms of 
rejecting the Speenhamland attempts to provide directly for the subsistence of the poor, 
but he eschews Bentham’s proposal to set up for-profit labor houses for the poor.  Mill 
argues that the poor should not be given amounts of money that will make them so 
comfortable that they quit laboring, but rather be given just enough to provide a bare, 
meager existence.  He does not want to force the poor into industry houses (as Bentham 
did), as that interferes too much with individual liberty.  At the same time, however, he is 
critical of the past efforts to deal with the problem of poverty: 
To give profusely to the people, whether under the name of charity or of 
employment, without placing them under such influences that prudential motives 
shall act powerfully upon them, is to lavish the means of benefitting mankind, 
without attaining the object…Guarantee to them a certain payment, either by law, 
or by the feeling of the community, and no amount of comfort that you can give 
them will make either them or their descendants look to their own self-restraint as 
the proper means of preserving them in that state.
 11 
   
Thus according to Mill, poor relief should be sufficiently unattractive that people will not 
lose “self-restraint” and turn to it in lieu of employment.  He is willing to provide them 
some scant aid, so long as it is not “profuse,” for profuse aid undercuts their motivation to 
labor.     
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 Overall, both Bentham and Mill historically responded to conditions of poverty by 
arguing that society should not provide significant subsidies to the poor, as this ends up 
acting contrary to utilitarian goal of maximizing happiness for the greatest number of 
people.  The poor only need be given the opportunity (through Industry-Houses or direct 
aid) to keep from starving. 
Peter Singer’s Contemporary Utilitarianism 
In contemporary discussion of global poverty, a utilitarian approach has emerged 
in the work of Peter Singer.  In sharp contrast to the views of his historical predecessors, 
Singer claims that a utilitarian ethic justifies giving sufficient money to the poor to 
provide them with a decent level of subsistence. 
The Original Argument 
 In his famous 1972 essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Singer begins by 
offering a much-quoted example: “If I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child 
drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out.  This will mean getting my 
clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be 
a very bad thing.”12  In light of this example, Singer puts forth what he sees as an 
accepted general moral principle, readily justifiable on utilitarian grounds: “If it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”13 
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 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 230. 
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Ibid.  The “comparable moral importance” principle at the base of Singer’s argument is not, strictly 
speaking, utilitarian; it is simply a moral principle that Singer argues we currently endorse in our common 
sense morality, insofar as we feel a person should help another if he will only have to sacrifice something 
minor to do so.  At the same time, this principle may be able to be justified in utilitarian terms: if we are in 
a position where we can sacrifice a little of our own happiness in order to prevent something as disastrous 
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 Singer claims that in the example we respond and pull out the child because of the 
above general principle.  Given this general principle, he argues that we in fact have an 
obligation to aid the global poor, whether or not we realize this obligation.  Since dying 
as a result of starvation, illness, etc. is a very bad thing (a great disutility), and it will cost 
little in terms of happiness/utility to aid the global poor, we are morally obligated to do 
so.  In practical terms, this means that each individual person who has any kind of surplus 
wealth should donate that surplus to the poor.  In an effort to preempt objections about 
whether or not such aid will actually help poor people, Singer suggests poverty relief 
organizations such as Oxfam or UNICEF as examples of organizations that have solid 
track records in terms of using donations to provide aid.  If you live so comfortably that 
you are able to afford new clothes, dinner at a nice restaurant, or tickets to a movie, you 
have a moral obligation to donate to the poor.  The marginal happiness/utility that you 
can gain by treating yourself to such luxuries (an evening of relaxation or entertainment) 
is far outweighed by the utility of donating the money, as it will lead to a child’s life 
being saved.  
The Updated Argument 
In recent years, Singer has expanded and updated his argument for a moral 
imperative to provide monetary aid to the global poor.  In his most recent books One 
World: The Ethics of Globalization (2002) and The Life You Can Save (2009) he again 
begins with the image of a small child drowning in a shallow pond, but works to further 
expound upon his original formulation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
as starvation or death for another, we are morally bound to perform that action (provided this action will 
thus maximize utility, in comparison with other possible alternative courses of action). 
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First, Singer begins with the empirical question: exactly how wealthy are people 
in developed countries such as the United States, compared to the poorest in the world?  
He points out that according to a 1999 United Nations Development Program report, the 
assets of the three wealthiest individuals in the world exceed the combined Gross 
National Product of all of the least developed countries, with a total population of over 
600 million people.
14
  Lest we think that Singer’s argument thus should only apply 
directly to these extremely wealthy individuals, he also notes that the average person in 
the United States (even those classified as “poor” according to the U.S. Census Bureau) 
can afford many luxuries: “In the United States, 97 percent of those classified by the 
Census Bureau as poor own a color TV.  Three quarters of them own a car.  Three 
quarters of them have air-conditioning.  Three quarters of them have a VCR or DVD 
player.”15  Thus even outside of the extremely wealthy and the “comfortable” middle 
class, the difficulties of the less-well-off in the United States are “of a different order” 
than those poor people in developing nations, who must fight daily to meet their basic 
needs.     
 Given the implications of the drowning child example and the clear abundance of 
disposable income in Western households, Singer rhetorically asks whether or not it is 
“wrong” not to contribute to poverty relief efforts.  To strengthen his initial argument, he 
offers another imaginary example, a version of which he has adapted from Peter Unger’s 
book Living High and Letting Die:    
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 LYCS, 8.  Singer goes on to detail the amount of food waste the American middle class produces, as well 
as how much expendable income they have available to use for consumer goods and entertainment. 
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Bob is close to retirement.  He has invested most of his savings in a very rare and 
valuable old car, a Bugatti, which he has not been able to insure.  The Bugatti is 
his pride and joy.  Not only does Bob get pleasure from driving and caring for his 
car, he also knows that its rising market value means that he will be able to sell it 
and live comfortably after retirement.  One day when Bob is out for a drive, he 
parks the Bugatti near the end of a railway siding and goes for a walk up the track.  
As he does so, he sees that a runaway train, with no one aboard, is rolling down 
the railway track.  Looking farther down the track, he sees a small figure of a 
child who appears to be absorbed in playing on the tracks.  Oblivious to the 
runaway train, the child is in great danger.  Bob can’t stop the train, and the child 
is too far away to hear his warning shout, but Bob can throw a switch that will 
divert the train down the siding where his Bugatti is parked.  If he does so, 
nobody will be killed, but the train will crash through the decaying barrier at the 
end of the siding and destroy his Bugatti.  Thinking of his joy in owning the car 
and the financial security it represents, Bob decides not to throw the switch.
16
 
 
Singer points out that this example mirrors his drowning child example, with at least one 
difference.  There is some factor of uncertainty involved: Bob does not know that the 
child will die as a result of his inaction, as it is possible that the child will hear the train 
and jump to safety at the last minute.   
 And yet, Singer claims that almost everyone responds to both examples in the 
same way: they say that we should wade in to save the drowning child, and that Bob 
acted poorly when he decided not to throw the switch and destroy his car; he should have 
thrown the switch to save the child instead.  No matter how important and valuable the 
car was to Bob, they say, we cannot take a serious risk with a child’s life merely to save a 
car.  On the basis of these two examples, Singer claims that thinking in concrete terms 
reveals a shared intuition: we ought to help others in need when we are in a position to 
aid them.  Singer then restates his general moral argument, which “instead of pulling at 
your heartstrings by focusing on a single child in need, [the argument] appeals to your 
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reason and seeks your assent to an abstract but compelling moral principle.”17  He 
formalizes the argument as follows: 
First premise: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are 
 bad. 
 
Second premise: If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, 
 without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so.  
  
Third premise: By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death 
 from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing anything 
 nearly as important. 
   
Conclusion: Therefore, if you do not donate to aid agencies, you are doing 
 something wrong.
18
 
 
 Examining each of the premises in turn, Singer claims that we must accept that 
the argument is sound.  The first premise is clearly true, as suffering and death as a result 
of conditions of poverty are unquestionably bad.  The second premise, he claims, is 
equally as hard to reject, as the phrase “nearly as important” provides us some wiggle 
room when it comes to practical situations.  Neglecting one child to save another (taking 
food from my own  hungry child and giving it to another, for example) certainly involves 
sacrificing something that is equally as important, and thus this premise does not require 
us to perform that action.  The third premise may raise some practical questions (which I 
will mention later), but on the whole it is true that a donation to an aid agency can 
prevent the extremely bad results of some people dying due to poverty.  Thus, according 
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 Ibid., 15-16.  To be clear, this is Singer’s formulation of his argument’s premises and conclusion.  His 
argument incorporates aid agencies in order to preemptively answer objections about how exactly an 
individual is to go about donating his money to poor people.  Notice that the portion of his conclusion 
relating to aid agencies does not necessarily follow from the premises; it is possible for someone to take 
other courses of action to fulfill his duty to aid the global poor. 
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to Singer, since it appears that the premises are true, the conclusion must be true: if I do 
not donate, I am doing something morally wrong.   
 It’s worth taking a moment to examine Singer’s practical discussion of exactly 
how much he thinks each individual Westerner should give.  To answer this question, 
Singer turns to the Millennium Development Goals, adopted by the United Nations in 
2000 as a set of practical goals to which to work towards by 2015.  These goals include 
reducing by half the number of the world’s people living in extreme poverty, along with 
similarly reducing the number of people suffering from malnutrition, child mortality, lack 
of primary schooling, and HIV/AIDS.
19
  The economist Jeffrey Sachs worked with the 
U.N. to reach an estimated cost of achieving these goals: $121 billion in 2006, rising to 
$189 billion by 2015.  Taking into account a (rough) average income across Western 
nations, Singer argues that if every person gave their fair share (meaning that we all gave 
an equal amount), it would mean $200 per year per person; this would generate around 
$171 billion, clearly within the range for which Sachs and the U.N. are striving.  This 
sum of $200 per person per year seems incredibly paltry, compared to the amount of 
money Westerners spend on all kinds of luxury items. 
 Singer recognizes that this initial “fair share” position is too basic; it does not take 
into account the discrepancies in income among Western citizens.  While his above 
standard for donation seems “fair” in one sense (everyone gives $200), it also seems 
unfair that people at and below the average level of income give $200, while millionaires 
and billionaires have only to meet the same standard (which pales in comparison to their 
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vast wealth).  Given this concern, he modifies his understanding of “fairness,” and 
instead argues for a sliding scale in terms of the amount that people are morally bound to 
donate, based on their income.  Thus a person who makes a lot of money is obligated to 
donate a greater percentage of his income, and conversely a person who makes very little 
would have to donate less than $200.
20
  Generally speaking, he argues that everyone 
should at least give 1% of their income, those people in the top 5%-10% income bracket 
should give 5%, and those with an income upwards of (roughly) $148,000 should give 
10% per year.    This scale is meant to modify our moral responsibilities in terms of a 
more appropriate sense of “fairness.” 
 Thus taking Singer’s argument seriously alters our standard view of philanthropy 
in a significant way, and turns it into a strict moral obligation.  As Singer says: 
We tend to assume that if people do not harm others, keep their promises, do not 
lie or cheat, support their children and their elderly parents, and perhaps 
contribute a little to needier members of their local community, they’ve done 
well.  If we have money left over after meeting our needs and those of our 
dependents, we may spend it as we please.  Giving to strangers, especially those 
beyond one’s community, may be good, but we don’t think of it as something we 
have to do.  But if the basic argument presented above is right, then what many of 
us consider acceptable behavior must be viewed in a new, more ominous light.  
When we spend our surplus on concerts or fashionable shoes, on fine dining and 
good wines, or on holidays in faraway lands, we are doing something wrong.
21
 
 
                                                 
20
 See LYCS, 162-168 for his precise calculations and breakdown of this sliding scale.  By enacting this 
scale, Singer points out that the donations from only the top 10% of American families would yield 
somewhere around $471 billion per year, which is well  beyond the $189 billion required to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals.  Thus we would be able to raise plenty more in donations than is 
minimally necessary. 
     
21
 Ibid., 18.  It’s worth noting that Singer takes time to work through the texts of the major religions, 
pointing out how all of them contain a great number of direct references to duties to aid and care for the 
poor.  As such, he points out that the argument he is making is not in any way outlandish or contrary to 
standard historical grounds for moral behavior, but rather runs parallel to those teachings.  Cf. LYCS, 19-22. 
23 
 
Those who donate to aid agencies aren’t doing something supererogatory, but rather 
doing what our moral code says they must do.  By implication, then, those who don’t 
donate are in some way neglecting their moral duties.   
Dealing With the Most Common Responses and Objections 
 With the argument fully developed, Singer then turns his attention to some of the 
most common objections that he has faced in the years since he first published “Famine, 
Affluence, and Morality.”  As we shall see, these are not the only objections raised to 
Singer’s argument, but they are some of the most common.22      
 The first objection Singer examines is the claim that people (i.e. affluent 
Westerners) worked hard to earn their money, and as a result that gives them the right to 
spend it however they so choose.  At face value, Singer says, this appears to follow a 
common-sense version of fairness.  Yet what these respondents fail to acknowledge is the 
great influence that their environment has had upon their ability to earn a comfortable life 
as a result of hard work.  As such, the pure luck of being born into a society so structured 
(as well as the pure luck of being born with certain desirable abilities) is totally 
overlooked.  Singer cites the economist and social scientist Herbert Simon, who estimates 
that “social capital” is responsible for 90 percent of what people earn in wealthy 
societies.  Such social capital refers to good physical infrastructure, an effective police 
force and judiciary, enforced property rights, reliable power and sanitation systems, and 
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so on.
23
  Being born into a society with such aspects in place was purely a result of luck, 
rather than any individual effort.  Without such social capital in place, even the hardest 
worker would struggle to escape a life of poverty.  Singer mentions the billionaire 
businessman Warren Buffet, who quipped: “If you stick me down in the middle of 
Bangladesh or Peru, you’ll find out how much this talent is going to produce in the wrong 
kind of soil.”24  Thus the resultant wealth of a person has as much (or perhaps more) to 
do with the “soil” in which they end up planted, rather than their efforts, no matter how 
Herculean.   
 Furthermore, Singer argues that while a person has a “right” to do whatever she 
wants with her money, this does not settle the question of what she should do with it.  
We, as the outside observer, can still say that what she is doing with her money, whether 
it be buying fancy clothes, taking lavish vacations, or flushing it down the toilet, shows a 
deplorable lack of empathy, and thus is morally reprehensible.  In this way, says Singer, 
we can’t use force to take away a rich person’s money, but we can say that she should 
choose to give it up based on an appeal to this particular moral standard.
25
 
 The second objection Singer takes up is the claim that, since the United States is 
“the most generous nation,” the individual Westerner does not have a moral obligation to 
donate any more money.  As a society, we are certainly “already giving enough” through 
standard avenues of taxation.  To this response, Singer references many statistics at 
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length to prove that in fact the opposite is true.  He cites the Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) figures, which show that as of 2006 the United 
States is second-to-last on the list of industrialized nations in terms of giving a percentage 
of its national income to foreign aid.  While the average ratio for developed nations is 46 
cents/$100 (46 cents of every $100 generated in national income is donated as aid), the 
ratio for the U.S. is 18 cents/$100 (the proposed United Nations target goal is 70 
cents/$100).  Viewed as a percentage of the federal government’s annual budget, foreign 
aid comprises less than 1%.
26
  Either way, the reality is that the U.S. is near the bottom of 
the list of developed nations, rather than at the top.  In addition, Singer notes that the ten 
poorest countries in the world receive only 5% of all U.S. foreign aid; the majority of 
such aid goes to countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Israel, where the U.S. 
has a great deal of strategic interest.
27
  As such, the aid does not go to the countries with 
the greatest number of impoverished individuals, but rather to countries where our aid 
helps our political aims. 
 The standard rejoinder to this reality, according to Singer, is to point towards 
private charitable giving; surely the wide prevalence of charitable organizations means 
that Americans still end up giving the most as a society.  Taking into account private 
charitable giving, our contribution rises to around 2.2% of gross national income, which 
appears prima facie to be much more respectable.  But underneath this rosy number are a 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 33-35.  Singer notes that when asked in surveys, almost 50% of respondents thought that the U.S. 
gave 15-20% of its national income to foreign aid, even though the real number is less than 1%!  In 
addition, “A majority of people in these surveys also said that America gives too much aid – but when they 
were asked how much America should give, the median answers ranged from 5 percent to 10 percent of 
government spending.  In other words, people wanted foreign aid ‘cut’ to an amount five to ten times 
greater than the U.S. actually gives!” (Ibid., 35). 
   
27
 Ibid., 107. 
26 
 
few problematic facts: the first is that well over a third of this donated money goes to 
religious organizations, and they use a great deal of the money to pay clergy and build 
houses of worship.  Another large portion goes to the education sector, meaning 
universities, libraries, etc.  As such, even the most optimistic estimates claim that less 
than 10% of private philanthropy goes to organizations that use the money to aid the poor 
directly in developing nations.
28
 
 Thus the claim that the United States and/or its people are the most charitable is 
statistically untrue.  In addition, the ways in which giving occurs most often don’t lend 
themselves to alleviating actual conditions of poverty around the world.  As Singer says, 
one cannot escape his conclusion by trying to claim we’ve given enough already; as the 
numbers indicate, we have a long way to go to be able to make such a claim. 
 A third major objection that Singer discusses has to do with claims about human 
nature and our moral motivations to aid people across the globe.  Singer describes what 
he sees as one of the most common psychological barriers to people acting as a result of 
his argument: what he calls “parochialism.”  Parochialism describes the situation in 
which we feel that we are only able to care for those directly around us, or that our 
concern for the welfare of other people is limited to our kin (and a few select, but nearby, 
others).  As a result, those who use this psychological evidence against Singer claim that 
it is just “not in our nature” to be able to care about those far away, regardless of how 
much they are suffering.        
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Singer admits that such psychological evidence exists, although he claims it is a 
result of evolutionary considerations, wherein human beings millions of years ago 
required such kin-centric feelings in order to pass on our genes; if we did not care for our 
children, they would not survive to carry on our genes.  While we are still biologically 
predisposed to care for our kin, this fact now exists alongside an explosion in global 
interconnectedness.  Thanks to today’s media and information technology, it is very easy 
to interact with other people across the globe, and to see their suffering and need.  Thus it 
is clearly false to say that we have no means of recognizing the needs of others around 
the globe, or ways in which we can provide aid.  Singer says that our psychology can 
certainly adjust to incorporate these other people, and thus it does not absolve us of his 
strict moral obligation. 
 In a related formulation of the parochialism objection, some respondents claim 
that we have a greater moral duty to provide for those with whom we have close personal 
relationships or those who are members of our nation/state than we do to provide for 
other human beings on the other side of the world; thus it is morally acceptable to value 
the needs of these people over the needs of poor people thousands of miles away.
 29
  To 
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this objection, Singer takes a direct approach, claiming that this line of thinking suffers 
from an “is implies ought” problem.  As he explains, “the fact that we tend to favor our 
families, communities, and countries may explain our failure to save the lives of the poor 
beyond those boundaries, but it does not justify that failure from an ethical perspective, 
no matter how many generations of our ancestors have seen nothing wrong with it.”30  It 
is no doubt true that affluent Westerners have compatriots who are in need; but, 
according to Singer, unless they are in as dire a situation as those individuals living in 
extreme poverty, one cannot justify spending the money on one’s neighbors.31  He claims 
that in almost all cases you can take care of your friends and family using far less money 
that you are used to spending (and thereby actually have money left over to help the 
poor).  We can provide food, clothing, and shelter for our children and other close 
relations quite adequately without dining at expensive restaurants, purchasing designer 
clothing, or building houses full of extra bathrooms and bedrooms.  While Singer admits 
that human beings have clear attachment feelings towards their children and kin, he 
                                                                                                                                                 
impersonal standard.  In this way, he allows the philanthropist to take into account what it is she is giving 
up, how central it was to her life, as well as to the lives of others to whom she sees herself relationally 
connected.   
 Unfortunately, Miller is quite vague about the practical implications of this Principle of Sympathy, 
and how such relational considerations play out in actual decisions of how much to give.  See here Richard 
Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
especially 12-13.  While Miller’s principle is in some ways different from Singer’s, it could still fall prey to 
some of the objections that Singer’s argument faces.  Moreover, it’s possible that Singer could respond to 
Miller by pointing out that the caveat in the general moral principle about “sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral worth” does in fact take into account our relationships. 
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31 Singer acknowledges that even those who are disposed to aid those in need oftentimes claim that such aid 
should go first and foremost to those poor people living in their own country (thus espousing some 
relational connection between countrymen).  In response, Singer strongly defends his argument to aid the 
“worst off” in the world who live in absolute poverty, regardless of whether or not we live in the same 
country: “Reducing the numbers of human beings living in absolute poverty is surely a more urgent priority 
than reducing the relative poverty caused by some people living in palaces while others live in houses that 
are merely adequate.”  OW, 175. 
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claims this does not justify such limitless spending on these people to whom we feel such 
attachments.  Hearkening back to the utilitarian character of his argument, he notes that 
our attachment feelings do not in and of themselves appear to sufficiently justify placing 
a thousand times more importance on the lives of our children than the children of 
strangers (especially when those strangers’ children live in mortal danger as a result of 
conditions of poverty).
32
  Notice that this argument does not require individuals to totally 
neglect their own children in order to save the lives of other children living in poverty 
around the world.  Such actions would clearly cause the donator to “sacrifice something 
of comparable moral importance,” and thus they are not obligated to do such a thing.  Yet 
this caveat alone does not therefore mean that such relationships can overtake a concern 
for the needs of the poor, no matter how “unrelated” to us they are.   
 The last objection Singer examines has to do with the “fairness argument” 
described above, where we should all pitch in and provide our $200 donation per year in 
order to help those in need.  Singer notes that although he has derived this number on the 
assumption that everyone would donate their fair share, we certainly must recognize the 
reality that not everyone will do so.  There are two related objections that arise from this 
possibility: first, some may ask why they have to give anything at all, since others may 
not do so.  If others aren’t going to help, why am I to be stuck with the check, so to 
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speak?  In response, Singer puts forth a modified version of his original drowning child 
example to force us to think about our moral duties in relation to the actions of others: 
You are walking past the shallow pond when you see that ten children have fallen 
in and need to be rescued.  Glancing around, you see no parents or caregivers, but 
you do notice that, as well as yourself, there are nine adults who have just arrived 
at the pond, have also seen the drowning children, and are in as good as position 
as you to rescue a child.
33
   
 
In this scenario, Singer says, we are morally responsible to wade in and save a child, 
regardless of whether or not anyone else acts.  The mere presence of other moral actors 
with identical duties in the scenario does nothing to affect the demands of our obligation.  
Even if those other people totally neglect their moral duties, it does not diminish our own.   
 This then brings up the second concern, voiced by what Singer calls the “fair-
share” theorists.  They would say that since you have done your fair share in rescuing one 
child, you have no further obligation to do anything.  In response to these fair-share 
theorists, Singer continues in his example: 
So you rush into the water, grab a child, and place him safely away from the 
water.  You look up, expecting that every other adult will have done the same, and 
all the children will therefore be safe, but to your dismay you see that while four 
other adults have each rescued a child, the other five just strolled on.  In the pond 
there are still five children, apparently about to drown.
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 Singer finds this fair-share view appalling, insofar as he says one cannot sit back 
and be satisfied that he performed his minimal moral duty (outlined in terms of ten 
possible rescuers and ten drowning children); just because the other people neglected to 
act does not mean that you can be somehow morally innocent if you stopped after one 
child.  Our moral obligation in this situation holds not only in the instance of saving one 
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child, but carries on to saving other children, regardless of the actions of other people.  
The fact that others neglected their moral obligations does not lessen our own, and in fact 
in this may increase the mandate of our individual obligation.  In the same way, just 
because other people may not contribute to poverty relief efforts, I cannot sit back and 
say that I therefore don’t have to do my fair share, or that I don’t have to try to make up 
for such “moral obligation deserters.” 
 Overall, Singer is able to deal with these four common objections to his argument 
as discussed above: (a) The claim that those with expendable income have earned it, and 
as a result they have a right to spend it as they see fit, (b) that the United States is by far 
the most generous nation already, and thus we have no obligation to give any more 
money to the poor, (c) that we only have a duty to those close to us, and can’t be 
expected (given human nature) to care about others who are far away from us, and finally 
(d) that it is not “fair” to require that a person contribute if others won’t do the same, or to 
demand that we do more than our “fair share” when others fair to do theirs. 
Three More Critiques of Singer’s Utilitarian Argument 
While I think Singer successfully defends his position against these possible 
objections, his argument still runs up against problems to which I don’t think he has an 
adequate answer.   
A Utilitarian Paradox 
The first problem has to do with how his argument plays out, regarding exactly 
how much each individual is morally bound to give.  Taking his basic argument seriously 
would have extremely significant effects on our daily lives.  Thinking back to the 
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information Singer provides about how much expendable income Americans of all 
classes have, his argument dictates that we must donate that extra income to poverty 
relief efforts.  Even after mailing off a small donation to an aid agency, one cannot go out 
to dinner or open a celebratory bottle of champagne, as the money spent on those luxuries 
could have also been sent to help those in need.  Strictly speaking, on the terms of the 
argument, “You must keep cutting back on unnecessary spending, and donating what you 
save, until you have reduced yourself to the point where if you give any more, you will 
be sacrificing something nearly as important as a child’s life – like giving so much that 
you can no longer afford to give your children an adequate education.”35  Since taking in 
a movie or having a glass of champagne is not as important as saving a child’s life, it 
must be done without, and the savings contributed to aid the poor. 
 The implications of Singer’s argument in practical terms mean that we need to 
drastically reduce our consumption and spending to a minimal level, to a point that 
leaves us just barely better off than those to whom we would be donating.  In addition, 
we need to set aside any feelings of partiality towards our family, friends, or compatriots.  
Thus we would all need to be Zell Kravinsky (see note 32): give away all that you can 
(including your kidney) to poverty relief, keeping only the very minimum that you need 
for you and your family to survive.  This standard seems to require a great deal, far more 
than the average individual Westerner can stomach.  Regardless of whether or not 
individuals can afford to do this, constructing a morality wherein this is the prescribed 
standard looks to be going too far. 
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Singer appears to be aware of such a problem; he acknowledges that the strict 
conclusion of his argument may not actually have the intended consequences.  Instead of 
people donating all they can, they will be turned off by such a stringent standard, and 
instead give little or nothing.
36
  It is here that he steps headlong into the paradox: he 
discards the strong version of his utilitarian argument for other utilitarian reasons.  
Rather than trying to convince people of his strong conclusion, he downplays it, and turns 
to his “fair-share” view.  On the first version of this update, he works to establish a 
minimum amount that each individual should donate (in relation to the U.N. Millennium 
Development Goals).  Thus if everyone gave at least this minimum amount of $200, we 
would generate the required amount to eradicate poverty.  Realizing that prescription 
based on “fairness” neglects to take account of differences in income, Singer develops a 
sliding scale to apply to the “fair-share” view, wherein each person has to give a certain 
amount proportional to her income (and thus the richer one is, the more one donates). 
Notice however that Singer, in the discussion of the “ten drowning children” 
example above, explicitly argues against the fair-share view.  His original argument does 
not allow for a reliance on any minimum standard; we must keep giving until by giving 
we would actually be causing more harm than benefit.  I am not morally allowed to stop 
after saving one child just because other passersby will not wade in on behalf of the other 
nine drowning children.  I must keep going back into the pond until all the children have 
been saved. 
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 Singer’s position thus ends up being rather befuddling.  On the one hand he wants 
to justify his argument on strict utilitarian grounds, and the logical conclusion of this 
argument is clear: we have to keep giving money to the poor until by doing so we will be 
creating disutility for ourselves.   
But realizing that this argument may not actually increase utility in terms of 
generating donations, he deliberately incorporates a “fair-share” minimum standard, 
despite claiming that this “fair-share” view is unacceptable (because it means we only 
have to save a few of the drowning children).  In other words, Singer considers the 
possible consequences of people being turned off by the strong argument, and thus 
softens it in order to (hopefully) produce better consequences in terms of utility.  In 
making this move, his language even softens, from arguing about what our moral duties 
“are” to considerations of what we can morally “criticize.”  He says that in the interests 
of helping societal opinions on philanthropy move forward, “It may be best to refrain 
from criticizing those who achieve [only] the fair-share level.  In moving our society’s 
standards forward, we may have to progress one step at a time.”37 
  That is not to say that he abandons his strong argument and its conclusion.  He 
still holds that the argument is sound, and thus the conclusion that we must give all we 
can still holds true.  Yet he ends up paradoxically muzzling this strong utilitarian 
argument for the sake of greater overall utility. 
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The Fallacy of Philanthropic Logic 
The second and third critiques come from philosopher Paul Gomberg’s 2002 
paper “The Fallacy of Philanthropy,” and focus respectively on the general moral 
principle foundational to Singer’s argument, and on the causes of poverty. 38   
Concerning the former, Gomberg argues that Singer’s argument suffers from an 
inductive problem in terms of the “general moral principle” upon which it is based.  In 
his argument, Singer claims that based on scenarios such as rescuing a child drowning in 
a shallow pond, we can posit a general moral principle.  This principle establishes a duty 
to sacrifice a small amount personal utility if by doing so we will save another’s life (a 
great increase in utility).  Gomberg critiques this claim, pointing out that such a moral 
principle doesn’t exist in our society.  He argues that what he calls “philanthropic” logic 
proceeds as follows:  
A general moral principle is inferred from a particular imagined situation(s) 
where we agree about the right thing to do; then conclusions are drawn from that 
principle that imply a change in how we live.  Thus, it is argued, a new moral 
obligation is implicit in the morality we already accept.
39
 
 
In Singer’s case, this reasoning to a general principle begins with  rescuing a child from 
drowning in a shallow pond, and from this example he derives the general moral 
principle: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do 
it.” 
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Gomberg agrees that one of our ethical norms is a “duty to rescue” when 
immediate action can be effective without dire consequences to the rescuer.  Given this 
principle, we would find it ethically reprehensible for someone to walk by and not wade 
in to save the child.   What he disagrees with, however, is Singer’s inductive move to 
draw out a general moral principle, from which we can then deduce a moral obligation to 
“rescue” the global poor.  Singer thinks that if we accept that we must wade in and save 
the child, then we must also accept that our ethical norms and obligations are such that 
we must wade in and save the poor.  Gomberg disagrees, arguing that just because we 
have a duty to rescue in individual (and extreme) circumstances, it does not follow that 
we are always obligated to prevent anything bad from happening if it will only cost us a 
little in terms of effort.   
 Gomberg finds the inductive move illegitimate precisely because Singer’s general 
moral principle is consequentialist-utilitarian, whereas our “duty to rescue in extreme 
circumstances” is not.  Gomberg offers this illuminating example to make the force of the 
distinction clear: 
[A girl named] Libby has been so impressed with the discussion of Singer in her 
Ethics class that she has decided to sell her one valuable prized possession, a pair 
of boots made by a famous artisan, to a collector who will pay her $5,000 for 
them.  Having also read [Peter] Unger, Libby believes that, by the very most 
conservative estimates, the $5,000, given to UNICEF, will give twenty infants 
who would otherwise die the overwhelming probability of living to adulthood in 
good health and having productive lives.  Libby puts on the boots for a last time 
(it takes several minutes to put them on and take them off), and, carrying a spare 
pair of shoes over her shoulder, walks to the collector’s house to sell them.  But 
on the way she encounters a child in imminent danger of drowning in a shallow 
ornamental pond.  If Libby wades in to rescue her, the boots will be spoiled and 
valueless.   
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 The issue, as Gomberg points out, is that the consequentialist-utilitarian ethical 
norm that Singer draws out would dictate that Libby must let the child drown so as to not 
ruin the boots.  This seems reprehensible, according to Gomberg, because we have a 
general “duty to rescue” moral principle that is not consequentialist-utilitarian.  This 
moral principle would not allow Libby to let the child drown and defend herself by 
saying she was saving the boots in order to save twenty lives.  According to our moral 
community, she would be violating her duty to rescue those in need; she should wade in 
and save the child.  It seems then that Singer’s utilitarian-consequentialist argument 
dictates that Libby must let one child die, as the utility of saving one child is not as 
morally weighty as the utility of saving the boots, which will be sold to generate money 
that will save several children’s lives.  Gomberg says that it doesn’t just “seem” this way; 
in fact, Singer himself begrudgingly admits that Libby should let the child drown: 
“Singer (in correspondence) bites the consequentialist bullet and says that while we 
would shudder at the sort of person who would walk past the child, she does the right 
thing.”40   
 Thus his moral precept can dictate that a person should do something that we find 
absolutely grotesque: standing on the shore watching one child drown, all the while 
justifying this inaction because it will lead to twenty lives being saved.  Clearly there is a 
problem here, and that is Gomberg’s criticism: Singer is wrong to inductively derive a 
general principle that says we must provide aid to others (as long as we don’t sacrifice 
anything of comparable moral importance) from individual instances where we are 
morally bound to rescue strangers in need.  “Our current ethical culture requires rescue of 
                                                 
40
 Ibid., 45n20. 
38 
 
strangers in emergency.  It does not require relief of the poor.  We respond to the story of 
the endangered child because we feel bound by a relevant norm.  It is wrong to infer, as 
the philanthropists do, a general value or principle from this norm; it is wrong to infer 
that we must accept a norm requiring relief to the poor.”41   
The Causes of Poverty 
 The third critique of Singer’s argument (the second critique offered by Gomberg) 
is to claim that Singer’s argument makes the causes of global poverty irrelevant when 
ascribing a duty to all individuals.  When establishing a duty to aid the drowning child, it 
doesn’t matter how the child got there, or what will happen if we save him/her; we 
simply have a duty to do so.  Yet, according to Gomberg, that is a disanalogy when it 
comes to poverty.  The causes and consequences are extremely relevant to our obligations 
(and thus ethical norms).  Do we see that we caused the poverty?  Whose ‘fault’ is it?  
Will my acting philanthropically actually make a difference?  Knowing the answers to 
these questions will definitely affect where our philanthropic efforts, if any, would be 
concentrated.  As he puts it:  
Philanthropic logic asserts a duty to aid the world’s poor like our duty to rescue a 
child in danger of drowning, proceeding from the latter situation to a general 
principle and then applying that general principle to the problem of pervasive 
poverty and its effects.  It argues that alleged differences between the two cases 
are morally irrelevant and that the duties to aid are similar.  However, 
considerations of possible or probably long term consequences of aiding a 
particular person seem wildly irrelevant to our duty to rescue a child in danger of 
drowning while parallel speculations about the causes of poverty and the 
consequences of a particular response are relevant to the issue of whether and 
how to address poverty.
42
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 The causal issue comes into play here in two ways: one, we must be concerned 
with what consequences will be caused by our intervening philanthropically and trying to 
“save” the child drowning in poverty.  Along these lines, some like Garrett Hardin could 
respond to Singer’s argument by claiming that helping the global poor through 
philanthropy would in fact cause great harm to our society if everyone donated.  Hardin 
argues that if we imagine developed nations as “lifeboats” with limited capacity, 
providing aid to the poor (saving their lives by allowing the poor into our metaphorical 
lifeboats) would end up sinking the boats, and causing harm to all of us.  Hardin’s 
concern is in many ways Malthusian: if we use philanthropy to keep the poor alive, it will 
end up harming society as a whole.  On utilitarian terms, the potential for disaster 
outweighs the possible benefits to those who are saved.
 43
  Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, questions as to the causes of global poverty are paramount to any attempts to 
rectify the situation.  In the case of one child, we need not be so concerned with what 
caused him to end up in the pond, but in terms of the larger issue of global poverty, we 
are hard-pressed to come up with an effective solution unless we take some effort to 
examine the causes.     
 In this way, there is a disanalogy between the drowning child and the child living 
in poverty: “Speculations about the causes of poverty and consequences of alternative 
responses are relevant to whether we should aid the victims of absolute poverty, but in 
our ethical culture parallel speculations about how the child [drowning in the pond] came 
to be in need of rescue or of the consequences of rescue are irrelevant to whether we must 
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rescue.”44  Responding in the latter situation involves merely an adherence to a moral 
responsibility, regardless of causes or consequences.  The case of the former is different, 
according to Gomberg; we should be asking questions about the causes of the poverty, 
and the consequences of whether or not our philanthropic actions would actually help 
solve the problem of poverty.  He goes on to claim that philanthropic aid is actually 
counterproductive, and we would be better off seeking institutional reform.  At best, 
philanthropy merely deflects attention and concern away from the real causal issues in 
terms of poverty.  At worst, such aid can actually be counterproductive, unable to help 
people in developing nations rise out of poverty, and causing harm to the world as a 
whole.  Thus, says Gomberg, Singer’s argument suffers severely from a problem of 
disanalogy, and a lack of concern for the causes of poverty. 
Conclusion 
 In one sense, I find Singer’s argument very appealing, as its effectiveness lies in 
the simplicity of the diagnosis and treatment.  Since he is able to quantify what is needed 
to help those who are in poverty, and what it would cost each individual, there is a certain 
“common-sense intuition” to which he appeals.  Few would argue that they are unable to 
cough up a few meager dollars per day or week, especially in the face of such immense 
deprivations.  As Richard Miller states, “Singer’s argument remains a vital presence 
because he seemed to describe a route by which virtually all of us, including people 
appalled by utilitarianism, would be forced by reflection on our own convictions and a 
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plausible empirical hypothesis to embrace a radical moral imperative of global aid.”45  
Thus, it seems that having an obligation to aid the global poor is a good thing: the poor 
will benefit immensely through philanthropic aid, and it will only cost us very little (in 
terms of money and thus utility). 
 But, as I have argued above, Singer’s approach runs up against three specific 
critiques that I do not think he can overcome.  First, he ends up caught in a paradox, as he 
wants to offer a strict utilitarian argument that is in practice quite demanding, but ends up 
softening it with a practical minimum standard that will perhaps be accepted by more 
individuals, but leaves him arguing against his utilitarian argument for utilitarian reasons.  
Secondly, his argument to induce the duty to aid the poor does not logically follow from 
our generally accepted duty to rescue, as Gomberg points out.  This all leads into what I 
think is the insurmountable hurdle for Singer’s argument: efficacy, in relation to causes.  
There is a concern as to whether or not Singer’s focus on monetary/philanthropic aid will 
actually be effective.  It is entirely possible that we may be able to generate enough 
money to meet the demands of his argument (in terms of the U.N. Millennium 
Development Goals).  But will this money really end up solving the problem of global 
poverty?  Singer is neglecting a key aspect of the problem of poverty: its causes.  This is 
puzzling for a utilitarian, because utilitarianism as a moral theory is first and foremost 
concerned with what consequences a person’s actions will have.     
 While he clearly provides a practical approach to follow, such a focus on 
philanthropy doesn’t really shed any light on the causes of poverty around the world.  
Against this charge, Singer responds very briefly, saying only that while philanthropic aid 
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may deflect attention away from institutional concerns, he is “open minded” about other 
approaches to poverty that may work better.  And yet, he still feels his argument holds, 
and provides a very good/effective way to combat poverty.
46
   
 The fact that Singer is unable to sufficiently answer Gomberg’s critique about the 
causes of poverty is a huge problem for his argument; we need to be asking questions 
about causes.  An effective and morally compelling argument for aiding the global poor 
must have the issue of causality in mind if it is to offer a prescription for overcoming 
such causes.  As we shall see in the next chapter, this issue ends up being at the forefront 
of the approach advocated by Thomas Pogge. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THOMAS POGGE AND AN APPEAL TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
 As I argued in the last chapter, Peter Singer’s approach to poverty appears to run 
up against serious critiques to which he has no suitable answer.  Moreover, despite 
Singer’s persistence in putting forth his argument in the forty or so years since it first 
appeared, his appeal has not convinced as many people as he would have hoped to donate 
their surplus wealth to philanthropic organizations.  Many critics of Singer rightly point 
out (as I discussed in the last chapter) that the causes of poverty are extremely important 
when trying to decide who has any moral responsibility or duty to act.  Philosopher Jan 
Narveson, for instance, rejects Singer’s proposals for precisely this reason.  He argues 
that we would owe something (money) to the global poor if we were in any way causing 
their poverty; in other words, we would have a duty to pay reparations.  However, he 
claims, we are not in any way causing them to be poor: “Our distant sufferers aren’t so 
because we made them so.  It could have been, to be sure; it just happens not to be.”1  
Although he goes on to argue that it would be “nice” for individuals to contribute to 
poverty-relief efforts, we have no strict moral duty to do so, precisely because we in no 
way caused the impoverishment of these people.  We have not harmed anyone, and 
according to our ordinary moral standards, we don’t owe anything to people that we 
didn’t harm.
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 It is this issue that lies at the heart of philosopher Thomas Pogge’s approach to 
global poverty.  Pogge disagrees strongly with Narveson; we are directly harming the 
poor, he claims, and because of this demonstrable fact, we have a moral obligation to stop 
causing such harm.  Rather than a duty to act (by donating money, as Singer argued), 
Pogge claims that we have a duty to stop acting.  We must cease acting in ways that harm 
the poorest people of the world.  His argument works to not only detail the global 
structures that perpetuate such harms, but also to examine the role that individual affluent 
citizens play in supporting these structures. 
 In this chapter I will examine Pogge’s argument for the claim that we are in fact 
causing harm to the global poor, and as a result have a duty to refrain from continuing 
such harm.  First, given that Pogge’s argument draws explicitly upon a conception of 
human rights, I will provide a short sketch of the development of human rights from their 
origin in the “natural rights” of the Enlightenment to their modern-day solidification in 
the work of the United Nations.  Then I will detail Pogge’s argument that we are causing 
the harms of global poverty, and what that fact implies for individuals living in affluent 
societies.  Lastly, I will examine some criticisms of Pogge’s position, and argue that these 
objections cast serious doubt on Pogge’s argument.   
The Origins of “Human Rights” 
John Locke and Natural Rights 
The modern approach to human rights has its genesis in the Enlightenment 
concept of natural rights.  One of the most famous works articulating this position is John 
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Locke’s 17th century Second Treatise of Government.2  Locke argues that individuals are 
imbued with the natural rights of “perfect freedom” and “equality” in virtue of being 
products of divine creation.  These natural rights derive from the concept of the “law of 
nature,” which Locke argues “obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches 
all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought 
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions…for men being all the 
workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker.”3   
Thus Locke claims that individuals, as a result of being created by God, are 
possessors of the rights noted above, which are essentially rights of non-interference.  
Within the state of nature, each individual has (equally) the right of freedom in his 
personal life and property.  Our reason is a faculty by which we can apprehend the law of 
nature, which dictates that no one may interfere with the natural rights of another 
individual person.   
In the state of nature, if someone does violate another’s rights, the person harmed 
has a right to punish the offender.  When we move from this state towards forming a civil 
government, Locke argues, we voluntarily forfeit our rights of punishment, while keeping 
intact our natural rights of freedom and equality.  We still maintain a right to act as we 
see fit and be treated the same as other people, so long as we do not violate the rights of 
others.  These rights are considered inalienable; they apply to individuals specifically, 
and even when we form a government, we do not forfeit these specific rights. 
                                                 
2
 Note that Locke’s work is not necessarily the first appearance of such a position, but his work typifies the 
early social/moral reasoning based on the existence of natural rights. 
 
3
 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), 8. 
46 
 
Modern Appearance of Human Rights 
While the language of rights was discarded by utilitarians in the 19
th
 century, it 
was resurrected in the 20
th
 century as an attempt to convince people around the globe that 
there is some interpersonal standard that every individual can invoke in virtue of his 
humanity.  In the 20
th
 century, a concept of universal “rights” emerged that detached the 
idea of “natural” from rights, and replaced it with “human.”  Rather than being grounded 
in the natural law bestowed by God, “human” rights are based on the premise that each 
individual human being possesses them solely in virtue of being a member of the human 
community.   
 Human rights have come to play an important role in our moral discourse, insofar 
as they force individuals to reflect upon interactions with others, and the claims that we 
can make on our fellow human beings (and institutions).  According to the concept of 
human rights, there are certain things that individuals, qua human beings, require, and 
there are corresponding duties (placed somewhere, either on individuals or governments) 
to provide these things. 
 In his influential 1979 essay “The Nature and Value of Rights,” Joel Feinberg 
argues for the necessity of a conception of human rights to serve as a basis for individual 
human self-respect.  Feinberg asks the reader to imagine a fictional place called 
“Nowheresville,” a place where individuals exist but have no rights.  He points out that 
this place is problematic, because individuals have no standard by which they can make 
claims on other people.  In order for people to get their “due” (which he sees as a share of 
basic goods), they need to be able to make claims on other people in relation to these 
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“due” goods.  Without a conception of human rights, there is no standard by which we 
can generate such claims.  Rights, he states, are things that are “claimed, demanded, 
affirmed, insisted upon…they are especially sturdy objects to ‘stand upon.’”4  Thus 
Feinberg argues that human rights are an integral part of our nature: 
[Rights are] connected in a way with the customary rhetoric about what it is to be 
a human being.  Having rights enables us to ‘stand up like men’, to look others in 
the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone.  To think of 
oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but properly proud.
5
  
 
Thus Feinberg holds that rights are an aspect of being fully human, insofar as they are 
tools that we can use to assert our humanity to other people (or have asserted on our 
behalf).  Rights give us an avenue to equalize ourselves with others and make claims 
upon them. 
 A particularly important benchmark in establishing this modern conception of 
human rights is the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).  In 
the wake of the atrocities of World War II, the fledgling U.N. wanted to create some 
standard that could be used to prevent such horrors from recurring.  The result of this 
effort was the UDHR, which attempted to codify certain rights that all humans possess, 
and create some minimal standards of treatment for human beings throughout the world.   
 In developing this document, the politics of the time came into play.  Because of 
Cold War tensions between the West and the Communist countries, there was a division 
in the types of rights that were stressed as critical for inclusion in the UDHR.  The 
Western countries focused in on what are called “first-generation” or “negative” political 
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rights, based on individual liberties and the freedom/autonomy of the individual person.
6
  
The Communist countries pushed for what are referred to as “second-generation” or 
“positive” rights, economic rights that are “intended to provide individuals with 
protection against deprivation of the basic material necessities of life.”7  Given the 
background politics, these two types of rights (negative and positive, political and 
economic) were seen as distinct within the debate (and the UDHR document it produced). 
 As I have pointed out, the Lockean notion of rights was focused on the (negative) 
rights of non-interference.  During the development of the UDHR, there was a push for 
(positive) economic rights, which guaranteed specific goods to individuals, rather than 
simply guaranteeing political autonomy.  At the same time, the Western interpretation of 
the document gave precedence to the negative rights focused on liberty and political 
freedoms; economic rights were seen to be secondary.  This is not to say that they were 
ignored, but working to guarantee negative rights was considered primary by Western 
countries, and devoting resources to positive (economic) rights was secondary.  
Henry Shue and the Negative/Positive Rights Distinction 
 In his 1996 book Basic Rights Henry Shue argues that this negative/positive 
distinction is unfounded, and claims that both kinds of rights entail both negative and 
positive actions.
8
  Shue first points out the necessary link between rights that individuals 
have and duties that are incumbent upon outside individuals or institutions to fulfill.  
                                                 
6
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Shue claims that rights in and of themselves are not the final objects that individuals want 
to possess, but rather that individuals want the goods or substance of the right; a person 
does not enjoy a right to security in and of itself, rather he enjoys the ‘good’ of being 
secure by having a right to security.  Individuals do not want a right to clean water; they 
want the clean water itself.  Furthermore, the enjoyment of these goods needs to be 
socially guaranteed, meaning that others are bound to make arrangements so that I will be 
able to enjoy the substance of my right.  Take for example a right to security: having or 
asserting such a right entails that some outside entity, perhaps (and most likely) a 
government, needs to make certain arrangements so that I may enjoy the good of being 
secure as a result of my having a right to security.  Thus Shue makes the critical assertion 
that having a right “involves a rationally justified demand for social guarantees against 
standard threats [which] means, in effect, that the relevant other people have a duty to 
create, if they do not exist, or if they do, to preserve effective institutions for the 
enjoyment of what people have rights to enjoy.”9 
 Shue argues that “negative rights” and “positive rights” both entail positive and 
negative actions; hence, there are no purely positive or purely negative rights.  Negative 
rights appear to have a feature of non-interference, meaning that individuals simply have 
a duty to leave others alone.  Positive rights, on the other hand, involve some activity on 
the part of those with the duty, meaning that they must act to provide the good of a right 
(such as providing food to those with a right to subsistence).  Shue lays out this 
distinction as follows:  
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The basic idea behind the general suggestion that there are positive rights and 
negative rights seems to have been that one kind of rights (the positive ones) 
require other people to act positively – to ‘do something’ – whereas another kind 
of rights (the negative ones) require other people merely to refrain from acting in 
certain ways – to do nothing that violates the rights.10 
 
 However, this distinction between negative and positive rights breaks down when 
we consider the practical implications of respecting these rights.  While it is true that, by 
refraining from acting in a way that would interfere with someone’s liberty, we are 
respecting his right to security/non-interference, “It is impossible to protect anyone’s 
rights to physical security without taking, or making payments toward the taking of, a 
wide range of positive actions.”11  In order to actually fulfill our duty to protect 
someone’s right to security, we need to take positive actions, such as creating laws, hiring 
police forces, etc.  These are positive, active attempts to provide viable guarantees for the 
security of individuals within a society against reasonably foreseeable threats.  People, he 
claims, want to feel reasonably secure, and not just feel “the cold comfort of knowing 
that the occasional criminal is punished after someone’s security has already been 
violated.”12  No society (or the members thereof) operates solely under a bare right to 
non-interference.
13
   
 Thus a negative right of security necessarily involves positive action on the part 
of an outside source.  While the “core” of the right remains negative (as it prescribes a 
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sense of non-interference), this core says nothing about the social protections that must be 
actively (read: positively) instituted and upheld.  Conversely, in the case of a positive 
right like subsistence, we may not be required to actively provide food for the poor, but 
may instead have a negative duty to not interfere in their obtaining and consuming it:   
It is…quite clear that the honoring of subsistence rights may often in no way 
involve transferring commodities to people, but may instead involve preventing 
people’s being deprived of the commodities or the means to grow, make, or buy 
the commodities.  [But] preventing such deprivations will indeed require what can 
be called positive actions, especially protective and self-protective actions.
14
 
 
Shue argues that the supposed “hard and fast” distinction between negative and positive 
rights is at least blurred, if not altogether non-existent.  In order to fulfill a positive duty, 
one may have to refrain from acting, and in order to fulfill a negative duty, one may have 
to actually perform some action.  Shue’s argument is clearly accepted and utilized by 
Thomas Pogge, as he tries to connect the positive rights of the poor to the negative duties 
that he says individual affluent citizens have.
15
 
Thomas Pogge and our Negative Duties 
 In my discussion of his utilitarian argument, I pointed out that Peter Singer 
attempts to ground a duty for assisting/rescuing the global poor, based on a generally 
accepted moral principle that he derives from thinking about our moral response to 
strangers in emergencies.  While Singer’s argument does not invoke human rights, the 
duty that he defends can be seen as a positive duty; it requires an individual to actively do 
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something about global poverty.  Specifically, she needs to step in and give monetary aid 
to the poor.  As we have seen, however, Singer’s approach is beset with a multitude of 
philosophical problems (detailed in Chapter One).   
 But what about changing course and focusing on negative duties, rather than 
positive ones?  Instead of trying to convince people that they need to do something, what 
about convincing them that they need to stop doing something?  Such an attempt is made 
by Thomas Pogge in his 2002 book World Poverty and Human Rights.
16
  Pogge 
recognizes that a standard move when confronted with a picture like the one Singer paints 
is to quickly claim innocence.  If I don’t feel that I am causing the problems of global 
poverty, then I do not have to provide the solution, especially if it involves donating 
money.  (Narveson’s argument noted at the beginning of this chapter makes this point.)  
This escape route is readily available and utilized, says Pogge, because Singer’s 
arguments rest on mandating specific positive actions that individuals and governments 
must take, based solely on the needs of others.   
 Pogge argues for a different approach, one which works from the concept of 
negative duties.  Rather than claiming that individuals have a positive duty to act (by 
giving aid), he argues that we in fact have a negative duty to refrain from acting.  
Focusing specifically on the causes of global poverty, he argues that Western nations are 
actively promoting a global economic and political order that directly contributes to the 
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impoverishment of billions of people around the globe.  Given this fact, he says we must 
stop imposing these policies.  This negative duty falls not only on the shoulders of 
Western leaders and policy-makers, but also on individual citizens of those countries.    
An Institutional Framework for Human Rights 
 Pogge begins his argument by establishing just how horrific the realities of global 
poverty are.  In addition to the image cited in the introduction to this dissertation, Pogge 
offers three more disquieting figures: 
In 2000 the bottom half of the world’s population owned 1.1% of all global 
wealth, while the top 10% of the population owned 85.1%.
17
 
 
In terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), there are 1.2 million people living in 
absolute poverty, most of whom are living on about $338 (U.S. dollars) per 
year.
18
 
 
If the number of deaths as a result of poverty-related causes was shared 
proportionally amongst all countries (by population), severe poverty would kill 
16,500 Americans per week.  Each year, 15 times as many US citizens would die 
of poverty-related causes as were lost in the entire Vietnam War.
19
 
 
In the face of these grotesque realities, Pogge does not try to establish (as Singer did) a 
duty to provide monetary aid to these impoverished people.  Instead, he wants to take a 
step backwards and examine the causes of such realities.  Given these causes, he argues 
that we (individual Western citizens) do in fact have a duty, but it is not Singer’s 
utilitarian duty to donate money.     
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 Pogge begins his examination by arguing that the material deprivations that 
comprise the conditions of absolute poverty are in fact a violation of those individuals’ 
human rights.  By “human rights,” Pogge refers to what he sees as a basic facet of our 
shared human existence; rights are moral precepts that apply to us solely in virtue of our 
humanity.  More broadly, he states that “Human rights are…to govern how all of us 
together ought to design the basic rules of our common life.”20  Pogge offers six 
particular elements of human rights, which he claims are generally uncontroversial:  
First, human rights express ultimate moral concerns: agents have a moral duty to 
respect human rights, a duty that does not derive from a more general moral duty 
to comply with national or international laws…Second, human rights express 
weighty moral concerns, which normally override other normative considerations.  
Third, these moral concerns are focused on human beings, as all of them and they 
alone have human rights and the special moral status associated therewith.  
Fourth, with respect to these moral concerns, all human beings have equal status: 
They have exactly the same human rights, and the moral significance of these 
rights and of their fulfillment does not vary with whose human rights are at stake.  
Fifth, human rights express moral concerns whose validity is unrestricted, that is, 
they are conceived as binding on all human agents irrespective of their particular 
epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition, or philosophy.  Sixth, these moral 
concerns are broadly sharable, that is, capable of being understood and 
appreciated by persons from different epochs and cultures as well as by adherents 
of a variety of different religions, moral traditions, and philosophies.
21
 
 
 Pogge argues that human rights are recognized as being applicable to all human 
beings, and correlatively they establish binding duties upon certain other parties.  That is 
to say, rights are necessarily coupled with duties.  If one person has a human right to a 
certain good, then there is a responsibility placed upon some other party in regards to this 
right.  If I have a right to clean water, for example, then some other party has a duty 
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placed upon him, either to provide such water for me, or to refrain from acting in such a 
way as to interfere with my ability to obtain clean water (an important distinction to 
which I will return shortly).  As such, my human right is only fulfilled when I have 
secure access to the “good” upon which my right is focused, as Shue argues above.  
Merely having a moral or legally instantiated right to clean water means nothing if I am 
not able to actually obtain said clean water (the “good” of the right).   
 In the case of the global poor, Pogge argues that there is what he calls a “basic” 
human right to subsistence: a minimal level of food, clean water, and shelter to which all 
human beings are entitled.
22
  In human rights terms, then, if certain people’s poverty is in 
some way due to a violation of their basic human rights, it then follows that some party 
has a correlative duty.  But this brings up the question of exactly who or what has a duty, 
and what they must do or not do as a result. 
 To answer this question, Pogge draws a distinction between what he calls an 
“interactional” understanding of human rights and an “institutional” one.  The former 
understanding posits human rights as claims one individual makes upon another, without 
presupposing the existence of social institutions.  Thus any violation of a human right can 
be traced back to individual wrongdoers in individual personal interactions.  In some 
cases, this picture of human rights and duties appears to function reasonably well; 
individual instances of torture or abuse can be understood in terms of individual 
interactions.  Yet in terms of global poverty, such violations of basic rights don’t fit an 
interactional picture.  It is extremely difficult to point out one particular interaction 
between persons that can be considered to constitute the exact cause of the violation of a 
                                                 
22
 Here he is explicitly following the lead of the UDHR and its focus on “socioeconomic rights.” 
56 
 
poor person’s basic human rights. 23  Thus it appears that an interactional understanding 
leaves out a great deal of what we often describe as violations of basic human rights.  
 Because of these deficiencies Pogge endorses the second option: an “institutional” 
understanding of human rights.  This understanding takes into account the relational 
framework of our globalized world, and the coercive effects that governmental, 
economic, and social institutions can have on individual human beings.  In essence, the 
rules, umpires, and owners of the political and economic game have a direct hand in how 
well the rights of individual “players” (by this I mean human beings) are protected and 
promoted.  Pogge argues that “We should conceive human rights primarily as claims on 
coercive social institutions and secondarily as claims against those who uphold such 
institutions.  Such an institutional understanding contrasts with an interactional one, 
which presents human rights as placing the treatment of human beings under certain 
constraints that do not presuppose the existence of social institutions.”24   
Notice that this institutional understanding works on two (related) levels: on the 
one hand, social institutions are responsible for any violations of individuals’ human 
rights that may occur.  At the same time, those institutions operate through the actions of 
individual people who uphold, design, and carry out such institutions; the institutions 
don’t just spring out of the ground, so to speak, nor do they operate without the actions of 
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individual agents.  Thus these individuals also have duties to uphold human rights, and 
these duties run parallel to those of the institutions to which they are connected.  Pogge’s 
institutional understanding is well summed up by the following claim:     
I understand human rights…primarily as weighty moral claims on social 
institutions.  An institutional order is human-rights violating when it foreseeably 
gives rise to greater insecurity in access to the objects of human rights (physical 
integrity, freedom of movement, adequate nutrition, etc.) than would be 
reasonably avoidable through an alternative feasible institutional design.  Moral 
claims on social institutions are also, indirectly, moral claims against those who 
participate in designing and upholding these social institutions: Such agents, too, 
are violating human rights by imposing an institutional order under which access 
to the objects of human rights is foreseeably and avoidably insecure for some or 
all participants.
25
  
 
Negative and Positive Duties 
 Pogge thus establishes his understanding of human rights as institutional, meaning 
that duties are placed on institutions and the individuals who uphold them.  He then 
draws another important distinction: between positive and negative duties.  A positive 
duty means that, faced with a violation of a human right, one has to do something to stop 
or correct the violation.  Take for instance the example of clean water that I used above: 
in this example, a positive duty would involve having a moral obligation to actively do 
something in order to provide me with clean water (buying me bottled water, helping to 
dig a well, etc.).  On the other hand, a negative duty means that one only has to refrain 
from acting in such a way as to interfere with my ability to obtain the good of the right.  
Thus in the example, someone with only a negative duty regarding my water only has to 
refrain from acting (perhaps by not dumping pollutants into my water supply).   
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 With this negative/positive duties distinction in place, Pogge then makes a crucial 
move to focus not on positive duties, but rather on negative duties.  He first offers up a 
recapitulation of Singer’s utilitarian position:   
One might argue that the distinction between causing poverty and failing to 
reduce it has little or no moral importance.  Allowing hunger to kill people whom 
one could easily save, even mere foreigners, is morally on a par with killing them 
or at any rate little better.  At least this is true for economic institutions: What 
matters for the moral assessment of an economic order under which many are 
starving is whether there is a feasible institutional alternative under which such 
starvation would not occur.  It does not matter, or does not matter much, in what 
kind of causal relation the relevant economic order stands to the starvation in 
question.
26
 
 
But Pogge disagrees with this position (Singer’s), claiming instead that: 
I reject such heavily recipient-oriented approaches … The distinction between 
causing poverty and merely failing to reduce it is morally significant.  And I grant 
at least for argument’s sake that, notwithstanding the enormous complexity of 
modern economic interaction, such a distinction can be applied, at least roughly, 
to the global order.  My argument conceives, then both human rights and justice 
as involving solely negative duties: specific minimal constraints – more minimal 
in the case of human rights – on what harms persons may inflict upon others.27 
 
 This focus solely on negative duties taps into one of the central tenets of our 
common shared morality: that we are morally obligated not to violate the rights other 
human beings, regardless of whatever we may gain as a result.  Thus Pogge does not 
stand outside of our common morality, or challenge the way in which morality is 
generally conceived, but instead he draws from this basic moral precept a logical 
conclusion.  He says his view is “motivated by the belief that negative…moral duties are 
more stringent than positive ones.  For example, the duty not to assault people is more 
stringent than the duty to prevent such assaults by others.  And, having assaulted another, 
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the attacker has more reason to ensure that his victim’s injuries are treated than a 
bystander would.”28  Thus rather than having a duty to do anything, negative duties 
involve having a moral responsibility to refrain from acting in a way that interferes with a 
person’s human rights.   
 It should be noted that Pogge does not disavow the existence of positive duties 
altogether; rather, he sets this question aside and instead focuses only on negative duties.  
He argues that there currently is a pervasive assumption among human rights theorists 
that such human rights as a freedom from poverty must entail correlative positive duties: 
people must have to do something in order to help those in poverty.
29
  But most people in 
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 One such approach (although it diverges from a human rights paradigm) that advocates for positive 
action, and that has garnered significant attention over the last fifteen years or so, is the capabilities 
approach, developed and championed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.  The argument from 
capabilities theorists is that a person who lives in poverty is unable to meet her own needs, insofar as she is 
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Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen claims that any attempt to aid the global poor must focus on the 
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freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations.” (Development as 
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 Sen argues that such capabilities are developed or hindered in a variety of ways, not merely in 
virtue of a lack of income.  Merely expanding the Gross National Product of a country may do little to 
actually improve the day-to-day lives of its citizens.  Our human lives are affected by a myriad of factors, 
and a deficiency in such areas may not always be compensated for by an increase in wealth.  In practical 
terms, Sen argues that basic justice demands that we promote these capabilities of the poor, insofar as we 
must act to provide aid in ways that will allow a poor person to develop her abilities to flourish and lead a 
life according to her own conception of the good. 
 Furthering Sen’s philosophical argument in terms of practical considerations, Martha Nussbaum 
bolsters the capabilities position by advancing a specific list of human capabilities.  In her work Women 
and Human Development, Nussbaum claims that these capabilities comprise “a bare minimum of what 
respect for human dignity requires.” (Women and Human Development, 5.)  In order for human beings to 
lead a life that is in any way meaningful (from the standpoint of ‘humanity’), they need to be able to reach 
a certain threshold level in relation to specific aspects of their humanity, such as life, bodily health, bodily 
integrity, or control over one’s environment.  Without reaching the threshold of these capabilities, leading a 
meaningful life that can be called ‘human’ is practically impossible. 
 Thus both Sen and Nussbaum argue that the capabilities approach is therefore well-attuned to the 
diversity of human needs, and the ways in which different situations around the world affect poor people in 
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the U.S. and other affluent countries don’t feel that they have a positive duty to end 
severe global poverty.
30
  In fact, Pogge generally agrees with this view, or at least, for 
purposes of discussion, accepts it; he will not claim that we must actively do something 
to fulfill any positive duty to the global poor.   
 But this does not mean that we, the people of the developed West, are let entirely 
off the hook.  According to Pogge, our duties are strictly negative; we have a duty to 
refrain from violating the rights of other human beings.  If, for instance, we have an 
institutional order that promotes and practices torture, this clearly violates the human 
rights of those individuals who are tortured.  This institutional order is thus guilty of 
violating a negative duty—and those individuals who put in place or support this 
institutional order are equally culpable.  It is here that Pogge’s argument will hone in on 
the average person living in developed nations.  He sees all of us as supporting coercive 
global institutions that cause rights violations, and thus he sees us as directly implicated 
in causing these violations of our negative duties.        
How We are Harming the Poor 
 But even if one accepts Pogge’s institutional understanding of human rights, as 
well as the existence of negative duties, this may not mean that we have to do anything.  
                                                                                                                                                 
different ways.  Cf. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
Amartya Sen, “The Concept of Development,” in Global Ethics, eds. Thomas Pogge and Keith Horton (St. 
Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2008), 157-180, and also Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 
30
 See here PAU, 28, and WPHR, 10.  This can clearly be seen in the haste of the U.S. government to refuse 
to sign several international statements and protocols asserting duties upon affluent countries to provide aid 
to developing peoples, such as the “Rome Declaration” and the U.N.’s “International Covenant on Social, 
Economic, and Cultural Rights.”  Even when they do sign on, the U.S. government has been quick to issue 
“interpretive statements” claiming that such agreements do not give rise to any binding international 
obligations. 
61 
 
Can’t we just say that the human rights violations of global poverty are the fault of 
national institutions in those far-away countries?  We aren’t doing anything to violate our 
duties; we are just innocent bystanders.  We aren’t the ones causing such grotesque 
human rights abuses. 
 Pogge vehemently disagrees.  On his view, we are causing the human rights 
violations of the poor around the world.  As he puts it, “What I challenge is a common 
factual claim: that we are not harming the poor, that the developed countries and the 
global economic order they sustain are not substantial contributors to life-threatening 
poverty suffered by billions in the developing world.”31  Through the global institutional 
framework (political, economic, and social), we are violating our negative duties by 
inflicting direct harms upon the poorest people of the world.  Again, this isn’t merely a 
condemnation of our institutions and bureaucrats, but also an indictment of the average 
Western citizen who supports and benefits from these structures and institutions.   
 By arguing that we are causing such rights violations, Pogge is rejecting what he 
refers to as “explanatory nationalism,” the view that the causes of poverty in poor 
countries can be explained entirely with reference to national factors: corrupt 
governments, weak infrastructure, cultural deficiencies, etc.
32
  In effect, whatever 
problems nations (and their people) have are solely a result of their own actions, not the 
actions of other nations/peoples or the global economy.  
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 In rejecting explanatory nationalism, Pogge argues that in today’s global economy 
there is a great deal of interplay among different governmental and other institutions, 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and large multi-
national corporations.  These various entities combine and collude in a multitude of ways 
to set policies and goals that have a great effect on the lives of individual people around 
the world.  The policies and actions of a given institution can and do affect people around 
the globe.  Individual countries are not islands, wherein individual peoples’ lives are only 
affected and shaped by the actions of the government/institutions under which they live.   
 Pogge argues to the contrary: our global economic order causes harm to the poor 
in a variety of ways, both direct and indirect.  The direct harms come through the 
adoption of economic protectionist measures by developed nations such as the United 
States, while, at the same time, pressuring developing nations to refrain from adopting 
similar policies.  We insist on protecting prices and incomes within our own nation by 
maintaining high tariffs on imports, while leaning on developing nations to eradicate their 
own tariffs.
33
  This allows our domestic industrial producers to be shielded against 
international competition, and at the same time allows markets in developing countries to 
be flooded with the goods that we produce.  Domestic producers abroad can’t compete 
with such cheap imports, crippling their ability to stay afloat.  In addition, we also 
subsidize our agriculture, which allows our producers to be insulated from the 
international economic climate, while at the same time leaving developing nations’ 
farmers out in the cold to face plummeting market prices.  In general, says Pogge, his 
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complaint against these policies “is not that it opens markets too much, but that it opens 
our markets too little and thereby gains for us the benefits of free trade while withholding 
them from the global poor.”34  We push developing nations to leave their own markets 
open to any competition without having to put ourselves at an equal level (in terms of 
market risk and price fluctuations).  As such, these policies are causing a direct harm to 
those people living in poverty around the world.   
 Pogge goes further, arguing that we are also upholding an order that indirectly 
causes poverty, through the incentives it offers rulers of developing nations.  Here he 
points to two specific privileges that the world’s economic apparatus bestows upon the 
ruler of any country: a resource privilege, and a borrowing privilege.  The resource 
privilege allows any de facto ruler of a country the power to sell their country’s natural 
resources to other countries (or corporations).  Thus no matter how a ruler came into 
power, or how autocratic or oppressive his regime is, he is internationally recognized as 
having the authority to sell natural resources to the highest bidder.  Here Pogge says there 
is a clear disconnect between this standard and the ones to which we hold our own 
national economic order: It definitely matters within our nation how a person got his 
hands on the diamond necklace he is selling.  If he robbed or killed someone to get it, we 
don’t see him as having a valid claim of ownership over that property.  And yet, we allow 
ruling juntas and despots to sell off the spoils of their crimes, so to speak.  This is of clear 
benefit to Western nations, as we are able to purchase the natural resources we want.  
Given this privilege, there is a long line of people eager to get power, who will keep these 
supplies flowing for the right price.  As Pogge caustically remarks, we hungrily purchase 
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oil from despots in extremely poor countries, and then turn around and “lavish 
condescending pity” upon those people for not being able to govern themselves 
democratically.
35
   
 Similarly, the borrowing privilege allows those same de facto rulers to borrow 
money from the IMF/World Bank and from private lenders for their country to use.  
Moreover, once the money has been transferred, we hold the debt as binding upon the 
country itself, even if the ruler is thrown from power.  Thus a ruler can come to power 
through a coup and quickly borrow vast sums of money in the name of his country 
through the international financial markets; even if he ends up thrown from power soon 
after, our loan agencies hold the successor governments as responsible to pay back the 
debts racked up by their predecessor.
36
   
 As Pogge points out, these two privileges provide an incredible incentive for 
people to attempt coups and political takeovers in developing countries.  If the takeover is 
successful, the new rulers are granted the right to sell off resources and borrow money, 
which they can use to solidify their power and punish their enemies.  This indirectly 
creates a climate of perennial instability and violence in developing countries, which 
often leaves infrastructure, social welfare, and democracy utterly neglected.
37
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 Thus the international economic policies of the world, which are set up by the 
affluent countries, are doing three main things (either directly or indirectly) to the poor 
that are morally indefensible: 1. Impoverishing, because “Their exercise often 
dispossesses a country’s people who are excluded from political participation as well as 
from the benefits of their government’s borrowing or resource sales” 2. Oppressing, 
because “They often give illegitimate rulers access to the funds they need to keep 
themselves in power,” and 3. Disrupting, because “They provide strong incentives toward 
the undemocratic acquisition and exercise of political power, resulting in the kinds of 
coups and civil wars that are so common in countries with a large resource sector.”38   
 It should be noted that Pogge does not discount local factors in assessing the 
causes of global poverty.  He acknowledges that there is a significant interplay between 
national and international factors.  He utilizes an analogy with students and teaching to 
make this point: “There may be great variations in the performance of students in one 
class.  These must be due to student-specific factors.  Still, it does not follow that these 
‘local’ factors fully explain the performance of a class.  Teacher and classroom quality, 
teaching times, reading materials, libraries, and other ‘global’ factors may also play an 
important role.”39  Neither set of factors is “causally inert,” lying dormant while the other 
works to impoverish people; both are constantly at work, and this interaction ends up 
multiplying the negative effects of the other.  So “the question is not what are we doing to 
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the developing countries?  The crucial question is what are we and the rulers and elites of 
the developing countries together doing to their impoverished populations?”40 
 Thus Pogge argues that we are causally implicated in the impoverishment of 
millions of people around the globe, through both direct actions/policies and the 
upholding of an economic order wherein we perpetuate a climate of instability and harm.  
This is in clear violation of our negative duty not to violate the rights of others.  Hence, 
we must stop violating the rights of the poor: we must cease our protectionist policies, 
and revoke the resource and borrowing privileges in the international arena.  But how can 
we do this?  And more importantly for my purposes here, who has to do this?  As I 
mentioned above, it is not just officials and elites who have a negative moral duty to 
cease such policies; it also falls upon all of us individual citizens of developed nations.  
According to Pogge:  
For the hope that these countries will, from the inside, democratize themselves 
and abolish the worst poverty and oppression is entirely naïve as long as the 
institutional context of these countries continues to favor so strongly the 
emergence and endurance of brutal and corrupt elites.  The primary responsibility 
for this institutional context, for the prevailing global order, lies with the 
governments and citizens of the wealthy countries, because we maintain this 
order, with at least latent coercion, and because we, and only we, could relatively 
easily reform it.
41
 
 
The Individual Ramifications of our Negative Duties 
 Pogge notes that many individual citizens will want to respond by saying that they 
aren’t doing anything wrong, because they don’t hold positions of power in government 
or the economic community.  The average American person, they say, can’t be held 
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responsible.  Pogge acknowledges that this may be the case, if the human rights 
violations in question are individual cases that cannot reasonably be avoided through 
appropriate institutional protections.  But we are implicated when we are upholding 
institutions that repeatedly and systematically cause human rights abuses, as the current 
international economic order does.  It’s not that we have sporadic instances of people 
being tortured or murdered; the economic climate is such that we are continually 
impoverishing people and driving them further and further into abject poverty, making us 
complicit in the deaths of millions of people per year.   
 Simply put, we are responsible for the global order that our representatives 
perpetuate.  Pursuant to that responsibility, we have an overarching negative duty to 
make sure that such an order does not violate the human rights of others, and in fact, 
that’s exactly what we are allowing to happen.  Pogge points out that “These 
governments are elected by us, responsive to our interests and preferences, acting in our 
name and in ways that benefit us.  This buck stops with us.”42  Here he draws an analogy 
between the oversight and thoughtlessness of the average Westerner and the “blissful 
ignorance” of German citizens during the Nazi regime’s extermination of the Jews during 
World War II: the German citizens were morally implicated in the crimes of the Nazis, 
not because they actively participated (most did not), but because they did nothing to stop 
those crimes, or even to reflect on their moral responsibilities.  Just because those people 
did not take the time to consider what they should be doing to stop the atrocities carried 
out in their name, we do not absolve them of neglecting their moral duties.  In fact, Pogge 
says, their lack of thinking about their moral responsibilities only exhibits the depth of 
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their moral failing.  They failed in their negative moral duty not to violate others’ rights, 
and in the same way, so are we.  Despite the shock value of this analogy, Pogge assures 
us that:          
The point of this parallel is not…to liken our conduct to that of Nazi 
sympathizers.  The common point is thoughtlessness.  Poverty so extensive and 
severe as to cause 18 million deaths a year requires a reflective moral response 
from each and every one of us.  It requires that we morally situate ourselves in 
respect to it and choose how to act or fail to act in the face of it.
43
   
 
Faced with the abject poverty and misery into which our international economic 
institutions are continually forcing people, Pogge argues, we all must realize that we are 
violating our negative duty, and work to change this reality.  We should be altering the 
economic climate so that it is no longer one-sided in our favor.   
 It is no doubt true that this will mean that we will incur some costs as a result of 
this change, just as the end of slavery imposed costs and losses on slaveholders.  
However, the acceptance of these costs is not charity, but rather justifiable compensation 
for the harms inflicted on the poor.
44
  Up to this point, he argues, it has been “for the sake 
of trivial economic gains that national and global elites are keeping billions of human 
beings in life-threatening poverty with all its attendant evils such as hunger and 
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communicable diseases, child labor and prostitution, trafficking, and premature death.”45  
We will have to forfeit these minor economic gains, but that means we will cease causing 
such incredible harms in order to garner them.   
 On Pogge’s view, it is clear that we don’t have to be causing such rampant 
poverty in order to maintain our standard of living; we could continue to enjoy our 
standard of living even while ceasing to violate the rights of the poor.  Our subsidies, 
protectionist measures, and other policies he discusses are not standing between our 
society and immanent economic collapse: “Our countries can flourish quite well without 
depriving the global poor…We can honor our negative duties and still build the most 
splendid republic that lofty nationalists, communitarians, and patriots might ever 
desire.”46  Moreover, it is morally indefensible that we are currently opting for such 
dereliction of our duties in order to garner such minor economic gains.  We cannot hide 
behind our own subsistence rights in order to justify trampling all over the rights of 
others.   
 So what do we have to do in order to realize our negative moral duties?  For 
starters, Pogge argues that we must cease the aspects of the international economic order 
that are causing poverty: protectionist trade measures, agriculture subsidies, the resource 
privilege, and the borrowing privilege.  Without such policies in place, we will be 
removing some of the most clear-cut causes of poverty in developing nations.     
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 But Pogge realizes that the simple removal of these policies may prove 
insufficient to raise people up out of the clutches of poverty.  To supplement these 
changes, he advocates adopting an additional policy called the “Global Resources 
Dividend.”   The GRD has its genesis in the idea that the natural resources of the planet 
should not belong to whoever manages to find themselves as head of state in some 
particular country, but rather to all of humanity (at least in part).  As such, the GRD 
functions to share the benefits of these resources with all people, especially the poor.  He 
proposes to levy a tax on all natural resources sales.  This will end up being passed on to 
consumers in the form of slightly higher prices on the end goods (such as gasoline from 
crude oil sales).  The proceeds of the tax will then be rebated back to the poorest 
countries of the world (as their share in the world’s natural resources).47  Thus not only 
has the resource privilege been abandoned, but it has been replaced with a policy that 
provides a direct avenue for the poorest people of the world to share in the natural wealth 
of their countries.  The GRD functions as a way to repay our debt for the harms that we 
have done in the past by violating the rights of the poor.     
 Thus rather than arguing in favor of private philanthropy (á la Singer), Pogge opts 
for structural reforms to attack the causes of global poverty.  That is not to say that he lets 
individuals off of the hook: in order to enact these structural changes, individuals must 
lobby their government, support NGOs, protest unjust economic policies, raise 
awareness, encourage others to get involved, etc., in order to force those in power to stop 
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violating the rights of the poor.  He doesn’t explicitly rule out making monetary 
donations to groups that aid the poor, but he wants to focus on using that money for 
structural change rather than as a one-time gift.  He claims that there are three clear 
benefits to focusing on structural change over private charity: (1) the burdens are shared 
among all of those responsible, since we must forfeit some of the economic gains we 
garner from unjust policies, (2) the money spent can end up providing benefits to a great 
number of people, rather than just to the fortunate recipients of private charity, and (3) if 
effective structural change occurs, then we do not have to keep donating year after year, 
trying to help the poor stay afloat.
48
  If we are able to bring about such structural changes, 
we can finally stem the tide of global poverty, and begin to effectively eradicate it.  But 
to do so, individuals in affluent nations must realize their complicity in violating the 
rights of the poor, and work to make such changes become a reality. 
Problems with Pogge’s Argument 
 While I think Pogge’s argument takes some strides in overcoming the weaknesses 
of Singer’s position, his approach is still beset with a number of significant problems.  
Conceptually, Pogge’s argument relies heavily on a distinction between negative and 
positive duties; he claims that negative duties are more stringent, and thus they become 
primary in considering our moral duties towards the poor.  But it seems that Pogge’s 
desired ends cannot be achieved without positive actions on the part of those people with 
negative duties of non-interference (affluent Westerners).  He says we have a duty not to 
uphold an unjust order, but in order to fulfill this obligation we have to actively work to 
try to change it.  As such, this appears to be a positive duty that really says “you have to 
                                                 
48
 PAU, 55. 
72 
 
work to change structures of global economic order that you have caused,” rather than 
“don’t harm others through this order.” 
 One problem here has to do with the causal link between individual Western 
citizens and the institutions whose policies are responsible for harming the poor.  Even if 
we acknowledge that these institutions and their policies are actively causing harm, how 
exactly are we responsible for these actions?  It is clear that we are benefitting from these 
institutions and their economic policies (thus that these policies have beneficial effects 
for us), but it does not seem that our mere existence as Western consumers is enough to 
charge us with causing these harms.  Did we ask for the economic structures to be 
constructed in this way?  Or was that merely done by those who have the power to set up 
such institutions?  In fact, we may have voted against the leaders who instituted such 
policies.  The rules are no doubt set up to our benefit, but this in no way indicates a direct 
causal link back to us.   
 Faced with this objection, Pogge’s response is to connect us to these human rights 
violations not by way of causality, but by way of our benefitting.  Hearkening back to his 
institutional understanding of human rights, he argues that even if we are not in charge of 
the global economic institutions, we still bear some moral responsibility since we benefit 
from their decisions, and (at least in the case of governments) they are acting on our 
behalf.  He claims that “Because unjust features of the global institutional order 
advantage the affluent in many ways, we profit from injustice through most ordinary 
economic transactions: the rewards for our labor are higher, and many commodities we 
buy cheaper, than they would be under a global institutional order designed to avoid 
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foreseeable human rights deficits.”49  Again even if we are not the ones who caused the 
rules to be set up in such a way, we are still linked to these grave wrongs as beneficiaries, 
and therefore still have a moral responsibility.   
 But this move from causal agent to beneficiary is problematic.  His response to 
the issue of how exactly Western individuals cause poverty is to assert that, while we 
may not agree that we are causing it, we are morally bound to act because we benefit 
from the global economic order.  But is “benefitting” from some immoral economic 
policies really on a par with directly causing them?  
Even if we can answer this question in the affirmative, another question must then 
be answered: how much must we do in order to “stop benefitting” from the economic 
policies of our global institutions?  As Tim Hayward notes, Pogge does not want to make 
the broad claim that we must “stop benefitting,” as this seems to create an extremely 
harsh and unrealistic duty in practical terms: how can we actually remove ourselves from 
any possible benefits as a result of global economic policies, while at the same time 
continuing to live our lives in Western society?
50
  The “stop benefiting” demand places a 
relatively impossible burden on the average Western citizen.  Instead, Pogge argues that 
it is wrong to benefit from these policies without compensating those who are harmed in 
the process: “Uncompensated participation in the imposition of this order can then be 
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said to be harming those whose human rights remain unfulfilled by helping to impose 
upon them unjust social institutions that contribute to their predicament.”51  He wants us 
to see our obligation not as charity, but as “just compensation” for harms that we have 
either caused or from which we have benefitted.     
 But we still have to face the quantitative question: what must we do in order to 
provide for this “just compensation” required by our being beneficiaries of unjust 
policies?  Pogge’s general answer is that we must push to change these policies and to 
enact the Global Resources Dividend, which will compensate for the past harms of our 
violating the rights of the poor.  Here he is mandating that we must take some positive 
actions in order to fulfill our negative duty to do no harm to the poor.  These duties, 
however, become quite murky, particularly in terms of their stringency.  From an 
individual standpoint, certainly I can lobby my government to adopt the GRD or stop 
subsidies, boycott stores, only buy fair-trade products, protest, write letters, etc., but if the 
institutions do not change the policies in question, what am I to do?  Have I thus fulfilled 
my obligation not to harm the global poor?  I am still a beneficiary of the economic 
structures, even if I am outspoken in my opposition to them.  As Corinna Meith points 
out, my negative duty in this situation  appears to be in many ways much more 
challenging to follow than our more familiar negative duties—the negative duty to refrain 
from actively killing other people, for instance.  In the latter case, I am quite clear in what 
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my duty requires of me: I cannot physically assault other human beings.  But in terms of 
Pogge’s negative duties, it is not at all clear what suffices to fulfill my obligation.52 
 Pogge, however, does not seem to see this problem as a serious issue.  In 
responding to this critique, he claims that the practical sum of our obligation “can be 
calculated reasonably closely…To fulfill our negative duties, each affluent person need 
only to do enough to ensure that, if all other affluent persons followed suit, the global 
poor would be no worse off than the poor under a just global order would be.”53  Given 
assumptions about the involvement of individuals and the actions of our government, 
Pogge conservatively estimates that we are each responsible for at least one poverty-
related death.  Taking this into account, he claims it would cost the United States (and its 
citizens) about $100 million annually.   
 Pogge’s calculation here is, by his own admission, “complicated” and “messy”—
not at all, in my view, satisfactory.  I don’t think he has even remotely answered the 
question posed by Meith: how much (and what exactly) do we have to do in order to 
fulfill our negative duties?
54
 
 This brings us to a third problem for Pogge’s argument.  In an attempt to provide 
a somewhat systematized practical proposal that individuals can support to fulfill their 
negative duties, he puts forth the Global Resources Dividend.  Through the GRD, we are 
asked to pay higher prices for commodities, with the idea that it will end up back in the 
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hands of the poorest of the poor.  But while the GRD may provide some monetary relief 
from the crushing effects of poverty, will it really solve global poverty?  Isn’t this just 
another transfer of wealth, but through a different channel than the one proposed by 
Singer (institutional rather than individual)?  While Pogge may or may not be right to 
claim (as noted above) that such institutional donations trump Singer’s individual 
philanthropy in terms of efficacy and scope, he has not provided a sufficient argument as 
to why this will end conditions of poverty.  In essence, he changes some rules of the 
game, but while we may end up with providing some compensation to the poor who are 
being harmed by us, it is by no means clear that these changes will result in the cessation 
of global poverty.   
 Ending the resource and borrowing privileges may also provide some headway in 
the struggle against poverty, but will their disappearance allow poor countries and their 
people unfettered access to the tools necessary to build a better standard of living?  As 
Alan Patten argues, the claim that ending these privileges will sufficiently undercut the 
causes of poverty is mistaken.  While it is true that local/national factors in these 
countries (such as corrupt ruling elites) are in some ways supported by international rules 
and the economic framework, they won’t simply disappear because the international rules 
are changed.  Even if tyrannical, undemocratic rule disappears, as Patten points out, 
“even fairly democratic countries, operating under an international set of rules that have 
been shaped for their own advantage, can routinely fail to enact policies designed to help 
their poorest and most marginalized citizens.”55 
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 The fact of the matter is, even if we end our tariffs and subsidies, the resource and 
borrowing privileges, and institute GRD payments, the economic playing field will not 
suddenly be leveled out.  Pogge seems to think that truly “free trade” (which he endorses) 
will enable the people of developing nations to climb out of poverty.  But he neglects the 
possibility that the advantages enjoyed by affluent nations in terms of technological 
innovation, infrastructure, or the scale of economies give the global poor little or no 
chance of competing successfully in this free-trade marketplace—unless they keep their 
own wages disastrously low.  If they are unable to compete against large corporate 
Western producers, then even without the crippling resource and borrowing privileges, 
they will flounder.  Even in the absence of the national factors with which Patton is 
concerned, it is not at all apparent that developing nations will suddenly have their boats 
“rise up with the tide.”56 
Conclusion 
Overall, I do think that Pogge’s approach makes significant strides past Singer’s 
in the right direction.  I am sympathetic to his argument that implicates individual 
Western citizens in the active impoverishment of people around the globe.  At the same 
time, however, Pogge’s argument is beset with its own problems, stemming from 
grounding his approach in a conception of negative duties.  While he is rightly focused in 
on the question of causality, he does not sufficiently answer the critical questions of 
moral motivation for individuals: (1) how am I (as an individual) actively causing the 
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impoverishment of millions? (2) Even if I accept that I am causally implicated, how 
much must I do?  (3) If we in rich countries cease violating the rights of the poor, will 
this really end global poverty?  From the standpoint of moral motivation, the implications 
of these questions are tremendously problematic for Pogge’s argument.  Is it enough to 
say that I voted for the other candidate, protested the WTO summits, or sent money to 
Oxfam?  In the end, Pogge runs up against some critiques similar to those which struck 
such serious blows to Singer’s argument: how much must I give, and will it really end up 
bringing about the end of global poverty?  Without satisfactory answers to these 
questions—or a shift in framework—it is unlikely that individuals will be motivated to 
act to end global poverty.   
 Given these issues, I argue that Pogge’s human rights approach as it is currently 
constructed is unsatisfactory.  But before moving to my own proposal (one that addresses 
moral motivation, as well as the underlying causes of poverty), I want to examine an 
important response to the arguments of both Singer and Pogge that comes through the 
lens of a feminist ethic of care.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
VIRGINIA HELD AND AN ETHIC OF CARE 
 At the end of the last chapter, I pointed out that Thomas Pogge’s argument from 
negative rights runs up against several issues in terms of moral motivation.  From the 
standpoint of the individual, we are left with the question: “How am I actively violating 
the rights of the poor on the other side of the world (thereby causing their poverty)?”  
Despite what is otherwise a plausible argument about Western policies, Pogge cannot 
clear this hurdle if his interlocutor is unwilling to accept that she is personally violating 
the negative rights of the poor.  And even if she does accept that she is violating the 
rights of the poor, the details as to what she must do to fulfill her duty are unclear. 
 In this chapter, I want to examine an ethical approach to global poverty that 
distances itself from any reliance on human rights.  Rather than trying to convince people 
that the poor have human rights, that these rights are being violated by our actions, and 
thus that we are violating our negative duties, we must realize how connected and 
interrelated to the poor we are and recognize our responsibility to care for them in virtue 
of these relationships.  In establishing this position, Virginia Held argues that we should 
act because we are connected to the poor as fellow human beings, and members of the 
global economic community.  As a result of these relationships, we must actively care 
about and for their needs.   
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 Before establishing Held’s position, I will explain the development of the ethic of 
care as it has emerged through the work of Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings.  I will then 
detail Virginia Held’s further development of the ethic of care as it applies to the issue of 
global poverty.  While I am sympathetic to Held’s argument and its focus on our 
interrelatedness as human beings (especially our being connected to the poor), I will 
lastly offer some criticisms of her argument. 
The Development of an Ethic of Care 
 Originally, the ethic of care developed as a response to the ethic of rights, which 
was seen to be overly “masculine.”  “Classical” care ethicists argued that concepts such 
as rights and duties are associated with a masculine view of the world.  Relationships are 
seen as essentially symmetrical/equal; each individual has rights, and other individuals 
have duties based on those rights.  Both individuals are possessors of rights and duties, 
and thus the relationship is equally balanced.  The paradigmatic relationship on this 
worldview is two adults, freely interacting with each other.  In contrast, from the care 
standpoint, key relationships are asymmetrical; different people have different roles that 
they fulfill in relationships.  The paradigmatic relationship according to care ethicists is 
the parent/child relationship, wherein the two people are unequal, and have different 
needs.  As a result, care ethicists argue that our moral theory should not only take this 
natural asymmetry into account, but also make it central. 
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 The ethic of care can be traced back (in large part) to the empirical research of 
Carol Gilligan, as reported in her influential 1982 book In a Different Voice.
1
  In this 
work, Gilligan details how she tested the traditional understanding of how human beings 
psychologically conceptualize moral decisions.  This understanding postulates that 
humans situate themselves in relation to societal rules, and then work through moral 
issues by seeing what rules apply to the issue at hand.
2
  Based upon what rules would be 
broken or upheld as a result of a particular course of action, a person would make a 
decision.  Gilligan’s empirical research calls this traditional “universal” procedure into 
question by probing the moral decision-making process of individuals with regard to 
different moral dilemmas and situations.  She performed three separate studies: the 
“college student study,” focused on a group of college students’ responses to moral 
dilemmas and life choices while taking a course on morality, the “abortion decision 
study,” focused on women who were pregnant (in their first trimester) but considering the 
possibility of an abortion, and lastly the “rights and responsibilities study,” focused on a 
random sampling of individuals’ responses to hypothetic moral dilemmas (taken at nine 
different points throughout the individuals’ lives).  In her research, Gilligan found that 
two different and distinct “voices” emerged, primarily along gender lines: one 
(predominantly masculine) voiced concerns about rules and whether or not people were 
breaking them, while the other (predominantly feminine) voiced concerns about how a 
possible decision would affect others to whom the person was connected.  Those who 
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spoke in this latter voice way talked about their relationship to other people in the given 
situation, their past and future relationships, and measured themselves not with respect to 
rules, but rather with respect to standards of nurturing and care.  She points towards 
phrases such as “giving to,” “helping out,” “being kind,” and “not hurting” as occurring 
regularly in the responses she received; these clearly exhibit concern for the participants’ 
relationships, rather than whether or not their actions violated any traditional moral 
rules.
3
  Gilligan argues that, from an empirical standpoint, this new “voice” came most 
often from women, while men in her studies tended to respond in the more “traditional 
voice” of rules. 
 Another example Gilligan cites that corroborates this difference between male and 
female responses to morality comes from empirical research on playground studies with 
children, done by Janet Lever.
4
 This research found that boys focus their games around 
principles, which are never questioned nor broken.  Whenever a dispute arises, these rules 
are consulted to reach a course of action.  Each member of the group is treated equally in 
relation to these principles, but the rules are never compromised in favor of any member 
of the group.  Girls, on the other hand, are willing to break or alter principles of their 
games, as they consider how it will affect the participants, with whom they have a caring 
relationship.  Playing baseball, for instance, boys stick by a “three strikes and you’re out” 
rule, whereas girls were more likely to allow extra chances so that someone may hit the 
                                                 
3
 Cf. In A Different Voice, 158-159.  These were some of the most common phrases that Gilligan found, 
particularly in responses in the rights and responsibilities study. 
       
4
 Ibid., 9-10.  Gilligan also references similar (previous) studies performed by Jean Piaget and George 
Herbert Mead, who watched children play marbles.  Cf. Carol Gilligan, “Moral Orientation and Moral 
Development,” Women and Moral Theory, Eds. Eva Kittay and Diana Meyers (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1987), 21-22. 
83 
 
ball.  For girls, Gilligan argues, their perspectives on morality and moral claims are 
“arising from the experience of connection and conceived [of] as a problem of inclusion, 
rather than one of balancing claims.”5 
 Gilligan acknowledges that earlier studies from Freud, Piaget, and Kohlberg 
sometimes noted that women’s responses to moral dilemmas often diverged from the 
usual masculine responses.  But rather than investigating this further, her predecessors 
saw this as evidence that women were somehow deficient in their moral thinking; they 
were a developmental failure (a conclusion of Freud) from the standpoint of morality, 
rather than exhibiting a unique or different aspect of their moral decision making.
6
     
 But why does this divergence exist?  Gilligan cites developmental theorist Nancy 
Chodorow’s argument that the early social environment impacts the development of boys 
and girls differently.
7
  Since women are largely responsible for early child care, a young 
girl experiences her development in terms of a great deal of contact with another female 
(her mother).  As Gilligan notes, this means that girls “experience themselves as like their 
mothers, thus fusing the experience of attachment with the process of identity 
formation.”8  As her mother is caring, so a girl develops herself to be caring as well.  In 
contrast, the male child seeking to develop himself as masculine, which entails a 
differentiation from the way in which his mother acts.  Thus girls use their mother as a 
positive role model (“be like her”) in terms of developing their identity, whereas boys use 
                                                 
5
 In A Different Voice, 160. 
  
6
 Ibid., 6-7. 
   
7
 Ibid., 7-9, and Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978). 
   
8
 Gilligan, In A Different Voice, 8. 
84 
 
their mother as a negative role model (“be different from her”) in their identity 
development.  The result is that the moral “voice” that men and women use in making 
moral decisions differs between one that focuses on rules and principles, and one that is 
inflected with concerns of care and attachment.   
 Situating this newfound conception of morality in relation to rights, Gilligan 
claims that the central feature of rights is an abstraction from concrete others by relying 
on impersonal principles.  According to a rights perspective, we can do what we want to 
do, just as long as we do not violate the rights of others.  Gilligan disagrees with the 
primacy of such principles; instead of our moral standing always (and only) being 
accounted for in relation to impartial standards, she argues that we should also be seen as 
individuals within the context of relationships, and we should have a responsibility to 
others based on these relationships.  Gilligan’s use of the term “responsibility” as 
opposed to “care” is important here.  She wants to distinguish our moral imperatives 
under an ethic of care from those we have under and ethic of rights.  Under a rights 
perspective, we have obligations to other people only if their rights are violated.  Under a 
care perspective, we must respond to the needs of other people (thus we have a 
responsibility to them).  For Gilligan, the concept of responsibility involves activities that 
focus on the needs of other people, rather than focusing on abstract principles.   
 Thus she distinguishes an ethic of rights from an ethic of care: “While the ethic of 
rights is a manifestation of equal respect, balancing claims of other and self, the ethic of 
responsibility rests on an understanding that gives rise to compassion and care.”9  Rather 
than being ultimately concerned with treating everyone fairly, an ethic of responsibility is 
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ultimately concerned with making sure that unmet care needs are minimized.  Gilligan 
argues in favor of a balanced approach, taking into account both the rights and care 
perspectives.   We therefore should respond to others’ needs for care primarily because 
we feel a sense of personal responsibility in virtue of a relationship, rather than always 
appealing to impersonal principles (although such appeals may sometimes be necessary). 
 Taking Gilligan’s empirical research into account, Nel Noddings tries to go 
further and generate a philosophical ethic of care in her work Caring: A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education.
10
  Noddings explores Gilligan’s findings from 
a more phenomenological standpoint, working to detail a process of moral decision-
making based in our feelings of care.  She argues for a full-fledged “ethic of care” as an 
alternative moral theory (as opposed to utilitarianism, deontology, etc.), and provides a 
philosophical justification for where care comes from, how we learn to care, and what 
care generates in terms of moral standards.  This ethic of care has as its paradigm the 
attachment and caring relationship between a mother and a child.  Much like Gilligan, 
Noddings argues that the Western masculine conception of “universal justice” has tended 
to treat individuals impersonally by implicitly regarding all relationships as in some way 
equal or symmetrical.
11
  Rather than people looking to the individual circumstances of a 
situation, an ethic of rights first dictates that we must look to principles of justice or 
rights in order to understand how these rules must be applied in our given situation.  Thus 
any individual or situation can fit within this framework of general principles in order to 
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make a moral judgment.  Noddings points out that in applying universal principles, we 
are forced to abstract away from concrete situations in order to see if the given situation 
fits into a pre-established category.  When this occurs, she argues that “We often lose the 
very qualities or factors that gave rise to the moral question in the situation.”12  Noddings 
agrees that there is something natural or shared that gives rise to our moral precepts, but 
it is not as impersonal as “universal justice”; rather, she argues that all individuals have a 
natural disposition to care for others.
13
 
 This “natural caring” is the basis for our ethics in relationships, but it is not in and 
of itself an ethical relationship.  Natural caring is merely the biological sentiment to care 
for one’s young; it is not care performed out of any sense of moral obligation.  In this 
way, we don’t yet have an imperative that we should care for other people to whom we 
are not biologically related.   
 To produce this imperative, Noddings posits what she calls “ethical caring,” 
which generates a feeling that one “must” care for another person.  She argues that this 
“must” stems from reflection, where “I have a picture of those moments in which I was 
cared for and in which I cared, and I may reach toward this memory and guide my 
conduct by it.”14  Through reflections on being in care situations (either caring or being 
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cared for), we are able to generate an ideal care relationship that is meant to serve as a 
sort of muse or direction for relating to the other that exists in front of us in a given 
situation.   
 This distinction between natural and ethical caring plays an important role in 
Noddings’ ethic of care as it generates the “must” imperative or obligation to respond and 
care for others.  It is important to note that this caring “must” is not the same as a sense of 
duty in rights or justice language.  Noddings gives the example of a mother and a child: if 
the child cries, the mother first “wants” to respond to the child (from a natural biological 
imperative), and out of this desire for natural caring she feels (in an ethical sense) that she 
“must.”  Thus in these terms “The ‘must’ is not a dutiful imperative but one that 
accompanies the ‘I want’…it is a ‘must’ born of desire.”15  When we are in a situation 
that necessitates a moral judgment, the particular individuals and circumstances come 
into play.  Rather than an ethic that generates universally applicable imperatives such as 
“don’t kill” or “abortion is wrong,” Noddings’ version of care ethics relies distinctly on 
the individual circumstances and situations with which one is presented.  It is true that 
moral theories of utilitarianism or human rights take into account individual 
circumstances.  But making a moral decision on those moral theories involves first 
looking to impersonal moral standards, and then determining how they apply to our 
individual situation.  According to Noddings’ conception of care ethics, this appeal to 
impersonal moral standards is inappropriate.  We should begin with individual 
circumstances, and our action should come as a reaction to such a situation.  For instance, 
when a mother hears her infant’s cry, she should not first look to what principles apply in 
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her situation, and then determine the appropriate course of action; instead, according to 
Noddings, she should just act in response to her circumstances (in this case her crying 
infant).  An ethic of care necessitates a response that takes into account the individuals 
within the relationship, and the situation within which the relationship exists.
16
  An ethic 
of care stems from a natural sense of caring, and develops to having a “must”-type of 
imperative that links up to wanting to care for others.  Thus Noddings argues that this 
imperative lies at the base of her alternative ethical theory of care.  This ethic of care is 
meant to supersede moralities of utilitarianism or human rights.       
 Before moving to Virginia Held and her application of an ethic of care to global 
poverty, it is important to review precisely how it is distinct from an ethic of 
utilitarianism or human rights.  Rather than a “top-down” approach, working from moral 
principles to individual circumstances, care ethics works to make moral decisions starting 
with the individual circumstances and relationships, and from there derives a moral 
imperative to act.  Singer’s utilitarian argument involves first appealing to (or deriving) a 
general moral principle, and then applying it to the case of global poverty.  Similarly, 
Pogge’s argument works by appealing to the universal standard of human rights 
(specifically in terms of our negative duties).    
 Instead of working from abstract principles of utilitarianism or human rights, care 
ethics starts from the standpoint of our relationships (many of which are unequal by 
nature).  Given these relationships and the needs of those to whom we are related, we 
develop a sense of moral responsibility to care for others.  Philosopher Carol Gould 
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offers a concise summary of the ethic of care, and how it contrasts with other moral 
theories:   
Care – an idea originally articulated on the basis of women’s experiences in the 
practice of mothering but clearly of more general application – encompasses a 
range of characteristic dispositions, such as concern for the other not out of duty, 
but out of empathy; attentiveness and sensitivity to the needs of others, and, more 
strongly, taking the others’ interests as equal to or more important than one’s 
own; attention to the growth of the other; and an orientation to the common 
interests of the family or of those who are close or related to one.  These feelings 
and dispositions are directed, at least initially, to particular others rather than 
universally, and so they tend to contrast with traditional notions of universal and 
impartial principles and obligations.
17
 
 
Virginia Held: Rights and Care 
 One contemporary approach that both invokes and updates the perspective of care 
comes from Virginia Held.  In her 2006 book The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, 
and Global, Held attempts to reconcile Gilligan’s and Noddings' formulations of an ethic 
of care with rights language, and to apply care to global issues such as poverty.
 18
  
According to Held, Gilligan sees “care” and “justice” as two separate lenses through 
which individuals view moral issues, and claims there is a place for each in our moral 
decision-making; while Noddings agrees with the existence of these two lenses, she 
instead wants to replace a justice-based morality with an ethic of care.  Rather than either 
of these two positions, Held develops care as an aspect of our moral life, a practice which 
must be exercised and cultivated prior to any conception of rights-based morality. 
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Care versus Rights 
 Held understands an ethic of care as centering on the caring needs of other people, 
rather than on developing ourselves as “caring individuals.”19  On Held’s view, care is 
seen to be separate from a disposition of individuals; it is not merely a virtue that the best 
kind of human being would exhibit.  Rather, care involves actively taking account of our 
relationships, and working to maintain these relationships by caring for other people.  As 
she puts it, “The focus will remain, for the caring person, on his or her relations rather 
than on his or her own dispositions, and on the practice of care.”20  This concern for 
relations rather than dispositions, she says, delineates care as a “practice” from care as a 
“virtue.”  Understood as a virtue of human beings, “caring” means that I am a “caring 
person” because I take care of the people in my personal sphere.  Held argues that this 
view of care is too focused on the individual and her moral character, rather than on the 
needs of other people to whom she is related.  Thus care as a practice means that I am 
“caring” because those to whom I am related have their care needs met.  The other people 
in this image are concrete others with specific needs that must be met in order for them to 
be considered “cared for.”  Care must be seen as a practice that develops over time, by 
means of the repeated instances of caring for other individuals with whom we have 
relationships.  The moral importance of caring does not spring out of our developing 
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ourselves as a “caring” person, but instead springs more out of our actually caring about 
people with whom we relate.  Held offers a succinct description of the ethic of care as she 
understands it: “The ethics of care…focuses on persons responding with sensitivity to the 
needs of particular others with whom they share interests.”21 
 In agreement with Gilligan and Noddings, Held points out that an ethic of care 
characteristically views persons as relational and interdependent.  Care is of primary 
moral importance to human beings precisely because of our nature as creatures who 
relate to and depend upon other people.  She argues that this is contrary to the view of 
human beings in the rights tradition, where humans are viewed as much more 
individualized, and our relationships as constructed around rules, rights, and duties.  Held 
takes John Rawls’ Kantian-influenced A Theory of Justice as emblematic of a 
justice/rights perspective: “It sees justice as the most important basis on which to judge 
the acceptability of political and social arrangements.  It insists on respecting persons 
through recognition of their rights and provides moral constraints within which 
individuals may pursue their interests.”22  The primary concern from a rights perspective 
is to provide a framework under which individual actions take place, rather than starting 
with the needs and circumstances of individual people.  As long as I do not violate the 
rights of another person, I am free to act as I see fit.   
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 While Held sees this conception of justice/rights as offering important 
benchmarks for the moral treatment of individuals, she claims that it neglects some 
critical aspects of the way in which we relate to other people.  She argues that “The ethics 
of care, in contrast [to justice/rights], conceptualizes persons as deeply affected by, and 
involved in, relations with others; to many care theorists persons are at least partly 
constituted by their social ties.”23  We are constantly involved in relationships where care 
is of primary importance in shaping the moral components of our actions.  In other 
words, we don’t just treat another person well because we are bound not to violate her 
rights, but rather because we care about her and our relationship to her.  In this way, Held 
points out that “Caring well…requires vastly more than simply treating [people] fairly 
and not violating their basic rights.”24  Take a relationship between a parent and a child, 
for example: simply respecting a negative right of non-interference does little in the way 
of effectively providing for the needs of the child.  In order to meet the child’s needs, the 
parent must recognize that a relationship exists between the two of them, and as a result 
actively care for the child. 
 Even apart from the example of parent/child, our interactions with other human 
beings often depend upon a lot more than bare respect for rights.  As Held mentions, it is 
likely that, “When in society individuals treat each other with only the respect that justice 
requires but no further considerations, the social fabric of trust and concern can be 
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missing or disappearing.”25  This is not to say that Held agrees completely with 
Noddings’ argument that we should replace justice/rights perspective with a care 
perspective; she acknowledges that in some relationships we can use rights as minimum 
standards in our relations with others to a solid degree of success.  In commercial 
relationships, for example, as long as we respect the rights of the other person in the 
transaction (such as not physically coercing them, or abiding by the terms of any legal 
agreement), we can be seen as appropriately fulfilling our moral obligations.  At the same 
time, there is only a minimal standard in place here; while this is acceptable in some 
relationships, it cannot be reconciled with our moral standards for many of our other 
relationships.  Our personal relationships often involve the amalgamation of our own 
interests with those of another person, and we often place trust in the relationship and our 
relations.  If our moral considerations only reach as far as not violating others’ rights in 
these relationships, we leave out these critical aspects of our lives.  As Held puts it, 
“Moral theories that assume only individuals pursuing their own interests within the 
constraints supplied by universal rules are ill-suited to deal with the realities and values 
of caring relations and of relational persons in a global context.”26  So rather than a 
justice/rights perspective that neglects the realities of our caring relations and 
dependencies, the ethic of care “focuses on attentiveness to context, trust, responding to 
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needs, and offers narrative nuance; it cultivates caring relations in both personal, 
political, and global contexts.”27 
 Held is concerned with meshing justice/rights and care together in such a way as 
to deal effectively with obligations that arise both because of duties, and because of our 
relationships.  She argues not only that care should be part of our moral decision-making 
process, but also that care as a practice is more primary to our relationships than is 
justice/rights; care is, she argues, a sort of “wider moral framework into which justice 
should be fitted.”28  A justice/rights conception of morality dictates a certain equal moral 
minimum that should not be violated.  In all of our relationships, there is no doubt a 
minimum standard of treatment (or respect for rights) that must be in place.  But as Held 
points out: “Empirically before there can be respect for rights there must be a sense of 
social connectedness with those others whose rights are recognized.”29  This social 
connectedness and recognition of others as being persons worthy of our respect and effort 
comes through the perspective of care.  In one sense, by establishing that we care about 
other people, we are therefore able to recognize that they are also human beings with 
rights, and that those rights must not be violated.  Note that this picture of care as a 
“wider moral framework” does not bracket care into an exclusively foundational role; 
because she has established care as a practice, Held argues that an ethic of care pushes us 
to go far beyond merely respecting the rights of other people. 
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 Thus Held claims that we must not only see obligations to others in terms of 
justice/rights, but also (and more importantly) in terms of seeing others as needing care 
and our moral obligations as stemming from our relationships.
30
 
Held’s Ethic of Care and Poverty 
 Turning directly to the issue of global poverty, Held first notes that “Few trends 
could be more obviously in conflict with the values of care than a trend toward increasing 
hunger.”31  Citing U.N. statistics showing that the number of hungry people in the 
developing world grew between 2000 and 2004, she argues that poor people are not 
having their needs met, and thus are not being appropriately cared for.  Taking into 
account her view of care as a practice, and her position that everyone must recognize the 
responsibilities that they have to care for others who are dependent and in need of care, 
she argues that an ethic of care “clearly implies that the members of wealthy societies 
must recognize their responsibilities to alleviate the hunger and gross deprivations in care 
afflicting so many members of poor ones.”32   
 Much like Singer and Pogge, Held is trying to argue for a moral obligation on the 
part of individuals in wealthy societies to provide aid to poor people around the world.  
But Held’s ethic of care approach focuses on individual differences and social 
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connectedness, rather than on utility or individuals’ rights or duties, and as a result she 
argues that her view is more appropriate.  As she puts it, “The ethics of care, with its 
attention to actual differences between persons and groups and its resistance to 
universalizing all into an abstraction of the ahistorical rational-individual-as-such, may be 
more suited to the realities of global differences.”33  She claims that focusing on caring 
relations allows individual circumstances to play an important role in the way that we 
respond to the poor and their situations.  A key feature of her argument is an emphasis on 
social connections: she claims that prior to any conception of rights, there must be an 
acceptance that the global poor fall under our net of caring relations, and thus we should 
care about their well-being.  Like Pogge, Held claims that we are connected to the poor in 
virtue of the global economic community, but she also argues that we are connected more 
importantly as fellow members of the human community.   
 In developing this sense of connection, Held approvingly cites Fiona Robinson’s 
work.  Robinson argues that an ethic of care is inherently a relational ethic that involves 
humans being concerned with “concrete” rather than “generalizable” others.  In terms of 
an approach to global poverty, Robinson claims that this is a distinct asset to the care 
ethics approach: “Because care forces us to think concretely about people’s real needs 
and to evaluate how those needs will be met, it introduces questions about what we value 
into the public, and ultimately the international, sphere.”34  Rather than thinking 
abstractly about other people on the other side of the world and how our actions are 
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violating our rights, care ethics forces us to look directly at the lack of care in the lives of 
those people. 
 Taking Robinson’s point into account, Held sets up a “net” of caring relations in 
terms of the recognition of group membership: “Before rights can be specified, respected, 
and upheld, persons must agree on who the members of the group are within which they 
are to be specified and respected and upheld…all must feel sufficiently connected to seek 
agreement among themselves and to be willing to respect each others’ rights.”35  Even 
before establishing others as holders of rights (and ourselves as holders of duties), Held 
points out that we must delineate what constitutes membership in our given social groups, 
and thus to what “others” we are connected.  Before we can respect the rights of others, 
we have to see that we are connected to those others through some shared group.  Held 
therefore asserts that “A relation of social connection, or a caring relation, is normatively 
prior and has priority over an acknowledgement of rights.”36   
 Held places a high priority on social connection; in particular, the connection she 
claims exists (or should exist) between the affluent and the poor of the globe.  
Empirically, she argues that it is no doubt possible for a caring person to develop and 
sustain a caring relationship with people not just in front of her, but also across the globe.  
Caring relations “can extend to fellow members of groups of various kinds, to fellow 
                                                 
35
 Held, 129. 
 
36
 Ibid., 125. 
 
98 
 
citizens, and beyond.  We can, for instance, develop caring relations for person who are 
suffering deprivation in distant parts of the globe.”37   
 Given that we are able to care for others around the globe, Held argues that we 
have a responsibility to care for the poor in developing countries, as their care needs are 
not being met: 
The ethics of care clearly implies that society must recognize its responsibilities to 
its children and other who are dependent, enabling the best possible bringing up 
and educating of its future generations, appropriate responses to its members in 
need of…care, and assistance with the care of dependents.38 
 
Thus we are connected to the global poor, and therefore we have responsibility to care for 
them and work to meet their needs.  While each individual in the West may not see 
himself as connected to every individual poor person in the developing world, we as 
individuals need to work to continually expand our connections of care. 
 Held states that her argument focusing on global poverty is not just an attempt to 
get people in Western countries to abstractly “care about” those people living in 
destitution; rather, she seeks to urge Westerners to acknowledge that they have a 
responsibility to see to the specific care needs and individual circumstances of the poor.  
This approach, Held says, is a strategy founded on “closeness rather than distance or 
remoteness, based on promoting interaction rather than following rules.”39  Robinson 
agrees with this goal, claiming that individuals must “approach moral problems by 
looking carefully at where, why, and how the structures of existing social and personal 
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relations have led to exclusion and marginalization, as well as at how attachments may 
have degenerated or broken down so as to cause suffering.”40  In practical terms, both 
Held and Robinson argue that entities with the means to effect change (governments, 
NGOs) must work with existing connections across borders and try to broaden their 
scope by establishing new connections with new peoples.  In this way, the more people 
that get involved, the more the “moral distance” between the First and Third worlds will 
shrink.  Thus, according to Held and Robinson, if we can better establish connections of 
care across global borders, it would go a long way in allowing individuals to find 
solutions that provide care for those who need it. 
 In terms of such practical solutions, Held argues that an approach to poverty 
generated by the ethic of care would center on organizing economic structures to actually 
meet the needs of everyone (the poor especially), rather than leaving them as they are 
currently: set up so as to provide a great deal of wealth for a few people, while at the 
same time creating and maintaining widespread poverty.  Thus she claims that the ethic 
of care would “make the meeting of genuine economic needs a high priority.”41  Some of 
Held’s possible solutions to the issue of global poverty are economic in character, and 
look similar to those prescribed by those who favor a human rights approach, such as 
Pogge.  She specifically argues for the cessation of national farm subsidies and better 
national welfare programs, as such initiatives will promote a kind of economic 
development that allows for the needs of everyone (including those people in poor 
countries) to be met.   
                                                 
40
 Robinson, 46. 
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 Held, 65. 
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 But given how her ethic of care works in being attuned to circumstances and 
individual care relations, many of her prescriptive claims differ from those offered by 
Pogge or Singer.  For example, she argues that we must work to transform the 
overarching cultural constructs that drive the priorities of nations and world leaders; in 
particular, she singles out the “cultural construct of masculinity” and its effects on the 
behavior of states.  She defines this construct as follows: “Among its influences are the 
overemphasis on the part of states on military security and economic preeminence, and 
the neglect of other aspects of security such as environmental and ecological concerns, 
the moral acceptability of policies to those affected, and the cultivating and maintaining 
of cooperative relations with others.”42  She argues that by focusing the work of 
nongovernmental organizations and international agencies on developing ties of care 
between actual persons, there is a much better chance of decreasing the exploitation and 
domination of this culture. 
 Held’s approach also has another beneficial aspect, stemming from her argument 
for the priority of care over rights: establishing and fostering caring relations between 
peoples lessens the likelihood that people will violate the rights of others.  In our current 
world, the rights violations upon which Pogge focuses his concerns come about, 
according to Held, because people do not care enough about the other human beings who 
are being harmed by their actions.  But, as she argues, “In a world in which the multiple 
ties of care would have been expanded to encompass the whole human community, 
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 Ibid., 161.  Held acknowledges that calling this a “culture of masculinity” certainly alludes to the 
attitudes of men, but argues that such a culture is not merely propagated by men; it is a construct that is 
utilized by all in power, focused on solidifying their power, rather than caring for those over whom they 
have power. 
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poverty and exclusion really would be on the wane rather than, as at present, increasing… 
(Thus) caring relations might make appeals to human rights less important.”43  In other 
words, if everyone actually cares for the global poor and responds to their situation, we 
might not need to rely on (or resort to) trying to convince people to act because others 
have had their rights violated. 
 In summing up her position, Held argues that an ethic of care approach not only 
achieves the goals of a rights-based approach, but goes beyond to meet the diversity of 
needs of all people around the world:   
More attenuated but still evident caring relations between more distant people 
enable them to trust each other enough to form social organizations and political 
entities and to accept each other as fellow citizens of states.  A globalization of 
caring relations would help enable people of different states and cultures to live in 
peace, to respect each others’ rights, to care together for their environments, and 
to improve the lives of their children.
44
  
 
Strengths and Shortcomings of the Care Ethics Approach 
 At this juncture, I want to mention three specific strengths of the care ethics 
position.  The first strength is the fact that Held’s argument is built upon an inherent 
sense of interdependence and social connectedness.  The concept of responsibility, for 
care ethicists, moves away from the strict emphasis on duties that an appeal to human 
rights invokes.  Instead, the concept of care is one that involves connecting directly with 
other individuals.  It proceeds from a standpoint of compassion and empathy towards 
others, and is thus deeply relational and interpersonal.  Care involves responding to the 
needs of specific others and caring for them.  Rather than being compelled by an 
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impersonal duty (even if we agree with the existence of such duty), we are responsible for 
responding out of an internal sense of caring for those with whom we have a relationship. 
 Much of the potency of a care ethics position comes from its taking account of the 
relationships that human beings have with one another.  In trying to establish an 
interpersonal standard for all human beings to live by, the human rights approach treats 
all individuals as equal at a basic level.  While on one hand this is attractive (in 
preventing baseline discrimination), it becomes problematic as it neglects the unique 
circumstances of the relationships within which all individuals are enmeshed.   
 This first strength leads into a second (closely related) one: the centrality of 
diverse human needs.  In focusing on our relationships, care ethics highlights that 
inherent inequalities are a shared fact of our humanity.  Individuals have different needs, 
which vary based on innumerable factors (especially the circumstances of the 
relationships in which we partake).  For instance, an infant has much different needs than 
an adult; our developmental stage can make a big difference in what needs we have.  This 
inherent diversity must play a role in the morality that we use to deal with these needs.
45
  
The approach to poverty that Held and Robinson argue for works directly from the 
diversity of human needs; our caring response will vary in individual situations, 
depending on the individual care needs of poor people. 
                                                 
45
 Joan Tronto points out that this facet of care ethics is particularly important in changing assumptions 
about human beings.  She argues that adopting a care perspective brings the issue of dependency to the 
forefront, particularly our levels of dependency on other human beings.  Similarly, Eva Kittay details how 
this inherent diversity and inequality of needs exists for human beings in terms of development, especially 
in the cases of people who are developmentally disabled.  Cf. Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), especially 161-177, and Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
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 The third major strength of care ethics is that it undercuts the Western conception 
of the “rugged individual” or the “self-made person.”  Many individuals (especially in the 
West) argue that although they may require care as a baby or in their old age, between 
these two time periods (i.e. during adulthood) they in fact do not need anyone to care for 
them; they can “take care of themselves.”  In this sense, they claim that they are self-
sufficient.  Extrapolating, they argue that if they as adults do not require others to care for 
them, then they need not care for others at this stage of life.  Attacking this claim, Held 
points out that adult individuals are not atomistic creatures that function independent of 
others around them.  Rather, we are dependent during childhood, and we remain 
“interdependent with others in thoroughly fundamental ways throughout our lives…that 
we can think and act as if we were independent depends on a network of social relations 
making it possible for us to do so.”46  Even as “rugged individuals” we cannot operate in 
a vacuum, and we must rely on those to whom we are socially connected throughout our 
lives, even at the pinnacle of our adulthood.  Care ethics asserts that we have 
relationships with others, and, given these relations, we have responsibilities to care for 
those to whom we are socially related.
47
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 Held, 13-14. 
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 Against this view of society as a collection of “rugged individuals,” Iris Marion Young argues that 
individuals are instead beholden to what she calls “relational autonomy.”  Taking a cue from care ethics, 
Young claims in her work Global Challenges that an adequate conception of autonomy “should promote 
the capacity of individuals to pursue their own ends in the context of relationships in which others may do 
the same.” (Global Challenges, 47.)  Her concept of relational autonomy provides a solid ground upon 
which the interconnectedness of individuals is made clear, as opposed to a concept of the “rugged 
individual” which has permeated Western discourse.  As Young points out, “contemporary 
discourse…continues to assume falsely that all or most persons are or ought to be independent in the sense 
that they can rely on their own sphere of activity to support them and need nothing from others.” (Ibid.) 
 In practical terms, Young endorses an approach to global poverty that is much akin to the negative 
rights argument that Pogge makes, although she argues for a responsibility to act, rather than a strict duty.  
According to her, we are represented through social/political/economic institutions, and since we are a part 
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 But Held’s argument from relationships runs up against two serious problems in 
terms of moral motivation.  The argument from an ethic of care has at its base our 
relationships, and from these relationships our moral motivations spring, as Robinson 
notes: “From the perspective of an ethics of care, it is our personal and social relations – 
our feelings of connection and responsibility – which motivate us to focus our attention 
and respond morally to the suffering of others.”48  But this brings to light the first 
problem: why is it that we necessarily have responsibilities to care for those to whom we 
are related?  Noddings attempted to ground this claim about caring for others in terms of 
our biological disposition to care for our young.  Since we naturally care for our young, 
we can derive an ethical imperative to care for other people to whom we relate.  This 
however does not necessarily overcome the is/ought fallacy: just because I am 
biologically disposed to care for my young, why must I care for others with whom I 
maintain personal relationships?  
 It is at least possible that Held could provide a sufficient ground for her claim that 
we have a moral responsibility to care for those people with whom we are in 
relationships.  But even if she is able to answer this first objection, there still exists a 
second (and more serious) problem with Held’s argument: even if I acknowledge that I 
am in social relations and have a responsibility to care for those people to whom I am 
related, it is another matter altogether to agree that I am related in a morally relevant 
                                                                                                                                                 
of these structures, we bear a responsibility for the actions of these institutions.  Thus because of our 
complicit participation in world structures that cause and exacerbate conditions of poverty, we all have a 
responsibility to act to cease such interference.  Young goes further than calling this simple “interference,” 
and claims that such structures in fact “dominate” the existence of the global poor, and it is this “non-
domination” that is the core of our responsibility to the global poor.  Iris Marion Young, Global Challenges 
(Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007). 
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 Robinson, 157. 
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sense to the global poor, who are often far away.  Thus even if I claim that I should care 
for those with whom I am in certain relationships, there is no extrapolated imperative to 
care for the global poor.  While I may grant care ethics the point that our responsibilities 
stem from our relationships to others, I still can argue against my having any real morally 
significant relationship to the global poor.  And if I am not connected to the poor in any 
morally relevant way, then Held’s claim that I have a responsibility thus has no force.  To 
put it differently: I may acknowledge that I have a responsibility to care for those with 
whom I have a social relation.  Thus I would recognize a responsibility to the global poor 
if I were socially related to them in some significant way; but since I am not as such 
related, I have no responsibility to them.  They are over there, and I am here, and thus the 
distance between us precludes any real relationship.  I may no doubt feel bad that a poor 
person’s care needs are not met, but why am I the one with a responsibility to care for 
them? 
 This problem seriously undercuts the motivational force of Held’s argument.  
Looking back over the other approaches, one can see that the issue of moral motivation is 
of great importance.  Peter Singer’s argument has blunt force because of the stark 
analogy he uses to generate our moral obligation: the poor are drowning, just like a child 
drowning in a shallow pond.  Since you would rescue the child, you should rescue the 
poor by writing a check.  Thomas Pogge’s argument connects individual Westerners 
directly to the realities of global poverty; since we are actively causing conditions of 
poverty (a violation of the rights of the poor), we have a moral duty to right the wrongs 
that we have been complicit in causing. 
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 But Held’s ethic of care argument has at its base the much more tenuous premise 
that asks people to accept responsibility not because they are causing poverty, but in 
virtue of our realization that those in poverty have unmet needs and lack care.  While I 
don’t disagree with such sentiments, they appear to have less weight in terms of moral 
motivation than the causal connection of Pogge.  It is much easier to talk ourselves out of 
taking on an additional responsibility than to wiggle out of a duty that we feel we already 
have incumbent upon us.  Plenty of people can (and perhaps do) argue that they have no 
such feelings of “connection and responsibility” with regards to the poor of the world.   
Conclusion 
 In the end, I argue that Held’s ethic of care argument runs aground, similar to the 
way that Pogge’s argument from human rights did.  We are left with the question: “Why 
should I care about people so far away from me, to whom I am not related?”  In addition, 
Held neglects to go into any significant level of detail in terms of what we must do as 
individuals.  She is clear in arguing that we all have a responsibility to meet the care 
needs of those to whom we are related, and that we are related to the global poor.  
Robinson goes a bit further in saying that we must support actions by governments and 
NGOs that will create and reify connections between peoples across borders.  But from 
here (much like Pogge), neither she nor Held gives sufficient practical details as to what 
we must do.  We again have unanswered questions: “How much do I have to do in order 
to make sure that poor people are cared for, and have their needs met?”  “Is it enough to 
donate to effective NGO’s, lobby my government, vote for officials who share my 
concerns, etc.?”  While I do not think that Held has a sufficient response to these 
107 
 
questions, she is certainly onto something in arguing that there is a “deeper reality of 
human interdependency,” much deeper than the self-reliant person thinks. 49  I agree with 
the importance and primacy of feelings of connection and responsibility, but in a different 
way (as I will discuss in the next chapter).  It is too easy for people to simply say that 
they don’t feel such connection, no matter if they “should.”   
 It is true that we are dependent and interdependent beings; we have a need for 
other human beings in our lives in a very particular and profound way.  This aspect of our 
humanity provides a solid cornerstone on which to construct an alternative ethical 
approach to global poverty, one that provides us with compelling moral motivations to 
respond to the impoverishment of people around the world.  As I will argue in Chapter 
Four, we will respond in part because we recognize a connection to those in poverty, but 
more so because we realize that within this relationship there is something at stake for us 
in acting to help those people in poverty (more than just meeting the needs of other 
people). 
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 Held, 43.  She goes on to claim that “the artificial abstraction of the model of the liberal individual is at 
best suitable for a restricted and limited part of human life, rather than for the whole of it.” 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A MARXIAN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO GLOBAL POVERTY 
PART ONE: SELF-DECEPTION AND SPECIES-BEING 
In the final two chapters, my goal (as the culmination of the dissertation) is to 
develop an alternative approach to global poverty.  This alternative is in large part 
derived from Karl Marx’s vision of a society of free associated producers who are 
developed as fully human beings.  I want to stress that I am not advocating Marx’s 
communist position in toto, nor am I claiming that the establishment of some version of 
communism would directly or succinctly lead to the eradication of global poverty.  My 
position is that Marx’s conception of human nature as species-being provides a new lens 
through which to approach the issue of poverty.  I argue that a new Marxian approach is 
necessary because of something that gets passed over or neglected in current approaches 
of utilitarianism, human rights, and care ethics: poverty not only harms the poor, it harms 
every human being.  Its existence forces us to live in a world in which we don’t really 
want to live.  As I will argue below, this world is in fact a non-human world.  Through 
Marx’s concept of species-being, we will be able to see just what a truly human world 
might look like, and to see that this world is much more than just a “world without 
poverty.”      
My argument for this alternative ethic is broken down into four major sections 
(spanning Chapters Four and Five):
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 The first section of Chapter Four revisits the problems of moral motivation that 
current approaches of utilitarianism, human rights, and care ethics face (which I analyzed 
in earlier chapters).  Each ethic fails to provide a philosophically defensible argument for 
a motivation for individuals to contribute to poverty-relief efforts. 
 The second section involves developing a moral perspective based on species-
being as an alternative approach.  The basis of this approach is not maximizing utility,  
preventing rights violations, or caring for others, but a vision of what a fully “human 
world” would look like, which should motivate us to work towards achieving this goal 
not only for the poor, but also for ourselves.  Thus in this section I lay out what species-
being means and how a moral perspective derived from this concept differs from our 
current ethical perspective, as well as how it pushes us towards Marx’s vision of a fully 
human world in terms of free human production.  This full vision provides not only a 
picture of a post-poverty world (and post-poverty relationships between human beings), 
but also a great deal of context by which we can discern the best route forward. 
 In order to provide this way forward towards a “fully human world,” I argue that 
we first need to investigate and understand the root causes of conditions of poverty 
around the world.  Beginning in Chapter Five, the third section provides a discussion of 
what has caused (and/or continues to cause) the impoverishment of millions of people: a 
focus on labor-saving technology in production, in the interests of being “efficient.”  As a 
result of the one-directional focus on cost efficiency, there is one key aspect being 
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universally denied (through various ways and means) to those who are impoverished: 
access to meaningful labor.
1
 
 Thus in order to provide meaningful labor to all people (especially the poor of the 
world), we must revisit the roles that labor-saving technology and efficiency play in the 
productive process.  To do so, I will incorporate the work of E.F. Schumacher and his 
vision of what he calls “appropriate” or “human” levels of technology, wherein the goal 
is not saving labor through the use of technology, but rather creating more labor (which 
he calls “good work”), thereby giving more human beings the opportunity to develop 
themselves meaningfully.  In conclusion, I will focus not only on global policy and 
macro-movement initiatives to alleviate poverty, but also on the moral imperatives for 
individual human beings when faced with specific instances of poverty. 
Current Problems of Motivation 
To begin with, I think it is important to consider how we as human beings respond 
to conditions of poverty.  No matter where we live, we are constantly faced with the 
reality that millions of human beings live in squalor around the world.  Everyone is 
familiar with the commercials on television, focusing on the face of an ill-fed, dirty child 
with a heart-wrenching look upon her face, dubbed over with a narrator explaining how 
my donation of a meager few dollars per week can save this child’s life.  This is in a 
sense the “macro” poverty problem with which we are faced: a realization that people 
across the globe are so destitute.  While we do end up acting in some situations (maybe 
by signing up to sponsor the child on television), many times, perhaps all too frequently, 
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 As will become clear later in Chapter Five, the key here is meaningful labor, rather than simply labor 
itself.  While a lack of meaningful labor for many of the poor means that they are unemployed, for others it 
means being employed or laboring in a way that is alienated or dehumanizing.   
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we do nothing at all.  We change the channel, or say that we’ll make sure to call to pledge 
next month when we have some extra money.  It seems then that there is a problem with 
our current ethical motivation in the face of poverty: despite a myriad of efforts, poverty 
persists around the globe.   
As I discussed in the earlier chapters, current approaches to poverty come mainly 
in the forms of (a) broadly utilitarian appeals like Peter Singer’s (it costs us so little to 
help, and the poor benefit so much), (b) some appeal to human rights like Thomas 
Pogge’s (we as a society are violating our duties to the poor, and this means each 
individual has a duty to change this situation), or (c) an appeal to an ethic of care like 
Virginia Held’s (the poor have unmet needs, and we have a responsibility to care about 
them as a result).  While I laid out many of the problems that these approaches face 
previously, let us revisit them in terms of the moral motivation that they provide.  It 
seems that each argument ends up with contradictory problems of motivation.     
 In the case of Singer’s argument, there is a double-sided problem: he appears to 
demand both too much and too little of us.  On the one hand, taking Singer’s argument to 
its logical conclusion means that we would have to keep giving money to the poor until 
by giving we would be making ourselves worse off than the poor would be.  This 
standard ends up demanding that an individual give up most of his money to poverty 
relief, something seen as too demanding.  A position that requires that I give and give and 
give until I am scarcely better off than the poor faces a great motivational difficulty.
2
   
                                                 
2
 As I discussed in Chapter One, Singer paradoxically softens his proposal in a way (in pushing people to at 
least give something), but he still holds fast to his simple utilitarian logic: we must give until by giving we 
create disutility.  He acknowledges those who give some, but similarly admits that they should be giving 
more if they can. 
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 However, the other side of the coin (the argument being that if everyone donated a 
part of the necessary sum, then each person’s donation would be much smaller) appears 
to perhaps be a bit underwhelming.  My modest donation of $200 certainly is not going to 
“solve” global poverty.  The argument that demands we cough up a small amount of 
money per week doesn’t provide a clear path to eradicating poverty.  It seems that I (and 
my small donation) are simply too little to make a difference, and the problem of poverty 
is too big.  Again, this seriously undercuts the motivation for acting to provide aid.  
Either Singer demands too much, so I don’t take his argument seriously, or his baseline 
target is startlingly small, and since my donation really doesn’t make enough of an 
impact, I don’t act.   
 Turning to the type of rights-based argument that Pogge makes, we again find 
moral motivation issues.  As Chapter Two details, Pogge frames poverty in terms of 
rights violations, and connects the corresponding duties to all individuals who benefit 
from the economic policies of the West.  In other words, individuals have a duty to 
change the policies that are directly resulting in the rights of the poor being violated.  
Much like Singer’s approach, there appear to be two key motivational issues that arise: 
On the one hand, individuals can argue that they are not in fact responsible for the 
policies that their country and world leaders put into place.  If I had no hand in electing 
these officials or pushing for these policies, an argument claiming that my moral 
motivation should stem from duties that are incumbent upon me seems unfounded; if I 
didn’t cause the resultant poverty, why do I have a duty to fix it?3 
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 Iris Marion Young points out the problematic nature of this question for what she calls a “liability model” 
of responsibility.  She astutely remarks that when faced with an argument like Pogge’s, “The actors 
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 On the other hand, even if I accept that I have such a duty, an even greater 
motivational problem seems to arise: what does such a duty imply in terms of individual 
action?  Pogge’s prescription that we all (as beneficiaries) have a duty to change our 
government and its policies is particularly diffuse.  What does it mean to say that I, as an 
individual, have a responsibility to change my government and its policies?  It seems 
very unclear as to what constitutes a fulfillment of this duty; whether I simply must vote 
in an election, or I have to take up a career lobbying directly for change.  In a similar vein 
to the issue with Singer’s approach above, the perception is that the problem of 
government is “too big,” and my little action involved with trying to change it is merely 
an ineffective drop in the bucket.  As such, our duty is too diffuse and unclear, weakening 
the motivation to act.
4
 
                                                                                                                                                 
addressed hear themselves being blamed for harms.  More often than not, agents who believe themselves to 
be targets of blame react defensively: they look for other agents to blame instead of themselves, or find 
excuses that mitigate their liability in cases where they admit that their actions do causally contribute to the 
harm.”  Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy 23 (2006): 
124. 
 
4
 This critique of moral motivation that I make against Pogge’s argument also holds up against Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as well.  It is true that the capabilities approach is distinct in some ways 
from Pogge’s human rights approach.  Pogge admits such a distinction exists between a “resourcist” 
approach like his (a human rights approach focused on providing certain “resources” for the poor) and a 
capabilities approach: the former believes what individuals need “should be defined as bundles of goods or 
resources needed by human beings in general, without reference to the natural diversity among them.  
These goods might include certain rights and liberties, powers and prerogatives, income and wealth, as well 
as access to education, health care, employment, and public goods.”  (Pogge, “Can the Capabilities 
Approach Be Justified?” 201.)  Adherents of the capabilities approach argue that the different abilities of an 
individual to use such basic goods to meet the goals of his life must be the starting point, rather than a list 
of basic goods that all humans need.  Thus there is a distinction, insofar as the capabilities approach is 
focusing on the inherent diversity of human beings and their conceptions of a good life.  (Given this 
distinction, Pogge goes on to argue that the capabilities approach can be philosophically justified, but that it 
is not superior to resourcist approaches, such as his or that of John Rawls.) 
 That being said, the impetus for moral motivation on the capabilities view is extensionally similar, 
if not identical, to that of human rights theorists such as Pogge.  They (Pogge and capabilities theorists) 
both argue that we must stop harming poor people, and do something(s) in order to help them climb out of 
poverty.  For Pogge, the “something” we must do is to stop violating our negative duties, and work to 
compensate for any ways in which we have benefitted from the active impoverishment of the poor.  
According to Nussbaum, we must provide aid in ways that are sensitive to a person being able to develop 
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 Held’s argument also suffers from problems in terms of generating sufficient 
moral motivation.  As I discussed in Chapter Three, her ethic of care approach has at its 
base the more tenuous premise that asks people to accept responsibility, not because they 
are causing poverty, but in virtue of our realization that those in poverty lack care, and 
thus have unmet needs.  The first hurdle for this argument is the possibility that a person 
may claim she has no feelings of connection to the global poor, and thus she has no 
responsibility to care as a result.  But even if one acknowledges such a responsibility, the 
second hurdle emerges: she is left with the same questions as the interlocutor to Pogge: 
“How much do I have to do in order to make sure that poor people are cared for, and have 
their needs met?”  Is it enough to donate to effective NGOs, lobby my government, vote 
for officials who share my concerns, etc.?  As a result, Held’s argument does not give a 
sufficient (and compelling) ground for a person’s moral motivation to act.    
 These problems that I have detailed are critical blows to the efficacy of their 
respective approaches, precisely because they undercut the motivation of potential actors 
                                                                                                                                                 
her capabilities and flourish.  Nussbaum argues, for example, “If basic justice requires that a person’s 
entitlements not be curtailed by arbitrary features, then justice is ubiquitously violated in the current world 
order, and the bare existence of the inequality (pushing many people beneath the capability threshold) is 
reason enough to do something about it.”  (Creating Capabilities, 115.)  Building upon this foundation in 
“basic justice,” she moves to claim (in a manner almost identical to Pogge) that we have either caused the 
poverty of millions around the globe (through colonialism, robbing those people of the ability to develop 
their capabilities), or that we are benefitting from the global economic rules being set up in our favor. 
 I argue that, at best, the capabilities approach starts by acknowledging that institutions are set up 
in ways that violate our duties to the poor, and then moves to a focus on how the inappropriate distribution 
of resources affects a person’s capability to achieve certain ends in her life.  At worst, it appears to assume 
that we are morally obligated to act to end poverty, and then, based on this assumption, develops a nuanced 
way as to ways in which we can fulfill this obligation.  I argue that this assumption is a serious shortcoming 
of the capabilities view; it does not sufficiently ground a moral motivation to act.  In many ways, 
Nussbaum’s argument mirrors the motivational claims of Pogge (and in such a way as to be subject to the 
same criticisms that I mentioned in Chapter Two and above), but it does so without giving enough of an 
argument as to why affluent individuals should be doing anything to contribute to poverty-relief efforts.  
See here Thomas Pogge, “Can the Capabilities Approach Be Justified?” Philosophical Topics 30 (2) 2002: 
201, and Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2011), 115-116. 
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whom Singer, Pogge, and Held are trying to persuade into helping fight global poverty.  
In the face of these concerns, I now want to turn to constructing and explaining a 
different approach to poverty, one which will overcome these pitfalls of moral 
motivation, but more importantly, will be grounded in an alternative conceptual 
framework from which to approach the problem of poverty. 
An Alternative Approach: Species-Being and Living in a “Human” World 
The central concept around which I am constructing my alternative approach is 
Karl Marx’s conception of human nature, which he phrases as “species-being.”  Before 
more fully elaborating species-being, let me provide a small disclaimer: I do not set out to 
critique a human rights approach along the lines of Marx’s critique of human rights that 
he puts forth in “On the Jewish Question.”  There he argues that ‘abstract’ rights only 
occur within the context of civil society, which he sees as a basic feature of a capitalist 
economic system.  In relation to the issue of Jewish rights, he states that mere political 
emancipation through granting Jews rights does not offer them real “human 
emancipation.”  Rather, these political rights simply entrench the egoism that is generated 
and sustained through a capitalist economic system.  So it is that he claims, “The so-
called rights of man as distinguished from the rights of the citizen are only the rights of 
the member of civil society, that is, of egoistic man, man separated from other men and 
from the community.”5  The natural rights of human beings (as they operate within civil 
society) focus on the individual in such a way, according to Marx, that they reinforce a 
concept of human beings as egoists.  For instance, a natural right to security, backed with 
                                                 
5
 Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” Selected Writings, Ed. Lawrence Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 
16 (Hereafter noted as SW; in addition I will indicate to which specific text of Marx’ I refer). 
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a civil right to such security, does not deal with atomistic egoism but rather reifies and 
guarantees that such egoism is protected.  Accordingly, Marx proclaims his diagnosis of 
the problem of rights as follows: 
Thus none of the so-called rights of men goes beyond the egoistic man, the man 
withdrawn into himself, his private interest and his private choice, and separated 
from the community as a member of civil society.  Far from viewing man here in 
his species-being, his species-life itself – society – rather appears to be an external 
framework for the individual, limiting his original independence.  The only bond 
between men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the maintenance of 
their property and egoistic persons.
6
 
 
 I think Marx makes a valid point here in terms of the entrenchment of a capitalist 
ethos in the rights that are offered.  It is true that “natural rights” are often posited as a 
“guarantee” of the individuality of human beings, and a way to respect a need for 
individual freedom.  In this sense, the concept of community (or species-being) is 
separated out at a fundamental level and replaced with egoistic concerns. I will return to 
species-being in more detail later.   
 I offer this quick discussion of Marx’s argument above to illustrate exactly upon 
what my argument does not center: My aim here is not to critique rights on these 
grounds, and chalk them up purely to capitalism’s hold over the ethical apparatus of our 
society and its approach to (for my purposes) global poverty.  While Marx’s comments 
here in “On the Jewish Question” hint at core aspects of this truly human ethic, they do 
not go much further.   
Speaking and Understanding a “Human Language” 
 Let us return to a point made above: there are noticeable problems with the way 
that we react when we are faced with instances of poverty around the world.  But poverty 
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doesn’t simply confront us from across the globe on our television screens; in fact, 
impoverished people often confront us directly.  Consider the beggars that we encounter 
on the street: living in Chicago, I am confronted on a daily basis with this reality.  Getting 
off the train, leaving the bank, or walking out of my apartment I cross paths with people 
who are asking for money, pleading for help and compassion from strangers passing by.  
In order to understand what happens in these interactions, I refer to an excerpt from 
Marx’s short piece “Free Human Production” where he argues that we do not speak what 
he calls a “human language”: 
Our objects in their relation to one another constitute the only intelligible 
language we use with one another.  We would not understand a human language, 
and it would remain without effect.  On the one hand, it would be felt and spoken 
as a plea, as begging, and as humiliation and hence uttered with shame and with a 
feeling of supplication; on the other hand, it would be heard and rejected as 
effrontery or madness.  We are so mutually alienated from human nature that the 
direct language of this nature is an injury to human dignity for us, while the 
alienated language of objective values appears as justified, self-confident, and 
self-accepted human dignity.
7
 
 
 The beggar, in expressing his need, experiences humiliation; the one he 
approaches recoils in distaste.  But this interaction, as Marx points out, involves a radical 
alienation from our species-being.  What we should be recognizing as an intrinsic aspect 
of humanity (our universal neediness), we reject as “effrontery or madness,” and our 
mask of individual self-reliance appears to be considered “self-accepted human dignity.”8  
We cannot utter our needs unmediated, nor can we expect a “human” response to our 
expression.  This alienated language directly affects the way in which we relate to the 
poor people we encounter.   
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 “Free Human Production,” SW, 52. 
 
8
 I will provide further elaboration on these concepts of need and self-reliance in the next section. 
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In response to these encounters with the realities of poverty, there is a clear 
human impulse that arises in us to help.  We have a genuine sense of sadness (perhaps 
anger) at the fact that people must live in such conditions, and it makes us want to help 
them somehow.  While we do end up acting in some situations (maybe by handing some 
change to the beggar), many times, all too frequently (I will argue), we do nothing at all.  
Rather than providing help to the person, or at least reflecting on their undeniable 
neediness, we almost instinctively seek some way to explain away or suppress our initial 
human impulse.  We conjure up several possible excuses for why our actions wouldn’t 
really help or would be inappropriate.  We tell ourselves whatever story seems to work: 
“She’ll just buy drugs,” “What good will some pennies do for her?” and so on.  Another 
common story: we tell ourselves that these people could pull themselves out of poverty if 
they really wanted to or tried, so we say “This person is lazy and should just get a job.”  
Thus in some sense we import Pogge’s idea of “explanatory nationalism” and convert it 
into a sort of “explanatory individualism”: whatever situation of poverty that these people 
are in is a result of their own doing, and the only reason they are not able to get out of it 
is because of their own laziness (or lack of action).   
It is worth noting that these stories may actually be true in some instances, but 
they certainly aren’t universal truths.  For instance, the “he’ll just buy drugs” story is an 
enormously convenient explanation that is undoubtedly true in some cases.  But it is also 
the case that the drug addict needs to eat.  Regardless, jumping from the mere possibility 
of their misusing our donation to a sense that this absolves us of any moral implications is 
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dubious.  Just because they might buy drugs does not mean that in every case we 
shouldn’t give them any kind of assistance.9 
What is so problematic in succumbing to these excuses is that we do so without 
any engagement with the individual in front of us.  We don’t stop, talk, or many times 
even look at the person that asks us for help; we merely hear his plea, conjure the excuse, 
and never break stride.  The reaction of concocting narrative excuses that occurs in these 
situations is extremely problematic, dehumanizing, and harmful not only to the poor 
person, but also to us.
10
   
Our quick rationalizing reaction to impoverished people that we encounter is a 
perfect example of what Jean-Paul Sartre refers to as “bad faith” or “self-deception.”  
Rather than critically examining our knee-jerk reactions to the poor people we encounter, 
we lie to ourselves in a particular (and peculiar) way.  This is not a standard sort of lie 
wherein, as Sartre points out, “the liar intends to deceive and he does not seek to hide this 
                                                 
9
 There is oftentimes (at least in some situations) a certain fear factor associated with these encounters; by 
stopping and taking out your wallet or purse you are opening yourself up to theft (or worse).  I certainly 
acknowledge these aspects, and would agree that such concerns should be taken into account. 
   
10
 The harm upon which I will focus is something psychological, a detriment to our humanity.  This type of 
harm is in contrast to the possibility of direct physical harm, such as the growth of terrorism which Noreena 
Hertz and John Perkins discuss.  In The Debt Threat, Hertz argues that the underhanded and destructive 
lending policies of the United States, IMF, and World Bank have created such hatred for the West within 
the developing world that it is directly leading to the rise of terrorism and anti-American sentiment.  Thus 
her claim is that such policies are harming us insofar as they sow the seeds of anger that manifest 
themselves through terrorist actions that claim American lives.  Similarly, Perkins in his Confessions of an 
Economic Hit Man argues that the companies involved in the infrastructure projects that such loans are 
focused around are swindling the indebted countries.  By inflating growth potential, “Economic Hit Men” 
convince countries to take on loans they cannot afford to pay back, resulting in the type of indebtedness 
that Hertz discusses, as well as great profits for the corporations.  The result is further poverty, misery, and 
hatred of the West among the poor.  While I agree with Hertz and Perkins in saying that poverty can and 
does feed terrorism and is thus harming us, my argument in this chapter is distinct.  The existence of 
poverty around the world does a distinct harm to each individual in terms of their humanity, rather than 
simply physically harming us as a group through terrorism.  For a full discussion of their respective 
arguments, see Noreena Hertz, The Debt Threat: How Debt is Destroying the Developing World and 
Threatening Us All (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), and John Perkins, Confessions of an Economic Hit 
Man (New York: Penguin Group, 2004).   
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intention from himself.”11  When we tell a standard lie, we are seeking to hide the truth 
from others, but not from ourselves.  But in the case of bad faith, while we may outright 
lie to others who question our motives or inaction, more often we are trying to hide 
something from ourselves which we know, or at least suspect, to be true.  According to 
Sartre “Bad faith…is indeed a lie to oneself.  To be sure, the one who practices bad faith 
is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth.”12  When we 
encounter a beggar on the street or a starving child on television, we (oftentimes) know 
that we can spare some change or make a donation, and yet our first reaction is one of 
self-deception/bad faith.  Our natural impulse is to help, but we quickly suppress it by 
convincing ourselves of any “pleasing untruth” that will work.   
I am not arguing that in every case we are able to spare any money.  Many times I 
in fact have no money on me when I encounter a beggar, or perhaps need the money I 
have for some necessity.  These are not instances of self-deception, provided that we 
engage in some reflection on the neediness of the poor person to whom we cannot aid.  
But the vague excuses you make to yourself as you walk past someone, while you have a 
few dollars in your pocket which you know you can spare, is self-deception.   
In his dystopian novel 1984, George Orwell introduces essentially the same 
concept with his phenomenon of “doublethink”: 
To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling 
carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled 
out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic 
against logic…to forget, whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back 
into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to 
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 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1977), 88. 
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forget it again, and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself – that 
was the ultimate subtlety: consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once 
again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed.
13
 
 
Even though we can provide some direct aid, we try to claim that there is no way our 
donation will help, or that it’s highly likely that this person will squander away the dollar, 
rather than buy food.  These are no doubt examples of the “carefully constructed lies” 
that Orwell mentions, which we end up in fact believing in the end.  Thus when faced 
with conditions of poverty, we all too often put our energy into creating excuses and 
affecting ourselves with “bad faith,” rather than offering aid to the poor person. 
 Why is it that we so rapidly look for such an excuse?  Why are we so apt to resort 
to self-deception or doublethink?  Generally speaking, we do so in order to protect 
ourselves.  Conditions of poverty (whether globally or in the form of the beggar on our 
doorstep) are jarring to our sense of the world, and attack our conception of ourselves as 
decent, moral human beings.  We are forced into a sort of phenomenological paradox: we 
recognize that “good people” help others in need and we see ourselves as good people, 
and yet, when faced with a poor person in need, we refuse to help.  In this respect, global 
poverty is doing something extremely harmful to us (and everyone); it rattles our sense of 
self and the world, and forces us to suppress our human instincts.  In order to protect 
ourselves from the cruel realities of poverty, we actively suppress our humanity and try to 
out-maneuver our human response, in the process causing harm to our being and offering 
no help to those in need. 
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Patterns of Self-Deception: The Rugged Individual and the Myth of Money 
Reflecting upon self-deception, such a result should give us pause.  Over time, as 
we are repeatedly faced with the appeals of beggars, we can see that we are in fact 
hardening ourselves to the poverty that exists near at hand and in the world at large.  We 
end up systematically denying our human impulses and the human connections that they 
signify.  One manifestation of this dehumanization of our ethical mindset that is deeply 
imbedded in our culture is the notion of the rugged individual.    
 One of the major reasons for a fundamental human impulse remaining without 
effect when approached by a beggar is a perception of human beings as independent, 
“self-reliant” creatures that should depend on no one else for their survival and existence.  
While I offered a critique of this view from the standpoint of care ethicists in Chapter 
Three, I want to refocus this critique here and frame it in terms of Marx.  Marx points out 
that within capitalism: “A being only regards himself as independent when he stands on 
his own feet, and he stands on his own feet only when he owes his existence to himself.  
A man who lives by the favor of another considers himself dependent.”14  We are 
inclined to see any acknowledgement of dependency on others as a grave weakness, 
something to be eradicated or overcome.  While we may admit that we have needs that 
must be satisfied, the implication is that we are (or at least should be) able to satisfy them 
through our own means; we have (or should have) an ability to obtain the 
objects/property that we require.   
More specifically, this independent person views human neediness as something 
to be minimized; the rugged individual is one who has few unmet needs because he has 
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the means to satisfy his needs.  He sees himself as “self-reliant,” able to meet his human 
needs solely through his own devices.  This is not to say that the self-reliant person tries 
to deny that he has any needs; he acknowledges that he has biological or psychological 
needs.  Admitting this fact does nothing to tarnish his independence.  What he does 
disavow, however, is an inherent state of neediness or dependence upon other people.  
This condition is held in such contempt by the rugged individual precisely because it 
refers to a lack of independence, an overarching reliance upon other people.  Such 
neediness is certainly anathema to the self-reliant person.   
Marx provides a splendid image to characterize the rugged individual in “On the 
Jewish Question,” where he notes that “Every man is equally viewed as a self-sufficient 
monad.”15  These self-reliant people view themselves as being independent entities, 
having no reason to rely upon others.  The image of monads brings to mind individuals as 
particles that do not interrelate or depend upon each other so much as collide or come 
into contact out of disinterested necessity. 
Of course, in contemporary society, no one can meet his own needs directly.  If 
this is the case, it would appear that the self-reliant person would have to admit that 
sometimes he must turn to the aid of other people.  But rather than admitting such 
dependence, he is able to call upon an ally, one which appears to allow him to retain his 
self-reliant status: money.    
 Money plays a critical role in promoting a sense of individualism and self-reliance 
that is divorced from needs and other human individuals.  Money is seen as emancipating 
us from dependency on other people.  Those individualists who see themselves as self-
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reliant do so through the lens of money, as an abundance of money allows them to 
exchange with others for objects that satisfy their needs.  Since one has money, he 
doesn’t “need anyone else,” per se.  In a most general sense, we do acknowledge that 
other people must exist in order for us to survive, but we see money as providing a 
sufficient distance between us and them; we don’t depend on these other people, nor do 
we give much thought to their humanity, needs, or the conditions under which they labor.  
Our sole concern is whether or not we are able to interact with them in a business 
capacity, exchanging money for a commodity to satisfy our needs.  It is the distance in 
this exchange that Marx speaks of when he discusses the fetishism of commodities: 
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social 
character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon 
the product of that labor; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of 
their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between 
themselves, but between the products of their labour.
16
  
 
Through the exchange of money for these fetishized commodities, we are removed from 
any direct relation with the other human beings who produce them.  Again, we only seem 
to acknowledge the other’s existence insofar as their labor is represented in the 
commodities that we purchase to meet our needs.  Money serves a purpose, not solely as 
an intermediary or go-between, but in fact as the placeholder for the other human 
individual.  Such substitution removes us from any true relation to the other human being 
involved in the production of the objects to satisfy my human needs.  What this 
substitution begets for us is the following situation: “The relations connecting the labour 
of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between 
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individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and 
social relations between things.”17   
It is this last phrase that echoes the beginning words in the earlier “human 
language” passage from “Free Human Production,” where our objects in their relation to 
one another constitute our relational language, rather than relations between free human 
beings/producers.  Money allows us to mask our reliance on other human beings behind a 
façade of individualism and self-reliance.  Thus Marx claims, “The need for money is 
therefore the true need produced by the modern economic system, and it is the only need 
which the latter produces.”18  Thus the rugged individual can view himself as perhaps 
equivalent to a frontiersman, able to secure his food, clothing, and shelter by his own 
unmediated efforts and labor.  Of course, he knows that he is, in a certain sense, 
dependent upon other people, but only insofar as he needs to purchase some goods or 
services from them.  In this admission he is not acknowledging that he’s dependent upon 
any particular other; rather, he spends his time engaged in a specialized form of labor, 
and thus does not have the time to produce everything that he needs.  As a result of his 
labor, he earns money, which he can exchange for the goods that he cannot produce 
himself.
19
  Since the money comes from the ‘sweat of his own brow’ as it were, he still 
claims that he is satisfying all of his needs through his labor (either directly or indirectly 
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through monetary exchange).  Money allows us to utilize it as a substitute for any 
recognition of a human need for others (or of any dependency upon them). 
My point here is not that we need to get rid of money; rather it’s that we must 
come to realize that the independence which money offers us is merely an illusion, 
sufficing only to reify an equally illusory sense of self-reliance and a lack of neediness.
20
  
The concept of speaking a “human language” helps us to understand the responses of 
self-deception that we have to poor people we encounter.  We are deceiving ourselves to 
be able to ignore the neediness of those that ask for our help, and reject their pleas as 
“effrontery or madness.”  Looking at the world through the lens of the dominant 
ideology, when approached by a beggar, we see his need and admittance of dependence 
as shameful and inappropriate, as Marx notes.  The self-deceiver asks himself: “If I am 
able to be independent and need no one’s help to meet my own needs, then why can’t this 
other person do the same?”  This ideology provides us with the narratives that we utilize 
in deceiving ourselves.  While we do so in an attempt to protect ourselves from the 
realities of poverty, we end up harming ourselves further by suppressing our human 
impulse to help.  Thus the existence of poverty causes harm not only to those who cannot 
meet their needs, but also to those who are forced to try to avert their eyes through bad 
faith.   
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A “Human Language” and a “Human World”   
Our current ideology, with its tendency to encourage self-deception, is clearly not 
the “human language” that Marx mentions; we are, as he says, “so mutually alienated 
from human nature” that we resort to a language that masks our neediness and replaces it 
with an assumed independence.  In contrast to the position of the self-reliant person, if we 
recognize that poverty harms all people, then we are stumbling upon a realization that 
there is in fact a certain connection between ourselves and the poor of the world.  Just as 
their humanity suffers by living in squalor, our humanity suffers a hardening of the heart, 
as we make excuses and deceive ourselves.  Self-deception appears to make life easier for 
us, but all it does is erode our humanity and cause further harm to the world.   
The power of this realization, based in Marx, is two-fold: On one level, we realize 
that poverty is in some way harming us through our responses of self-deception.  Thus 
acting to provide aid to the poor has at its core something beneficial for us, insofar as we 
will avoid the pitfalls of self-deception.  But in order to curtail the prevalence of the 
harms of self-deception, we have to, quite literally, change the world.  Here the second 
level of Marx’s vision comes to bear: it is clear that the world could be changed so that 
we would not have to respond to the poor by deceiving ourselves.  In other words, we 
realize that another kind of world is possible, one in which we would be able to speak the 
“human language” that Marx offers.21 
Thus rather than merely trying to prevent harm, we have a much more positive 
vision.  It is a vision of a different world, one in which people do not have to suffer the 
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 At this point, I am speaking of another possible world in terms of the material conditions of poverty.  As 
will become clear later, my argument is not only to claim that we can create a world without material 
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inhumanities of poverty or self-deception.  This provides a much stronger moral 
motivation to act to bring such a world into being: there are rewards for me, not just for 
those who are materially poor. 
But what would a truly “human language” look like?  In its simplest form, a truly 
human language would eliminate the alienation from which our current language suffers, 
and allow us to fully reconnect with our human nature.  With the creation of a world 
where we no longer have to engage in self-deception, we would be creating a world 
without poverty.  As such, we would be striving for a better world for everyone, the poor 
as well as ourselves.  In working to eliminate conditions of poverty for others, we are 
doing something beneficial to the entire species, which not only helps “them” but also 
“me,” and thus “us.”  Rather than following our current ethic’s focus on individualism 
and the dichotomy of rights and duties, I want to ground my alternative ethical approach 
in this more communal concept of our human nature as species-being.  Self-reliance and 
self-deception will end up being replaced by solidarity and freely-acknowledged 
neediness.   
The concept of a “human language” is inexorably linked to a more encompassing 
vision: a vision of a fully “human world.”  It is certainly not the case that simply altering 
our language to one that is fully human (in Marxian terms) will bring about the end of 
poverty.  My claim is that philosophical reflection on this idea of a “human language” 
allows us to imagine not only a fully human language, but also a different and fully 
“human” world.  Within this human world, human beings would be able to speak and 
understand a “human language.”  Thus the existence or establishment of a fully human 
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language necessarily points towards the existence or establishment of a fully human 
world. 
 I want to reiterate and make clear that I am not arguing that we must necessarily 
supersede capitalism in order for this fully human world to come to pass.  I leave open 
the question of whether or not this fully human world is possible under capitalism.  It is 
no doubt true that realizing this vision under capitalism would necessarily entail many 
substantive changes in our current ethos and economic structures (as I will argue later in 
Chapter Five), but I do not want to discount this possibility.
22
  Regardless of whether or 
not this vision of a fully human world is possible under capitalism, I argue that it is 
nevertheless morally compelling. 
So what would a fully human world look like?  It is certainly a vision of a world 
without poverty, but it is in fact much more.  It would not simply be a world in which no 
one has to live on less than $2 per day.  It would be a world in accordance with our 
nature, one where we do not have to harden ourselves against the reactions of this nature.  
Thus we could have a world wherein we don’t attempt to suppress our human instincts, 
but rather celebrate and develop our human nature. 
Vision of a Fully “Human World” 
So what kind of world does Marx, particularly in his early writings, enable us to 
imagine?  In the following sections I will discuss four major aspects of this fully human 
world. 
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Human Nature as Species-Being 
To begin with, a fully human world would be one in which all human beings have 
approximated their nature.  Marx’s term for our shared human nature is species-being.  
His conception of human nature is an Aristotelian or Platonic conception of human 
nature, where a being’s “nature” is its potential, its ideal form.  This ideal is a conception 
of the positive possibilities inherent in us.
23
   
What does Marx mean by “species-being”? 
Man is a species-being not only in that he practically and theoretically makes his 
own species as well as that of other things his object, but also – and this is only 
another expression for the same thing – in that as present and living species he 
considers himself to be a universal and consequently free being.
24
 
 
This conception of species-being is meant to distinguish us from other animal species.  
As human beings, we are able to conceive of ourselves as individual beings that can 
identify with and empathize with any other member of our species.  We can also think of 
our species as a whole, taking pride in “our” accomplishments and perhaps finding a 
sense of shame where we have failed.  Take for instance scientific accomplishments, such 
as landing a man on the moon, or perhaps the evolution of global struggles for political 
democracy, women’s rights, and against racism (although these are certainly not fully 
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achieved, and thus more problematic): when relating to these movements, we see them as 
accomplishments of humanity as a whole, and thus they elicit feelings of pride insofar as 
we feel that the species is bettering itself. 
 Another element of species-being which delineates us from animals involves our 
freedom and creativity in production.  Drawing on his Hegel-inflected historical 
materialism, Marx posits human beings as productive creatures that adapt consciously 
and creatively to changes in their environment: “The practical creation of an objective 
world, the treatment of inorganic nature, is proof that man is a conscious species-
being.”25  This is the basic “character” of our species: laboring to create objects to meet 
our human needs.   
Of course animals also build shelters and obtain food in order to survive, but there 
is an important distinction between humans and animals in terms of nature: while animals 
produce only because of immediate physical need, humans by nature produce in another 
way.  Instead of always producing for our immediate needs, Marx argues that we produce 
“universally,” and thus are “free.”  Although the requirement to produce material goods 
in order to survive is a constricting force upon us, we do not produce solely for mere 
survival purposes.  Animals are only able to produce according to the “standard and need 
of the species to which it belongs while man knows how to produce according to the 
standard of any species and at all times knows how to apply an intrinsic standard to the 
object.  Thus man creates also according to the laws of beauty.”26  In our freedom in 
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terms of production, we are not bound solely by the patterns of life that are biologically 
handed down to us.   
 There are a few ways that this freedom is made manifest.  In the context of sports 
and athletics, for example, we take up these pursuits because they meet some needs of 
leisure and entertainment, but we also have a fascination with humans’ physical abilities; 
we strive to push humanity and its accomplishments to the limits.  Technological 
endeavors such as space exploration have some survival motivations, but are more 
focused on developing our relation to the natural world even further than we previously 
thought possible.  As a unique species-being we are able to improve upon the ways in 
which production takes place, or in fact invent new objects and processes altogether.  We 
are able to see birds in flight, set ourselves to discovering if this is possible for us, and 
work to produce such a result.  Similarly, when we labor to produce works of art, music, 
or literature, we do so not merely to meet survival needs, but more to enrich and further 
develop ourselves, both as individuals and as a species.  Marx claims that this 
phenomenon is a movement wherein we are transcending our “natural needs” and 
developing what he refers to as truly “human needs.”27   
Another way in which our freedom and creativity in production becomes clear is 
in our social organization.  Unlike other species, we are able to consciously alter our 
social structures and the conditions under which production occurs.  We make changes to 
the political and economic structures of our society based on the productive results and 
the needs of our community (both individually and collectively).  Over the course of 
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 I will say more on what he means by “natural needs” and “human needs” below, and later will return to 
the example of art and its place in production and the development of species-being as it points towards a 
further conception of developing ourselves as fully human. 
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human history we have organized subgroups of our species into hierarchies, patriarchies, 
monarchies, oligarchies, democracies, and so on, altering the character of our social 
organization when necessary (to varying degrees of success).
28
  With all of these 
instances, we as a community were aware of our social organization, and able to imagine 
such structures as being arranged differently.  Thus it is that our species-being involves a 
conception of what is possible for us to be as human beings, and the environment which 
we can construct.   
This image of our nature (species-being) as a robust freedom to alter the way in 
which our world is organized is, I think, a particularly powerful one.  Given the 
unprecedented development of our productive forces (our creativity as a manifestation of 
our species-being), it is not necessary to live in a world where there is such poverty.  We 
as a species are in fact capable of creating a different world.  We could live in a much 
more humanized world, one in which the capacities of our species-being are much further 
developed (both in an individual and collective sense).
29
  So to begin with, a fully human 
world would be one in which we all recognize our human nature as species-being.  
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 Even the idea that we could change the social structure of our community is a human development.  As 
human communities have developed, we have been able to compare our social organization to that of other 
groups, and imagine the possibility of altering ours as a result. 
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 Martha Nussbaum, in developing and advocating the capabilities approach, corroborates Marx’s account 
of our nature as based in an Aristotelian concern for human flourishing; in order for individual human 
beings to flourish, they need to be able to develop particular aspects of their humanity.  With explicit 
reference to Marx’s account of human nature as species-being, Nussbaum argues that if our human facets 
and senses aren’t cultivated in a “fully human way – by which I think he [Marx] means a way infused by 
practical reasoning and sociability,” then we are not flourishing in terms of being human.  She goes on: 
“The core idea is that of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in 
cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the world.”  
(Women and Human Development, 72.)  Thus by nature we develop ourselves not only through our own 
individual actions, but in relationships and cooperation with other members of our species. 
 Nussbaum points out that since this concept of flourishing is an aspect of being human, it 
appropriately applies to all human beings, and thus it can be applied across national and cultural borders 
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Human versus Natural Needs 
Marx claims that we produce to satisfy our material needs, but also that our nature 
makes us able to transcend such a focus on producing only to survive.  He characterizes 
the productive process of our species-being as follows: 
The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, 
the production of material life itself.  This is a historical act, a fundamental 
condition of all history which must be fulfilled in order to sustain human life 
every day and every hour.
30
 
 
Moving forward from this act of satisfying needs: 
 
The second point is that once a need is satisfied, which requires the action of 
satisfying and the acquisition of the instrument for this purpose, new needs arise.  
The production of new needs is the first historical act.
31
 
 
 To better understand this historical act of need satisfaction and production, it is 
necessary to examine Marx’s distinction between two different types of need: natural 
needs and human needs.  Marx calls these needs that must be satisfied for the basic 
maintenance of human life “natural needs.”  In and of themselves they are not crude or 
                                                                                                                                                 
(which she does in applying the capabilities approach to the issue of global poverty).  At the same time, she 
refrains from offering a “comprehensive account of value” or the good life, as she wants to continue to be 
sensitive to cultural concerns.  Thus in her latest work Creating Capabilities she argues that her capabilities 
approach “focuses on the protection of areas of freedom so central that their removal makes a life not 
worthy of human dignity.” (Creating Capabilities, 27).  Cf. Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 70-80, and also Martha Nussbaum, Creating 
Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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 Ibid., 115-116.  It is worth noting that Marx appears to contradict himself a bit here: he refers to two 
distinct things as the “first historical act.”  In the first quote, he claims that the first historical act is 
producing to satisfy our natural survival needs.  In the second quote, he argues that after satisfying these 
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lifetime; when publication plans for the latter two parts fell through, this portion of the manuscript was 
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merely practical, but instead simply natural aspects of human existence, as “Life involves 
above all eating and drinking, shelter, clothing, and many other things.”32  These natural 
needs are oriented to a finite end, our continued existence, and thus constitute a sort of 
drive.  It is this finite aspect that demarcates our natural needs; their satisfaction is 
enough to keep us alive.   
 At the same time, this sense of continued existence is only our species-being in a 
minimal sense.  Their fulfillment alone is not enough to develop our species-being, thus 
not enough to make us fully human.  Satisfying our natural needs is necessary for a full 
realization of humanity, but it is by no means sufficient.  We begin as a species by 
laboring to satisfy the natural needs that we have in virtue of our physical condition.  In 
doing so, we move beyond our natural needs and in fact end up creating new needs.  This 
development of new needs leads not to more natural needs, but rather to a new kind of 
need, a “human need.”  Marx offers the relationship between man and woman as the 
paradigm example of this development of human needs: 
The immediate, natural, necessary relationship of human being to human being is 
the relationship of man to woman.  In this natural species-relationship man’s 
relationship to nature is immediately his relationship to man, as his relationship to 
man is immediately his relationship to nature, to his own natural condition.  From 
this relationship one can thus judge the entire level of mankind’s development.  
From the character of this relationship follows the extent to which man has 
become and comprehended himself as a generic being [species-being], as man; 
the relationship of man to woman is the most natural relationship of human being 
to human being.  It thus indicates the extent to which man’s natural behavior has 
become human…In this relationship is also apparent the extent to which man’s 
need has become human, thus the extent to which the other human being, as 
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human being, has become a need for him, the extent to which he in his most 
individual existence is at the same time a social being.
33
 
 
Thus we can judge the development of our species-being by how much our natural needs 
have been superseded by the creation of truly human needs.  But what does this mean?  
What are “human needs”?  A fully human world will be one in which our needs have 
truly been humanized, and we will be focused on creating more, rather than less, of them. 
 According to Marx, human needs have a direct connection to species-being, as 
our fulfillment of them involves striving for our fullest potential as human beings.  We 
can think of these human needs, at least in part, as what John Stuart Mill refers to as the 
“higher pleasures or faculties” of human beings.  In his essay “Utilitarianism” Mill 
distinguishes between the higher and lower pleasures of which human beings are capable:  
Human beings have faculties more elevated than animal appetites, and when once 
made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not 
include their gratification…there is no known theory of life which does not assign 
to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral 
sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.
34
 
 
In some ways similar to Marx’s natural needs, lower pleasures are physical pleasures 
fulfilled through food, drink, etc.  On the other hand, higher pleasures are those we seek 
that take us beyond mere survival and promote a higher quality of life.  Mill identifies 
pursuits such as art, music, and literature as examples of these higher pleasures.     
This analogy with Mill provides a clear link to our unique nature as species-being: 
fulfillment of natural needs provides the baseline for survival, whereas fulfillment of 
                                                 
33
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human needs involves going beyond survival to the quality of our existence.
35
  To live a 
life in which we feel the most fulfilled, complete, or satisfied, we must focus on meeting 
needs that affect the quality of our life.  While meeting natural needs allows us to survive, 
the fulfillment of a human need directly affects the quality of our existence, and pushes 
us towards a more developed sense of our species-being.
36
   
The question then remains as to what it is that can be the object of our truly 
human needs.  Marx agrees with Mill insofar as art, music, literature, and philosophy are 
certainly prime examples of human needs.  These higher pleasures become the human 
needs of everyone under true communism (a truly human world).  At the same time, 
Marx identifies what he claims is the primary human need, the recognition and 
fulfillment of which allows us to pursue and fulfill our other truly human needs: a need 
for “human” interaction with other people. 
 To more clearly illustrate our need for other people as our highest human need, let 
us consider the example noted previously: the relationship between man and woman.
37
  
This relationship can and does exhibit both levels of need (natural and human).  In terms 
of a natural need, we need a partner for sexual or procreative reasons, something involved 
in species survival and existence.  At the level of a human need, however, our need for a 
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partner is not merely one of physical desire, but rather a need for contact and love in 
order to fully humanize us.  This relationship opens up our individual existence through 
social interaction, developing us as species-being, the “us” being each partner in the 
relationship individually as well as a member of the species.
38
 
What does it mean to say that we have a human need for another person?  This 
need for others comes to bear on two distinct (and unequal) levels: in one sense, we have 
a need for others because we depend upon them for survival, and must relate and 
exchange with them in order to obtain the objects necessary to exist.  But in terms of a 
human world, our connection is in fact much stronger: we don’t just depend upon others 
for our physical survival; we need them in order to make our lives better.  In order to 
fully develop individually in terms of species-being, we require interaction, input, and aid 
from other humans. 
In fulfilling our need for others under capitalism, Marx argues we disregard this 
view of others as a truly human need and instead treat them as a mere means to satisfy 
our natural needs: 
Every man speculates upon creating a new need in another in order to force him to 
a new sacrifice, to place him in a new dependence, and to entice him into a new 
kind of pleasure and thereby into economic ruin.  Everyone tries to establish over 
others an alien power in order to find there the satisfaction of his own egoistic 
need…Private property does not know how to change crude need into human 
need…Every real or potential need is a weakness which will draw the bird into 
the lime.
39
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Rather than utilizing this “alien power” to satisfy our “crude” needs, we must enter into a 
relationship with other humans, a relationship which further develops both us and the 
other person in terms of species-being.  Our need for others is thus critical to our human 
development, and the key to achieving our human nature.   
Wealth and Poverty 
It is this focus on creating and celebrating our level of human needs that points 
towards the third key aspect of a fully human world: an alteration in our concepts of the 
“wealthy” person and the “poor” person.  More specifically, to achieve this world we 
must alter our perception of human neediness; we must stop minimizing it, and instead 
acknowledge and celebrate neediness (and the multitude of human needs) as a 
recognition of our humanity.  According to Marx, this alteration takes the form of a 
change in our understanding of wealth and poverty, which we currently view as polar 
opposites: 
It is apparent how the rich man [in a human society] and wide human need appear 
in place of economic wealth and poverty.  The rich man is simultaneously one 
who needs a totality of human manifestations of life and in whom his own 
realization exists as inner necessity, as need.  Not only the wealth but also the 
poverty of man equally acquire – under the premise of socialism – a human and 
thus social meaning.  [Poverty] is the passive bond which lets man experience the 
greatest wealth, the other human being, as need.
40
 
 
This vision of communism (Marx’s fully human world) is not one of “crude 
communism,” whereby everyone is leveled down to the status of a poor worker; mere 
equality of wages or position does not in any way achieve what Marx envisages:   
Universal envy establishing itself as a power is only the disguised form in which 
greed reestablishes and satisfies itself in another way…Crude communism is only 
the fulfillment of this envy and leveling on the basis of a preconceived minimum.  
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How little this overcoming of private property is an actual appropriation is shown 
precisely by…the reversion to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and wantless 
man who has not gone beyond private property.
41
 
 
The point that Marx makes turns out to be crux of the movement towards a fully human 
world.  In order to bring about such a world, we focus not on crass “equality” of wages, 
or simply redistributing money in order to meet everyone’s natural needs; rather, the 
focus must be on realizing and promoting our human needs.  Crude communism only 
aims at making everyone equally wealthy or poor (a position that is often incorrectly 
ascribed to Marx). 
Consider now an alteration of “rich” and “poor” that will better accord with our 
truly human needs.  Marx contrasts the meaning of “rich” and “poor” under capitalism 
with “rich” and “poor” under communism.  Under capitalism, “rich” references a state of 
self-reliance, wherein a person can meet all of his needs either by direct labor or through 
money that he has accumulated, and thus he is not “inappropriately needy.”  But having 
needs or being needy is an indelible part of our human nature, and the existence of needs 
is an indelible aspect of our nature as species-being.  Currently we push any recognition 
of a dependency on others behind a pseudo-independence founded on money: “Self-
denial, the denial of life and of all human needs, is [the] cardinal doctrine [of 
capitalism].”42  We work as hard as possible to wash away any possible level of 
neediness we may have, and in doing so we alienate ourselves further and further from 
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our true humanity.  The myth of self-reliance has convinced us that one can be totally 
independent, and that our nature requires no necessary connection to (and thus no 
dependence upon) others.  Although the “rich” may have the means/private property to 
satisfy his wants and desires, he glosses over the most important fact: his human needs 
depend upon other people for their satisfaction.  Under communism, the meaning of 
“rich” will be fundamentally altered to align with the fact of inherent human neediness.  
Rather than “rich” denoting self-reliance and a minimization of neediness, it will proceed 
from a sense of being “rich in needs”; in other words, the rich person is one who has 
many human needs that must be met through his sensuous activity, as well as the activity 
of others.  This characterization of wealth and ‘being rich’ will be changed to recognize 
the existence of human needs that everyone has.   
 Marx argues that our perception of “poverty” will change as well.  Under 
capitalism poverty is a negative circumstance, a situation to be avoided at all costs; it 
denotes a total inability to meet one’s human needs.  The rich person in capitalism looks 
down upon those lacking in the ability to provide for themselves; they are inappropriately 
needy.  By contrast, Marx argues that “poverty” should instead denote our recognition of 
our dependency upon other people.  In “poverty,” we recognize the mistake of self-
reliance, insofar as we see that as humans we must necessarily depend on other people.  
Therefore, rather than wealth and poverty being opposites, as they are under capitalism, a 
fully human person is in fact both rich and poor: he is “rich” in his abundance of human 
needs, and “poor” in his conscious realization of his dependence on others for the 
development and fulfillment of these needs.  In a truly human world, we recognize our 
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human need for and dependence upon others as an intrinsic aspect of our humanity.  As 
the final aspect of a human world will make clear, our human need for others involves 
depending upon them to help make us fully human by emancipating our senses.   
Emancipation of the Senses 
 For most individuals today, our senses are far from “emancipated.”  According to 
Marx, capitalism has crippled us in this particular way: 
Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is ours only if 
we have it, if it exists for us as a capital or is immediately possessed by us, eaten, 
drunk, worn, lived in, etc., in short, used; but private property grasps all these 
immediate forms of possession only as means of living…Hence all the physical 
and spiritual senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of them all, the 
sense of having.
43
   
   
Marx notes that our sense of need in our current ethic has been warped; the use of money 
convinces us that the satisfaction of any need involves owning and possessing an object.  
Our needs are to be satisfied through the appropriation of objects to ourselves (via 
monetary exchange), and this appropriation and hording involves possession of external 
objects.  While Marx is in some sense exaggerating for effect, he is still pointing to 
something that is very real and true today.  For example, we only consider a book “ours” 
if we purchase it and can place it on our shelf for display, rather than when we read it, 
enjoy it, and are affected by the contents with which we come into sensuous contact.  The 
“need” for a book is not considered a need to read the words and absorb the content (as 
art, literature, or science), but rather a need to purchase the book and see it as our own, 
privately and exclusively.  Such has become the view of humans and their relation to 
needs: needs are conditions of ourselves which we seek to eradicate through 
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consumption.  We annihilate our need for books, films, music, and works of art by 
purchasing a DVD or CD and crossing them off of our wish list, rather than celebrating 
our need for such things as a human need for sensuous experience through the medium of 
art.  A need for these kinds of experiences is reduced down to concerns of property, 
ownership, and consumption, and the value of commodities is determined by relations 
between objects, rather than human individuals.
44
  In this way, the needs of our senses are 
not truly humanized; in fact, our sensuous needs, which should be our truly human needs 
(those higher pleasures for art, literature, relationships, love), end up becoming mere 
consumption needs, akin to our natural survival needs.  This leaves us “stupid and one-
sided” insofar as we end up being only natural beings, not truly human beings.  Such a 
situation severely constricts our sensual relation to the world; Marx scoffs that “sense 
subordinated to crude, practical need has only a narrow meaning.”45  Having our senses 
stranded at this point of underdevelopment seriously stunts our human development, 
leaving us only partially or “crudely” human.   
Yet Marx’s point here is not meant to be damning, but rather empowering: 
“human nature had to be reduced to this absolute poverty so that it could give birth to its 
inner wealth.”46  There is, then, another possibility for our relationship to the objects of 
our needs that can free us from this one-sided obsession with having and owning.  “The 
overcoming of private property means therefore the complete emancipation of all human 
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senses and aptitudes.”47  But what could this mean to say that to become fully human we 
must “emancipate” our senses?  Marx explains:   
The human eye appreciates differently from the crude, inhuman eye, the human 
ear differently from the crude ear, etc…the senses of social man differ from those 
of the unsocial…The development of the five senses is a labor of the whole 
previous history of the world…[However] the care-laden, needy man has no mind 
for the most beautiful play.  The dealer in minerals sees only their market value 
but not their beauty…Hence the objectification of the human essence, both 
theoretically and practically, is necessary to humanize man’s senses and also 
create a human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of humanity and nature.
48
 
 
To humanize us, our human need for (and dependence upon) other people comes to the 
forefront; only when we realize this need and celebrate our “poverty” in that regard can 
we open ourselves up to the human transformation that can be brought about through our 
relationships with others.  More specifically, we depend upon others and our relationships 
with them to deepen our sensuous interactions with the world.   
Take for example a specific sensuous interaction: viewing El Greco’s El Entierro 
del Señor de Orgaz (Burial of the Count of Orgaz); looking at it for the first time (with a 
“crude, inhuman, practical” eye) can mean little.  Without any explanation of the 
meaning and significance of the work, I can appreciate it as being creative, colorful, or an 
intricate work.  But when another human being is able to explain the fullness of the work 
(the religious iconography, the political figures included and their significance, the 
intimate detail of each figure’s gaze), my senses are suddenly transformed from the crude 
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to the human; the painting has in fact become beautiful and meaningfully human.
49
  The 
emotional response that it invokes is mine.  Without having to steal the painting or hang it 
in my living room, I have owned and consumed it, insofar as it has elicited a truly human 
response within me.  This human response can only be generated through a social relation 
with other human beings, who can in fact “make the painting beautiful” for me.  The 
same can go for a piece of music, as Marx argues: “From the subjective point of view, as 
music alone awakens man’s musical sense and the most beautiful music has no meaning 
for the unmusical ear…the senses of social man differ from those of the unsocial.”50  At 
first listen, a Tchaikovsky composition can be enjoyable for the beat or instrumentation, 
but once someone explains the significance behind it, the light switch may flip on inside 
our head; suddenly the piece can turn from technically enjoyable to “beautiful.”  My 
senses have thus become humanized, and attuned to the experience in such a way that the 
music fulfills my truly human need.  Moreover, we are speaking here “not only [of] the 
five senses but also the so-called spiritual and moral senses (will, love, etc.).”51 
For a fully human person, the objects that satisfy our needs are not simply 
commodities to be consumed, but rather objects necessary for a realization of our full 
humanity.  We must have not only basic goods like food or water, but also music, art, and 
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literature.  We need them not just to consume, but also to enjoy, in order to be a fully 
human person.  According to Marx, by overcoming capitalist modes of production, our 
relation to the objects of our labor (and the objects of the labor of others) changes insofar 
as we will view these objects as the embodiment of our sensuous activity.  Thus it is that 
he says “The positive overcoming of private property – that is, the sensuous appropriation 
of the human essence and life, of objective man and of human works by and for man – is 
not to be grasped only as immediate, exclusive satisfaction or as possession, as having.  
Man appropriates to himself his manifold essence in an all-sided way, thus as a whole 
man.”52  This represents a fundamental shift in our recognition of our humanity; only 
through our relations with other people can our needs become truly human needs, and 
only by recognizing and focusing on our human needs can we become fully human, a 
“whole” person.53 
A Compelling Vision of ‘Selfishness’ 
 We can now see just what, in Marx’s view, a fully human world would look like.  
It would be a world in which everyone is “rich in human needs,” and since the greatest of 
these needs is the need for others, we are all aware that we are fundamentally dependent 
on others for the richness of our lives.  In addition, our senses have been emancipated.  
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be humanly affected has a great deal of scientific support.  Brian Barry, in his Why Social Justice Matters, 
spends a significant amount of time detailing exactly how changes (both negative and positive) in the early 
environment around a fetus or infant can have marked effects on the child’s development.  “The more we 
learn about the power of the early environment, the more plausible it becomes that, in the absence of some 
definite neurological deficit, all children have the same cognitive potential” (51).  Rather than different 
people simply being “better” than others in an innate sense, environmental conditions end up causing many 
different biological changes.  As such, all people are innately capable of being fully developed in terms of 
species-being.  See here Brian Barry, Why Social Justice Matters (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 
especially 46-70. 
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Given the recognition of our species-being and the central place accorded to our human 
needs, we have transcended our alienated language and in fact are speaking a truly human 
language.  This world is clearly something far greater than simply a world without 
material poverty (a lack of basic goods necessary for survival); it is in fact a world 
without the “human poverty” that Marx saw within the confines of capitalism.   
 Such a vision suggests an approach to the problem of global poverty that is 
distinct from current approaches, as it is positive rather than negative in nature.  In 
addition to explicating how grim of a state the world is currently in and focusing on 
getting rid of such dreadfulness, Marx’s vision is a positive statement about the future.  
Reflecting on a fully human world can make us realize just how good things could be, not 
only for those who are materially poor, but for everyone, ourselves included.  Currently 
we are forced to eviscerate our humanity through self-deception in order to cope with the 
poverty that confronts us in our daily lives.  Given this self-inflicted violence, we end up 
“impoverished” in an altogether different way than a mere lack of basic goods.   
An alternative ethical approach based in Marx’s vision of a fully human world 
pushes us to respond and help other people in poverty for a morally distinct reason: 
helping ourselves.  Instead of a motivation that can be seen as simply altruistic, we are in 
fact trying to stop the harm that is also being inflicted upon us.  In this way, we are doing 
something that is not only good for others, but also “good for us,” and thus “selfish.”  I 
don’t mean selfish in a tainted or egotistical way, but insofar as we realize poverty is 
harming us as well.  Of course, a moral approach where our impetus is that some action is 
“good for me” has often been viewed as selfish, and thus negative.  Kant for example 
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argues that we should act in accordance with our moral duties for the right reasons, rather 
than for anything resembling self-interest.
54
   
What this view overlooks is that in working against poverty, we are not acting 
only for our individual selves, but rather for “us.”  The Marxian approach I have set forth 
evokes a sense of solidarity with other human beings, and therefore our “selfish” 
concerns are not only focused on their effects on our individual selves, but also on others 
with whom we identify.  If I give a few dollars to a homeless person who asks me for 
money on the street, my action benefits him (by helping him purchase what he needs) and 
me (by allowing me to heed my human impulses, and keeping me from succumbing to 
self-deception).  In this way, I am giving him money to help “us,” instead of “me” or 
“him/them.”55  Within a fully human world such actions allow the “us” to include both 
myself and other human beings, and thus self-interested motivations aren’t atomistic, but 
are instead focused on helping all of us together.   
On my view, our acting to help those in poverty should be generated not from a 
sense of duty/obligation to the poor (thus avoiding the “guilt-trip” approach of Singer, 
Pogge, or Held), but rather a reflection upon our connection through species-being, and 
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 This “right reason” for Kant is simply the fulfillment of our moral duties, which rational beings should 
simply do with a “cheerful disposition” because it is the right thing to do.  For Kant, our actions are moral 
only insofar as we are following our rational duties dictated by the Categorical Imperative.  Cf. Immanuel 
Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” Practical Philosophy, Ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1999), 37-108, and “The Metaphysics of Morals,” Ibid., 353-604. 
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 There is an interesting empirical corollary to my claim here.  As Judith Lichtenberg discusses, several 
experiments focused on persons’ likelihood for helping others have shown that the chances of a person 
providing aid to someone in need rise greatly if the benefactor in question recently experienced good 
fortune.  In one such experiment, for example, a person exiting a phone booth was more likely to help a 
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coin return slot of the telephone.  Lichtenberg’s discussion brings to light an important issue about moral 
psychology, and the importance of my proposal about “selfishness.”  See here Judith Lichtenberg, “Famine, 
Affluence, and Psychology,” in Peter Singer Under Fire, ed. Jeffrey Schaler (Chicago: Open Court 
Publishing, 2009), 244-245. 
149 
 
the recognition that poverty directly harms not only the poor but us as well.  We realize 
that conditions of poverty force us to suppress our human urge to help, and force us to 
live in a less-than-desirable world, one where so many people live in poverty.  We want 
to live in a different kind of world, wherein each person can develop himself/herself as a 
certain kind of person, a fully human person who is able to interact with others in a 
human way, helping all of us to become fully human.  Our “selfish” motivation is 
therefore a motivation founded in our solidarity; I act for “us,” not simply for “you” or 
for “me.” 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A MARXIAN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO GLOBAL POVERTY 
PART TWO: A FULLY HUMAN WORLD VIA INTERMEDIATE TECHNOLOGY 
In Chapter Four, I connected the harms of global poverty directly to all human 
beings, poor and rich alike.  When faced with the neediness and pleas of a poor person, 
we harden ourselves against our human impulse to help through self-deception.  In 
concocting the stories which we tell ourselves, we are causing a serious harm to 
ourselves: we damage our humanity and our nature as species-being.  On the other hand, 
when we act in accordance with this nature as species-being, we are doing something not 
only for the poor person that we encounter, but also for ourselves.  We are heeding our 
human impulses to help, recognizing our own “poverty” in terms of our need for other 
people, and at the same time acknowledging the human needs of another person.   
Thus grounding our human nature in Marx’s concept of species-being begets a 
vision of “selfishness,” which in turn provides us with a compelling moral motivation for 
acting to provide aid to the poor of the world.  In helping, we are doing something that 
benefits “us,” not just “them.”   
As I discussed at the end of the last chapter, this fully human world is much more 
than just a world without poverty; it is a world wherein each individual works to develop 
herself as a fully human person, one who is “rich in human needs.”  Given our nature as 
151 
 
 
 
species-being, we work towards meeting the needs of all people in ways that develop all 
people as fully human.   
But what must we do in order to bring about this world?  In this last chapter, I 
turn to the question of how our world can be changed into one along the lines of Marx’s 
vision of a “fully human” world.  First, I will examine a critical facet of our human nature 
as species-being that Marx emphasizes: our human need for meaningful labor.  This is 
something that I will argue is passed over in the approaches of Singer, Pogge, and Held, 
but is of vital importance in addressing the causes of global poverty.  As I will argue, our 
current economic system is not set up in order to produce meaningful labor for all, but 
rather to be economically efficient.  Given the worship of such efficiency in the 
productive process, labor-saving technology has often been uncritically adopted.  This 
technology is instituted in the interests of being economically efficient, but it does so by 
denying meaningful labor to many people, resulting in the rampant and ever-expanding 
conditions of poverty present in our world.   
It is this aspect of our world (and our economic structures) that I argue must be 
altered if we are to bring about a fully human world.  In order to provide meaningful 
labor to all people (especially the poor of the world), we must revisit the roles that labor-
saving technology and monetary cost efficiency play in the productive process.  Relying 
on the work of E.F. Schumacher and his vision of what he calls “appropriate” or “human” 
levels of technology, I will argue that we must critically examine the role that labor-
saving technology plays within our world, and utilize technology not in order to be 
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efficient, but rather in order to provide a world in which all human beings have access to 
meaningful labor.  This fully human world will not only allow us to meet the needs of all 
human beings (thus solving the problem of global poverty), but also allow everyone to 
develop themselves in accordance with their nature as species-being. 
A World without Poverty? 
 For Marx, the establishment of such a human world necessarily involved 
capitalism being superseded by communism.  He saw communism as superior to 
capitalism in two distinct ways: it would eradicate the great material poverty that 
capitalism could not overcome, and secondly, it would provide the proper environment 
by which all people could develop their human needs and hone their senses to become 
fully human.   
 Whether or not Marx was right that communism would provide the fertile ground 
for such positive developments is beside the point here.  I want to pose a different 
question: can we develop a fully human world within the context of our current global 
structures?  Put differently, and in a most general sense, is a world without poverty 
possible?   
This is a serious question; an affirmative answer is neither nonsensical nor 
utopian.  It is not the same as asking “Can I keep myself from dying?” or “Can I make 
everyone in the world happy all of the time?”  The former is certainly nonsense; no 
matter how much I wish to stave off death, I cannot create a world wherein such is the 
case.  Similarly, the latter question is utopian in its childish naivety; it’s quite impossible 
to make everyone “happy” all of the time.   
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But there is plenty of evidence to suggest that it is possible to alter our world and 
its economic, political, and social structures in such a way that the result is a world where 
material poverty does not exist.  In Chapters One and Two I mentioned the quantifiable 
data that Singer and Pogge have brought to bear on their respective arguments, showing 
that through philanthropy or structural alterations, we could very easily generate (or 
reallocate) enough money and resources to aid the global poor.
1
   
These realities make it clear that the problems and causes of global poverty are 
structural, rather than physical.  We produce enough goods to meet the needs of 
everyone, and yet we end up with a world in which a small minority has an incredible 
abundance, and almost half of all humans have little to nothing.  Poverty is a contingent 
fact of the world, not a necessary one.  Unlike the concept of death or varying human 
emotions, there is no inherent reason why poverty must exist in the world.   
 The question then becomes: how do we eradicate global poverty?  Are there 
changes that could be brought about which would not only ensure that the basic needs of 
everyone are met, but also make our world more fully human?  There is another facet of 
our human nature emphasized by Marx that has particular practical salience in terms of 
the question of poverty and how to combat it: our human need for meaningful work. 
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 The work of Jeffrey Sachs goes a long way in clearly illustrating and echoing the statistical information 
that Singer and Pogge put forth.  In the chapter of his book The End of Poverty entitled “Can the Rich 
Afford To Help The Global Poor?”, Sachs points out how little in extra taxation it would cost the United 
States to elevate its level of foreign aid to meet the U.N. prescribed Millennium Development Goals 
(which, although they will not eliminate poverty, at least endeavor to cut it by half).  For the full argument, 
see Jeffery Sachs, The End of Poverty (New York: Penguin, 2005), 288-308. 
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Meaningful Labor versus Alienated Labor 
Marx’s conception of human nature as species-being is a conception of humans as 
productive creatures.  We must labor in order to produce objects that will satisfy our 
needs.  But, according to Marx, labor has another role to play in human life: 
Labor, life activity, and productive life appear to man at first only as a means to 
satisfy a need, the need to maintain physical existence.  Productive life, however, 
is species-life.  It is life begetting life.  In the mode of life activity lies the entire 
character of a species, its species-character; and free conscious activity is the 
species-character of man.  Life itself appears only as a means to life.
2
   
 
Marx asserts that labor functions at a higher level for human beings, beyond just 
satisfying basic survival needs; labor can transform us into more fully human creatures.  
Thus it is that labor is both an instrumental means to meet other needs, but also a need in 
and of itself, in accordance with our species-being.  Labor is more foundational than 
instrumental for human beings; it is, as Marx has it, our “species character.”  In the act of 
working, we not only produce objects but also develop ourselves as individuals and 
members of our species.   
Furthermore, this labor has a distinctly human quality to it; human beings perform 
such labor in a way that goes beyond merely physical, animalistic workings of the body:   
We pre-suppose labor in a form that stamps it as exclusively human.  A spider 
conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame 
many an architect in the construction of her cells.  But what distinguishes the 
worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure 
in imagination before he erects it in reality…He not only effects a change of form 
in the material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that 
gives the law to his modus operandi.
3
 
                                                 
2
 Karl Marx, “Alienated Labor,” in Selected Writings, Ed. Lawrence Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 
63.  (Hereafter noted as SW; in addition I will indicate to which specific text of Marx’ I refer.) 
 
3
 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.1 (New York: International Publishers, 2003), 174. 
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For Marx, truly human labor involves the imaginative and creative faculties of the human 
mind, in conjunction with the physical and manual processes.  Erich Fromm nicely ties 
together this sense of labor as foundational with development as species-being:  
Labor is the self-expression of man, an expression of his individual physical and 
mental powers.  In this process of genuine activity man develops himself, 
becomes himself; work is not only a means to an end – the product – but an end in 
itself, the meaningful expression of human energy: hence work is enjoyable.
4
   
 
 In this way, productive labor is not a necessary evil of life; rather it is the way in 
which human beings interact and shape their world, and in turn shape their humanity.  
Tracing Marx’s influences back through Hegel and Goethe, Fromm points out how in 
Marxian terms “man is alive only inasmuch as he is productive, inasmuch as he grasps 
the world outside of himself in the act of expressing his own specific human powers.”5  
The fully human person is actively shaping her world and her consciousness by laboring 
and producing objects that satisfy human needs.  For a person to be fully human, she 
must labor and feel that she is in some way a productive being, engaging in stimulating 
sensuous activity that is worthy of human time and effort. 
As I noted in Chapter Three with reference to the work of care ethicists, not 
everyone can labor.  Children, the elderly, and the mentally and physically handicapped 
are oftentimes unable to labor to meet their own needs.  But, while depending upon the 
labor of others for survival is a fact of human existence, spending one’s whole life unable 
to find some way to labor productively (in the absence of any outstanding impairment) is 
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 Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man (New York: Continuum, 1994), 41-42.   
5
 Ibid., 29. 
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particularly detrimental, and in fact dehumanizing.  Such a situation denies a person of 
the ability to experience an enhancement of his own humanity through his own 
productive/meaningful labor.  Kant makes this point when he argues that “life is the 
faculty of spontaneous activity, the awareness of all our human powers.  Occupation 
gives us this awareness…Without occupation man cannot live happily.  If he earns his 
bread, he eats it with greater pleasure than if it is doled out to him.”6 
I will refer to this level of productive, truly human labor as “meaningful labor,” 
insofar as it is the way in which people assert their humanity and develop their species-
being capabilities.  Through meaningful labor we interact with the world, exercising our 
freedom, interrelating with other people, and humanizing our senses.  Meaningful labor 
thus becomes a human need for us, the fulfillment of which serves to further develop our 
species-being. 
And yet if we pause for a moment, we can see that the description of labor offered 
above sounds nothing like the activity that much of the world engages in when they 
“work.”  The concept of work as “enjoyable” seems perhaps a bit out of place when taken 
in the context of the type of labor that most individuals are forced to endure.  Indeed most 
of the world spends their time toiling in ways which few of us would call “meaningful 
labor,” let alone “enjoyable work.”   
 Marx agrees that a great deal of what could (or should) be meaningful labor has 
turned instead into what he calls “alienated labor.”  He characterizes such activity as 
follows:   
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 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics (New York: Harper Torchbacks, 1963), 161. 
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The worker does not affirm himself in his work but denies himself, feels 
miserable and unhappy, develops no free physical and mental energy but mortifies 
his flesh and ruins his mind.  The worker therefore feels at ease only outside 
work, and during work he is outside himself.  He is at home when he is not 
working and when he is working he is not at home.  His work, therefore, is not 
voluntary, but coerced, forced labor.
7
 
 
Because of the increased reliance on of so-called “labor-saving” technology as capitalism 
developed, a great deal of the labor opportunities available (jobs) involve humans being 
forced into repetitive, stressful work that only involves the rote manipulation of 
machines.  While overall labor-time may end up being saved, the quality of the labor 
involved is often sacrificed.  Such work in no way taps into the creative human faculties, 
or allows for any growth or introspection on the part of the human laborer.     
Fromm provides a succinct characterization of alienation and its harmful effects 
on the human person:  
Alienation (or ‘estrangement’) means, for Marx, that man does not experience 
himself as the acting agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, 
others, and he himself) remain alien to him.  They stand above and against him as 
objects, even though they may be objects of his own creation.  Alienation is 
essentially experiencing the world and oneself passively, receptively, as the 
subject separated from the object.
8
 
 
By laboring in this way, we are not meeting our truly human needs.  Instead, we are 
passively transformed into commodities ourselves, as our productive abilities are bought 
and sold, and the objects we produce are not ours to own.  “Labor not only produces 
commodities.  It also produces itself and the worker as a commodity.”9   
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 Without any creative aspect to labor, a person simply becomes an “appendage of 
the machine,” a mere cog in the productive process, rather than a creative force that 
transforms raw materials into objects that satisfy human needs.
10
  Such labor conflicts 
with our humanity as species-being and our human needs.  Within our current economic 
system, labor has become “not the satisfaction of a need but only a means to satisfy other 
needs.”11  Rather than seeking out labor to satisfy our human needs, individuals in 
today’s society view labor as something to be minimized and avoided whenever possible.  
Marx notes that the alienation of labor is “obvious from the fact that as soon as no 
physical or other pressure exists, labor is avoided like the plague.”12   
“Free Human Production” in a Fully Human World 
 A great deal of the labor performed in the world today is of the alienated variety, 
rather than anything resembling meaningful labor.  This dichotomy between alienated 
and meaningful labor not only provides insight into a significant cause of global poverty, 
but also points to a promising solution.   
Before considering the relationship between labor and global poverty, let us 
consider one final piece of Marx’s fully human world, wherein he offers a picture (albeit 
a brief one) of what he calls “free human production.”  In his “Excerpt Notes of 1844,” 
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 Although the term “alienated labor” appears infrequently in Marx’s later writings, the underlying idea 
remains.  In The Communist Manifesto, he and Engels write that “owing to the extensive use of machinery 
and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, 
all charm for the workman.  He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most 
monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him.”  Marx and Engels, “The Communist 
Manifesto,” SW, 164. 
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 Marx, “Alienated Labor,” SW, 62. 
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Marx offers a vision of a “four-fold affirmation of humanity,” occurring in a society 
where meaningful labor is available to all:  
Suppose we had produced things as human beings: in his production each of us 
would have twice affirmed himself and the other.  (1) In my production I would 
have objectified my individuality and its particularity, and in the course of the 
activity I would have enjoyed an individual life; in viewing the object I would 
have experienced the individual joy of knowing my personality as an objective, 
sensuously perceptible, and indubitable power.  (2) In your satisfaction and your 
use of my product I would have had the direct and conscious satisfaction that my 
work satisfied a human need, that it objectified human nature, and that it created 
an object appropriate to the need of another human being.  (3) I would have been 
the mediator between you and the species and you would have experienced me as 
a reintegration of your own nature and a necessary part of your self; I would have 
been affirmed in your thought as well as your love.  (4) In my individual life I 
would have directly created your life; in my individual activity I would have 
immediately confirmed and realized my true human and social nature.
13
 
 
 This passage provides a description of how fully human persons will relate to 
each other as they labor within a fully human world.  First, in laboring I am exercising 
my freedom and my creative faculties.  Secondly, as the object of my labor satisfies the 
needs of a human person other than me, I can feel a sense of satisfaction in knowing that 
my labor fulfilled its telos by creating an object that satisfied a human need.  Third, this 
productive relationship helps me and the other person recognize our human need for 
others and their labor; I end up functioning as the “mediator” between the sensual world 
and the other person, and for this the other person is grateful.  Both of us recognize and 
celebrate our mutual dependence.  Finally, this interaction means that I am confirming 
and furthering my own nature as species-being, making me fully human. 
 This is a picture of what production should look like, according to Marx.  Rather 
than a picture of alienation, whereby structures of domination wedge their way between 
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human persons, Marx offers a vision in which the producer and the consumer/“needy” 
person have an actual relationship that benefits both of them in a human way.   
 Taken as a whole, Marx’s picture of a fully human world offers us a great deal 
that can be directly applied to the problems of global poverty.  An alternative ethic of 
species-being suggests ways in which we might alter certain fundamental features of our 
world in order to avoid the harms of desensitization and self-deception that result from 
our encounters with the poor.   
 It is interesting to note that Albert Camus, a fierce critic of the “rational terror” of 
Marxism, pays tribute to this key dimension of Marx’s thought: 
The very core of his theory was that work is profoundly dignified and unjustly 
despised.  He rebelled against the degradation of work to the level of a 
commodity and of the worker to the level of an object.  He reminded the 
privileged that their privileges were not divine and that property was not an 
eternal right.  He gave a bad conscience to those who had no right to a clear 
conscience, and denounced with unparalleled profundity a class whose crime is 
not so much having had power as having used it to advance the ends of a 
mediocre society deprived of any real nobility.  To him we owe the idea which is 
the despair of our times – but here despair is worth more than any hope – that 
when work is a degradation, it is not life, even though it occupies every moment 
of a life.  Who, despite the pretensions of this society, can sleep in it in peace 
when they know that it derives its mediocre pleasures from the work of millions 
of dead souls?  By demanding for the worker real riches, which are not the riches 
of money but of leisure and creation, he had reclaimed, despite all appearance to 
the contrary, the dignity of man.
14
 
 
 Marx’s vision of a human world points in particular to what must be done if we 
are going to adequately address the problem of poverty (both material and “human” 
poverty): given the centrality of labor to human life, we must create a world that is 
essentially free of “involuntary unemployment,” and, going even further, a world in 
which all have access to genuinely meaningful work.  If this goal can be achieved, then 
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the material poverty of others around the world, as well as the “human” poverty into 
which this forces all of us, can be eradicated. 
The Causes of Poverty 
Singer, Pogge, and Held’s Neglect of Meaningful Labor 
 As I noted earlier, it seems that the possibility of a world without material poverty 
is not incomprehensible; in fact, it seems quite clear that the existence of material poverty 
is in no way a necessary aspect of our world.  But my argument goes beyond simply 
correcting conditions of material poverty, and moves instead towards a vision of a fully 
human world.  What then can be done to turn the possibility of a fully human world 
without poverty into a reality?  Let us revisit Singer, Pogge, and Held and examine their 
proposed solutions, paying attention to the ways in which labor plays (or does not play) a 
role. 
It seems clear upon reflection that Singer’s approach doesn’t actually focus on 
getting us to a world without poverty.  Instead, he focuses on reducing the misery and 
suffering that result from conditions of poverty.  Singer wants the greatest number of 
people fulfilling their obligation and sending the highest amount of money to poor people 
as often as they can.       
The outcome (to borrow Singer’s famous image) is thus that we step in and save 
those who are drowning whenever we witness them in the pond.  Rather than changing 
the world so as to make drowning a thing of the past, we must just be ready to muddy our 
clothes as many times as is necessary to pull out those drowning.  Singer’s approach 
appears to be a mere change in distribution, rather than any real structural critique.  In an 
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interview with the New Left Project, Singer states: “Let’s stop worrying about inequality 
of wealth and income, and see if we can do something to produce a distribution of 
income and wealth that leads to less misery and premature death than the present 
distribution.  That shouldn’t be too difficult.” 15   
As I discussed in Chapter One, Singer doesn’t directly address the causes of 
poverty, focusing instead on defending a moral imperative to provide aid.  This means we 
are working to bail water out of a boat which still has in it a massive hole, so to speak.  
We don’t end up in a world without poverty, just one in which the worst off aren’t so bad 
off anymore (at least for the time being).   
Pogge moves further in the right direction of a positive vision, as he identifies 
what isn’t the cause of poverty: explanatory nationalism.  In this I think he is absolutely 
correct; affluent countries are willing to make the poor worse off by give them much less 
of a chance to be competitive in the global market.  In addition, free trade ends up 
making the poor less competitive in their own markets.  Pogge’s proposals (such as 
ceasing agricultural subsidies and the Global Resources Dividend) are in one way much 
more in tune with the realities of poverty; he is correct in claiming that we are “hunger’s 
willing executioners.”16   
But there remains a divide between these proposals and the root causes of 
poverty.  In the case of the GRD, Pogge makes a solid case as to how it may provide 
relief for the poor, but he does not clearly establish how this policy will stop people from 
violating their duties to the poor going forward.  Similarly, ceasing the resource and 
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borrowing privileges may provide some headway in the struggle against poverty, but will 
their disappearance allow poor countries and their people to necessarily climb out of 
poverty?  If we stop actively impoverishing people, we will at least be taking our foot off 
of the throats of millions.  But this argument in and of itself doesn’t lend itself to any 
direct structural correction to or prevention of the problem.  In addition, the situation is 
worse for Pogge; he explicitly endorses “free trade,” which can and does have very 
negative implications for the poorest of the world (as I discussed in Chapter Two). 
Held’s approach suffers from the same deficiencies as Pogge’s, as she supports 
some of the same policy proposals, such as ending national farm subsidies.  Held does, 
however, go beyond Pogge, focusing on structural issues, such as the culture of 
masculinity and its effects on the domination of poor people.  While she is moving 
further in the direction of the causes of poverty, she does not go far enough in 
establishing precisely how these structures are manifest in the lives of the poor.  She is 
correct to point out that poor people are marginalized, but she does not make the further 
move to establish exactly how and why they are marginalized (as I will attempt to do in 
the following section). 
The approaches advocated by Singer, Pogge, and Held will not “end” poverty, so 
much as mitigate existing misery – a worthy goal, but insufficient.17   
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 I also find the capabilities approach similarly “insufficient,” particularly as it is developed in the work of 
Martha Nussbaum.  Nussbaum does not incorporate enough of Marx’s view of human nature to push a 
capabilities approach towards recognizing a need for meaningful labor.  Nussbaum notes Marx’s claim that 
we actively shape our environment, but she neglects to incorporate the key element in how Marx claims we 
do such active molding: through labor.  It is not enough to make the negative point that we are not 
passively shaped by our environment; the positive point is the crucial one, whereby we actively shape our 
humanity and our environment through laboring to produce objects to satisfy human needs.  She notes that 
by nature we focus ourselves on “activity, goals, and projects,” but does not push this further to the 
underlying facet of labor, which is necessary for any of these aspects to come out.  By neglecting this 
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Unemployment, Alienation, and Efficiency 
The fundamental reason why the three approaches above are inadequate to the 
task of creating a world without poverty is that they begin with an insufficient analysis of 
the causes of poverty.  In other words, they are missing something: they have both 
glossed over the effects that a lack of meaningful labor has on the poor people of the 
world.   
At the most basic structural level, conditions of poverty spring not from 
inequalities in wealth or access to markets; these are concurrent symptoms of the 
problem, but are caused by much deeper problems regarding labor.  Massive amounts of 
poverty can be linked directly to unemployment.  In many cases, people around the world 
are living such impoverished lives because they are unable to find appropriate ways to 
labor productively.  Although precise data on unemployment in developing nations is 
extremely difficult to obtain, the World Bank estimates upwards of 30 percent of workers 
in some of the poorest developing nations are technically unemployed (without a job).
18
  
But such “involuntary” unemployment is far from the only cause: most those who are 
able to find work are confined to scratching out a living via subsistence agriculture, while 
                                                                                                                                                 
positive point, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach runs up against a problem: it does not explicitly accord a 
place for a basic capability of productive labor, or access to it.  In her list of capabilities, she talks of labor, 
but only in an instrumental role, or only in terms of employment.  She mentions that the capability of 
“Control over One’s Environment” involves “having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with 
others,” and that the capability of “Affiliation” involves “in work, being able to work as a human being, 
exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other 
workers.”  A focus on employment is very much distinct from actual (meaningful) labor, and thus 
Nussbaum does not appropriately argue for a (human) need for meaningful labor for all human individuals.  
See here Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 79-80, and also Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 33-34. 
 
18
 World Bank, World Bank World Development Indicators 2011, data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators, 50-55.  Precise data is difficult to obtain, especially in agricultural sectors, because 
of factors such as seasonal workers, child labor, and informal labor. 
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the rest are forced into sprawling urban slums where they find only jobs that entail long 
hours and excruciating physical toil for very little pay.  (Sweatshops are the obvious 
example here.)  According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development, “At 
least 70 percent of the world’s very poor people are rural, and…over 80 percent of rural 
households farm to some extent.”19  Despite being in a position to produce goods to 
satisfy their own needs, these rural farmers are still confined to abject poverty.  These 
available jobs (either in sweatshops or menial subsistence agriculture) are indicative of a 
lack of what I am calling meaningful, un-alienated, or human labor.       
Singer, Pogge, and Held all discuss poverty relief and its connection to money in 
the form of transnational aid, but none of them focuses on the issues of unemployment or 
the nature of the work that great numbers of the poor are forced to endure.  Singer moves 
at a somewhat superficial level, avoiding structural critiques.  Thus the causes of poverty 
are framed simply in terms of material deprivation.  Pogge and Held do point to structural 
issues related to terms of trade and resources, but do not delve deep enough.  While 
stopping subsidies perhaps restores the pure market aspect to global agricultural 
production, it does nothing to deal with the issue of scale; huge corporate producers in the 
U.S. can still cheaply export goods to developing nations, which can still serve to 
undercut the feasibility of small farming for local producers.  Thus Pogge and Held are 
not properly approaching the issue of labor, which undercuts the efficacy and 
appropriateness of his proposals.   
Also (and perhaps more importantly), neither Pogge’s nor Held’s proposals 
address labor itself.  Focusing on providing a more ‘level’ capitalist playing field or 
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 International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rural Poverty Report 2011, www.ifad.org/rpr2011, 3. 
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establishing connections of care across borders do nothing about the nature of work and 
how commodities are produced.  The issue is not just that poor farmers cannot compete, 
but also that the way in which goods are produced does not lend itself to many people 
working, but rather a few. 
Behind such vast unemployment and alienation in labor (as causes of poverty) are 
the attitudes with which labor itself is viewed by society and individuals.  Contemporary 
society seems to view labor in a somewhat ambivalent sense.  On the one hand, some 
people spend as much time working as possible; they push their unhealthy obsession to 
the point of even checking work-related email while on vacation (Americans seem to be 
the paradigm case here).  In some cases this is motivated by a fear of unemployment in 
the face of the current economic crisis, while others see any deviation from this lifestyle 
as sinfully idle.  On the other hand, people often complain about having to spend a 
significant portion of their time engaged in labor activities.  In the interest of trying to 
spend less time laboring (and thus more time in leisure activities), humans (here I am 
speaking generally, in terms of society) are constantly trying to invent and utilize labor-
saving technology.  Such innovations allow goods to be able to be produced faster and 
with less direct human labor.  This in and of itself is not especially problematic; Marx 
himself sees leisure time as beneficial.  In principle, increased utilization of technology in 
the productive process means we as a society require less labor to produce a given 
product, and thus the benefits of such increased technological “productivity” have been a 
mostly unquestioned assumption over the last two hundred or so years.  Technology that 
literally “saves labor” has been viewed as an undeniably beneficial thing.  Innovation 
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which allows more goods to be produced with less labor is in fact how “productivity” is 
defined in economic terms, and thus the growth of such productivity is good.  By 
implication, “productivity growth” could mean that workers enjoy the same standards of 
living while spending less time working, thanks to technology.   
And yet, this has in no way come about; in fact, the opposite is true.  What has 
resulted from the rampant utilization of labor-saving technology is that many workers 
have lost their jobs.  Those workers who are able to retain employment must work at a 
greater pace to keep their jobs (and wages), or that the labor they engage in has been 
reduced to the alienated labor of machine manipulation.   
It is worth briefly examining the negative human effects of unemployment.  
Amartya Sen makes a very important point about employment, specifically about the 
effects of losing that employment.  When someone is unemployed or can’t find work, 
their life is negatively affected in a myriad of ways: 
If income loss were all that were involved in unemployment, then that loss could 
be to a great extent erased – for the individuals involved – by income support.  If, 
however, unemployment has other serious effects on the lives of the individuals, 
causing deprivation of other kinds, then the amelioration through income support 
would be to that extent limited.  There is plenty of evidence that unemployment 
has many far-reaching effects other than loss of income, including psychological 
harm, loss of work motivation, skill and self-confidence, increase in ailments and 
morbidity (and even mortality rates), disruption of family relations and social life, 
a hardening of social exclusion and accentuation of racial tensions and gender 
asymmetries.
20
 
 
                                                 
20
 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 94.  Sen makes this 
point to bolster his capabilities approach, insofar as he claims this approach to poverty takes into account 
the inherent diversity of human well-being, and the different aspects of poverty.  Rather than just 
augmenting the income of a poor person, Sen argues we must enhance his abilities to achieve certain goals 
within his life. 
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In times of unemployment, people feel dehumanized.  They feel as if they have nothing 
to offer the world; their sense of personal worth and value within their family takes a 
huge blow.  Human beings link their sense of personal identity very closely to the type of 
labor in which they engage.
21
  It isn’t simply a lack of income that upsets the world of an 
unemployed person (although that clearly is a negative impact), but also the assault on his 
sense of self-worth and humanity.  We don’t work merely to obtain a wage, but also to 
experience ourselves as human beings, productive creatures who labor in response to the 
needs generated by our environment.  For the poor of the world who are unable to labor, 
their humanity suffers for reasons beyond a simple lack of money.  They are told by 
society that there is nothing of worth that they can contribute.  Given that unemployment 
is clearly a terrible thing, causing damage far beyond mere loss of income, it is not at all 
obvious that the social gains from labor-saving technology (cheaper items for 
consumption) are worth the human losses.   
 The standard economic response to this dilemma is to assert that those who are 
unemployed (as a result of labor-saving innovations) are only made so temporarily, and 
that most will undoubtedly find suitable employment elsewhere in time.   
 Yet there is a problem here: this apparent tendency of a high-unemployment and 
high-labor-saving-technology economy to rebound may be in fact an accidental feature, 
in no way inherent to the structure of our current economic system.  While many of the 
                                                 
21
 Writing in The Atlantic, Don Peck goes to great lengths to detail this link between identity and work, 
particularly in the wake of the massive unemployment during the “Great Recession.”  Especially for men, 
their identity as provider and head-of-household is challenged and eviscerated as they are unable to find 
work over an extended period of time.  As he argues, the recent financial crisis will have far-reaching 
effects on American society, specifically in terms of the psychological and emotional well-being of those 
affected.  See here Don Peck, “How a New Jobless Era Will Transform America,” The Atlantic (March 
2010), 42-56. 
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great technological innovations of the last century have created more jobs than they 
destroyed (at least in rich countries), this outcome is not at all clear in relation to more 
recent technologies.
22
  Take for example the automobile: while its innovation certainly 
put some people out of jobs (horse and buggy services, a decrease in railroad patronage), 
the number of jobs that resulted far exceeded any such losses.  Not only were there 
factories to build cars, but also shops for upkeep, a system of roads and highways to be 
built, businesses that sprang up along those highways, etc., all which generated vast 
opportunities for employment.  But the proliferation of computer technologies in recent 
years appears to have had the opposite effect: factory workers, service representatives, 
and shop owners have all been pushed out because their labor can be “saved” from the 
productive process.  Once they are out of work, it is not at all clear that the general 
economy is able to conjure up new areas of employment.  In addition, the necessary 
infrastructure for new information technology requires less human labor to operate and 
maintain, and therefore displaced workers are not necessarily guaranteed new “operator” 
jobs.
23
  Thus there may not be a necessary or automatic connection between the labor-
saving potential of a technology and any positive effects on overall employment. 
                                                 
22
 Marx cites the stark effects of such technological innovation on cotton weavers in colonial India, as 
compared to the effects on weavers in Britain: "When machinery seizes on an industry by degrees, it 
produces chronic misery among the operatives who compete with it.  Where the transition is rapid, the 
effect is acute and felt by great masses.  History discloses no tragedy more horrible than the gradual 
extinction of the English hand-loom weavers, an extinction that was spread over several decades, and 
finally sealed in 1838…On the other hand, the English cotton machinery produced an acute effect in India.  
The Governor General reported in 1834-1835: ‘The misery hardly finds a parallel in the history of 
commerce.  The bones of the cotton-weavers are bleaching the plains of India.’”  Marx, Capital, 406-407. 
 
23
 This is a point made in some detail by Jeremy Rifkin in his book The End of Work.  While there will be 
(and have been) new technologically-intensive opportunities for employment, their numbers are not 
sufficient enough to offset the job losses in the industries I mention above.  In today’s workplace, one 
person with a computer can often do the work which previously required the physical (or perhaps mental) 
labor of many more actual human beings.  Rifkin was originally writing in the mid-nineties during the rise 
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 It is worth taking a step back and critically assessing the role that technology 
plays in production, especially in relation to human labor.  Here it is worth incorporating 
what Andrew Feenberg refers to as a “critical theory of technology.”  On this view, 
technology that is utilized within a society comes within the context of the social and 
political structures under which that society operates.
24
  Accordingly, technology is not 
“value neutral,” but instead echoes the values of the specific societal systems.  Feenberg 
argues that “The values of a specific social system and the interests of its ruling classes 
are installed in the very design of rational procedures and machines even before these are 
assigned specific goals.”25  Thus technology is not a “rational destiny” that societies 
move inexorably towards, but rather a scene of struggle between different possibilities 
and values. 
Of course technology isn’t solely determined or adopted because of how well it 
fits into the logic of the dominant political/social systems; it has to work.  Its utilization 
must provide some functionality that is lacking otherwise.  Even so, Feenberg is correct 
in observing:  
                                                                                                                                                 
of the internet, and given the evidence of the last fifteen or so years, his prognostications have been playing 
out correctly.  See Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 32-34. 
 
24
 Feenberg situates his critical theory of technology as somewhat of a middle ground between what he 
calls “instrumentalist” and “substantive” theories of technology.  The former takes technology as 
necessarily value neutral; a given technology is simply a tool or process that reflects a movement towards 
universal rational truth, and thus has no inherent relation to any given social context.  On the other hand, 
substantive theory denies the neutrality of technology, and instead claims that technology is value-laden, 
and its incorporation into a given society inexorably leads to structures of domination.  While Feenberg’s 
position is much closer to a substantive theory, insofar as he does argue that technology is not value-
neutral, he does not agree that therefore technology is necessarily a form of inescapable domination.  This 
substantive view echoes the work of Herbert Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man and Horkheimer and 
Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment.  For a more detailed description of these positions, see Andrew 
Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 5-6. 
 
25
 Ibid., 14-15. 
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But it is not merely because a device works that it is chosen for development over 
many other equally coherent configurations of technical elements.  Were that the 
case, then by analogy one could also explain the choice of individual sentences in 
speech by their grammatical coherence.  The social character of technology lies 
not in the logic of its inner workings, but in the relation of that logic to a social 
context.
26
 (Emphasis mine) 
 
 Utilizing Feenberg’s insights, we can see that our current version of capitalism 
contains within it a logic that links the technology utilized with a clear social context and 
goals.  More specifically, the argument in favor of the adoption of new labor-saving 
technologies contains a key assumption: that in most cases, a healthy productive 
enterprise wants to minimize the amount of labor spent to produce commodities, because 
doing so is “efficient.”  By efficiency, I am not talking about technical efficiency 
(allocating resources properly so as not to be wasting raw materials in the productive 
process), but rather monetary cost efficiency in production.  The concern is for putting the 
least amount of money necessary into the productive process in order to garner the 
highest possible monetary return.
27
 
 Producers and corporations prize efficiency above all else, and are willing to 
sacrifice almost anything in order to produce goods at less cost.  Since labor is a cost, it 
must be brought to a minimum level in the productive equation.  The driving force behind 
this reduction to efficiency is clearly an interest in returning the highest rate of profit at 
all times.  When calculating future expenditures on labor in terms of hiring/keeping on 
workers, raising pay, or decreasing working hours, the vetting process always boils down 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 79. 
  
27
 Going forward, I will refer to “monetary cost efficiency” simply as “efficiency.”  The force of 
“monetary” cannot be understated here; all variables in the productive equation are calculated in terms of 
money, whether its up-front capital investment, technical output, or labor costs.  Thus on this equation, if a 
worker can do the same job while being paid less, there is no change in the technical efficiency measure, 
but the worker is paid less, and thus is it more efficient in terms of monetary cost. 
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to the question: how will this affect our rate of return on investment?  Any variable input 
into this formula that deviates from this structure is deemed an unacceptable (inefficient) 
expense.  If my company can make something more cheaply, the current economic 
climate tells us that we should do so (and perhaps must) because of the cost reduction and 
profit growth.  Any firm that employs less-than-maximally-productive technology is 
considered guilty of the ultimate economic sin: inefficiency.
28
   
This maniacal worship of efficiency and the technology implemented are very 
much informed by the social and political mores of the ruling class, rather than in any 
way being “value-neutral.”  The interest of profit maximization is the driving force 
behind the vast implementation of labor-saving technology.  The structured logic of our 
current system has turned efficiency into an end in itself.  Labor-saving technology in this 
case is always a good thing (provided that it is cost effective).  This means either the 
same amount of workers produce more goods at the same labor cost, or it takes fewer 
workers to continue the current level of production.  Put more bluntly, to be efficient you 
need to minimize labor costs; this puts some people out of work if labor-saving 
technology can do the same job for less, but employing people to do work that machines 
can do more cheaply is not something to be considered.   
Such a concern for efficiency, while not new, has clearly exploded as a result of 
the global market that has developed over the last few decades.  Prior to this era of 
globalized capitalism, such an overzealous pursuit of efficient production at the cost of 
labor was constrained by the physical limits of technology and the power of the labor 
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 My point is not simply that efficiency is sought after for some abstract reason, but rather that the cost 
savings are considered paramount.  In addition, many times competitive pressures force a firm into trying 
to be maximally efficient, as otherwise they are unable to compete and survive in the marketplace. 
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movement.  Since the marketplace for goods consisted of the working class, many of 
whom were a given company’s employees (think 1950s United States here), companies 
ended up providing labor and wages that allowed for an adequate standard of living for 
their employees.  This relationship was a reciprocal one, and could be described as the 
closest to Adam Smith’s ideal sense of mutually interested (or perhaps disinterested) 
parties.  If the company laid off too many workers or allowed working conditions and 
wages to become unlivable, no one would be able to purchase the products made, and 
thus no profits resulted.
29
 
 Instead, in today’s economic climate the relation between companies and their 
workers has become one where efficiency is the bedrock.  The ever-expanding global 
marketplace has erased this small community relationship between companies and their 
employees, and replaced it with an entirely different paradigm: one where efficiency has 
been coupled with a sense that unemployment can exist at levels that are “socially 
acceptable.”  In their work Full Employment Abandoned, William Mitchell and Joan 
Muysken claim (echoing my argument in the earlier part of this chapter) that community 
and social interconnectedness have been replaced in society by rugged individualism.  
They argue that unemployment has shifted from a problem caused by macroeconomic 
(societal) mistakes to a problem caused by individual mistakes and inaction.   
                                                 
29
 This tenuous but functioning relationship between producers and workers in the 1950s is well summed 
up by Benjamin Barber: “Once upon a time, in capitalism’s more creative and successful period, a 
productivist capitalism prospered by meeting the real needs of real people.  Creating a synergy between 
making money and helping others (the Puritan Protestant formula for entrepreneurial virtue), producers 
profited by making commodities for the workers they employed – a circle of virtue that, while it involved 
elements of risk-taking for producers and exploitation of workers, benefited both classes and society at 
large.”  For further elaboration, see Benjamin Barber, Consumed (New York: Norton, 2007), 9-10. 
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In today’s society, Mitchell and Muysken claim, the unemployment rate is viewed 
as a reflection of individual, voluntary, and utility-maximizing choices.  In other words, 
“Anyone who is unemployed is now considered to have chosen to be in that state because 
they have not invested in appropriate skills, have not searched effectively for available 
job opportunities (in some cases have not searched at all), or have become overly 
selective in the jobs they would accept.”30  This is a refrain I’ve made mention of already 
in this chapter: those who are poor exist in that state because they are too lazy, too 
unmotivated (most likely as a result of unnecessarily robust governmental welfare 
programs), or too uneducated to get a job.  Thus the hallmark of this era is that individual 
responsibility and self-reliance must be values developed in the coddled masses of the 
unemployed.  In this way, they have an “obligation” to endeavor to find a job, and be 
willing to do whatever it takes (including moving, taking menial employment, or going 
back to school) in order to secure employment.     
The corollary to this promotion of the rugged individual is the belief that there are 
enough jobs out there available to all of these people.  Therefore, if the poor were to just 
do their part, they would no longer be unemployed.  But as Mitchell and Muysken go on 
to argue: 
The reality is that no reciprocal obligation is placed on government to provide 
enough jobs and enough hours of employment for all those seeking work.  The 
major shortcoming is that the focus on the individual ignores the role that 
macroeconomic constraints play in creating welfare dependence.  The 
preoccupation with instituting behavioral requirements and enforcing sanctions 
for welfare recipients suggests that governments perceive dependence as an 
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 William Mitchell and Joan Muysken, Full Employment Abandoned  (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2008), 261.  While this understanding of the causes of a person being unemployment has 
changed to some degree in the wake of the global crisis and recession, it is still frequently appealed to as 
the cause of why someone is out of work. 
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individual preference.  However, if jobs are rationed then it is a compositional 
fallacy to consider that the difference between getting a job and being 
unemployed is a matter of individual endeavor.
31
 
 
Governmental policies, influenced by neo-liberal economics, have shifted from 
promoting a climate where full employment (striving to guarantee that everyone actually 
has work) is the target to one wherein “full employability” reigns. According to this 
principle, individuals need to equip themselves to get a job on whatever terms the 
economy is offering employment, and if they work hard enough they will get one.  Thus 
the onus (obligation) is placed solely on the individual worker to make himself 
“employable”; if he does not succeed in finding work, he has no one to blame but 
himself.  He either lacked the skills required in the job market, or didn’t try hard enough 
to find employment.  Again, the full employability model holds that there are (or can be) 
enough jobs out there in the market for all those seeking employment; if someone is 
unemployed, it is his own fault.  This explanation is offered up as true not only 
nationally, but also internationally.  Such a mindset feeds into the acceptance of 
explanatory nationalism as a theory of the causes of global poverty: countries are poor 
because they refuse to retool their economies for export-led production, or refuse to 
accept the prescriptions of structural adjustment loans from the IMF.
32
  If a country (or its 
people) is poor, it is that country’s fault.     
                                                 
31
 Ibid., 128. 
 
32
 In his book Globalization and its Discontents, Joseph Stiglitz details how these loans are offered with 
conditions that the debtor country must adopt neoliberal economic policies that focus domestic spending 
and production on producing goods for export, as it is more efficient.  Cf. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization 
and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003). 
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This assertion is patently false, especially in light of the realities of global poverty 
and the economic system that causes it.  With efficiency as the base, jobs need not end up 
being created if technology can perform the work for less.  As such labor-saving 
technology is implemented, fewer and fewer jobs are left behind to be doled out amongst 
an ever-increasing number of unemployed people.  There is a total neglect of the 
possibility that a systemic failure is occurring, one wherein the economic system is 
oriented in such a way as to not be able to generate enough work to provide employment 
for all able-bodied people.   
It is here that I think the hammer stroke has fallen hardest upon the poor of the 
world.
33
  Global implementation of technology has taken so much of the actual labor out 
of production that there are fewer and fewer jobs to go around.  Even when jobs are 
available, they involve so little meaningful exertion and are instead mechanical 
processes, manipulating machines that perform the actual labor.  Skilled labor has 
become lost in the fervor of “deskilling,” where producers want to hire particularly those 
who lack particular trade skills, as they can be paid less and replaced easily.  Those 
industries that still rely on great deals of human labor are often sweatshops, exploiting 
and dehumanizing workers to such cruel extents that the work can hardly be called labor.  
Mitchell and Muysken refer to this paring down of meaningful labor as “underutilization” 
or “underemployment,” a factor that goes unrecognized in the statistical analyses of 
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 Even outside of the poorest of the world (which my statistics offered in the Introduction identify), the 
recent economic crises have certainly brought to light the fact that such a focus on cutting labor-intensive 
production has very much affected the lower and middle classes in affluent countries such as the United 
States.  Outsourcing in particular has become the bane of the working class in the West, as producers 
concerned with efficiency demand a movement of production to areas where labor costs are the lowest at 
all times. 
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unemployment.  While people may be left with their jobs intact after a given technology 
is implemented within the workplace, the quality of that job can be quite adversely 
affected in one of two ways: either the laborer’s work is intensified, so they must work 
longer hours to produce enough to keep their wages the same, or they are subject to 
“deskilling.”34  In other areas, such as in agriculture, the global market and trade policies 
have made labor-intensive production almost impossible as these farmers cannot compete 
with the larger machine-driven producers.  Again, given the fact that over 70 percent of 
the world’s poorest people are rural agricultural workers, such policies have far-reaching 
negative effects on the poor.     
By focusing on monetary cost efficiency and framing increases in productivity 
(and technology) in terms of monetary profits, global economic players have erased so 
many of the opportunities for truly human labor that were involved in producing the 
goods of our world.  Prior to the globalized world of the last forty or so years, the 
expansion of markets meant that enterprises focused on technical efficiency; as demand 
for products was going up, producers were focused on making goods fast enough to keep 
up with rising demand.  But in today’s globalized marketplace, producers have turned 
instead to emphasizing monetary cost efficiency.  There is a downward pressure to make 
things more cheaply (and thus oftentimes with less human labor). 
Additionally, what little labor is left in the production process has changed 
character into an alienated, meaningless, and mechanized process, hardly befitting human 
laborers.  Again, societal attitudes on labor have been altered by the implementation of 
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 On this point, see Mitchell and Muysken, 169-170.  As we have seen in the United States in recent years, 
many workers who were formerly employed in skilled labor end up turning to the service industry, selling 
products and services, rather than utilizing their skills to produce objects for consumption. 
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vast labor-saving technologies, and labor itself has thus fallen out of favor as an integral 
part of life, existence, and production.  Labor in general has been devalued to the point of 
being seen as a commodity, rather than as an intrinsic aspect of our species-being, and a 
human need for human beings.
35
   
A Solution? 
As will become clearer in the following section, I argue against using the current 
definition of efficiency as the guiding principle of economic organization.  Instead, 
keeping in mind my goal as meaningful human labor, I will instead defend a different 
understanding of “efficiency” based in species-being, and focusing on a tempered use of 
technology to provide “good work.”     
 It may seem that I am being overly simplistic in my appraisal of efficiency.  Let 
me be clear about my critique: by jettisoning an all-encompassing concern for (monetary 
cost) efficiency, I am not claiming that producers should simply be willing to accept 
monetary losses in order to keep people employed, regardless of market fluctuations.  
Business enterprises need to be productive, and need not be wasteful in terms of 
resources or materials.  And yet my argument contains within it a sense that just because 
things are a certain way, there is no reason that they could not in fact be otherwise.  
Trying to make the lives of the worst off among us better, or seeing everyone’s basic 
rights fulfilled, is a worthy goal, but unless we aim for more than that, we cannot meet 
even that minimal goal.  What we need to aim for is a Marxian human world. 
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 This phenomenon of alienation is certainly not new, as Marx saw it as the utmost concern in his day.  At 
the same time, whatever progress that had been made in this area during the early 20
th
 century (again up 
until the 1950s) is swiftly and surely disappearing, because of the concern for efficiency. 
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 The key practical implication of a Marxian species-being approach to global 
poverty is that we should focus on providing all people with access to meaningful labor.  
Note however that merely providing menial employment to the involuntarily unemployed 
will only erase the technical deficits faced, but it does little for their humanity, if the labor 
is not in some way meaningful.  We needn’t pay people to dig holes in a field, and then 
pay other people to come and fill in those holes.  As we shall see, a focus on “meaningful 
labor” may mean striving to employ the unemployed, but it also points to a higher goal, 
wherein we must change the character of labor itself. 
 More specifically, we must affect changes in structures so that labor can be 
viewed in a much more positive light within society.  Currently, all that is seen to have 
value in the productive equation is money, and thus the concern is for overhead costs, 
labor time, and wages.  Instead of this simplistic view, we must change our mindset (and, 
in turn, our institutions) to realize that labor itself is something of value for human beings 
(both for its own sake, as well as instrumentally).  It is more than just a “factor in 
production.”       
Changing the character of work and re-humanizing it not only helps to solve the 
problem of alienated labor, but also suggests a solution to global poverty.  By altering our 
productive processes to incorporate “good work” again, we can not only allow for a more 
human production process, but also involve more humans in production.  Such an 
increase in the amount of labor necessary to produce goods that satisfy the needs of the 
world means that more people (especially those who are currently “poor”) are able to be a 
part of the productive process.  This alteration of the structures of labor-saving 
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technology is admittedly not “value-neutral”; it is influenced by a Marxian view of labor 
and labor’s value for human life, and thus its logical justification differs from a concern 
for monetary cost efficiency.    
How do we best approach changing the character of labor?  To this point, labor-
saving technology has been the lynchpin of the capitalist productive equation, and the 
result of such technology is that it has made vast numbers of human beings worse off.  In 
his historical analysis of capitalism, Immanuel Wallerstein details these disastrous results 
very clearly: 
The overwhelming proportion of the world’s work-forces, who live in rural zones 
or move between them and urban slums, are worse off than their ancestors five 
hundred years ago.  They eat less well, and certainly have a less balanced diet.  
Although they are more likely to survive the first year of life (because of the 
effect of social hygiene undertaken to protect the privileged), I doubt that the life 
prospects of the majority of the world’s population as of age one are greater than 
previously; I suspect the opposite is true.  They unquestionably work harder – 
more hours per day, per year, per lifetime.  And since they do this for less total 
reward, the rate of exploitation has escalated very sharply.
36
  
 
 Given these terrible results, we must revisit the role that labor-saving technology 
should have in the productive process.  Of course by not adopting some possible labor-
saving technology businesses will be decried as “inefficient” in terms of the logic of the 
current economic system.  But if we are able to change the context and logic of our 
system so as to generate a truly human world, the concept of efficiency in production 
changes as well.  If “efficiency” is to mean achieving some end of production with a 
minimal waste of valuable resources, then a level of technology that renders masses of 
human beings unemployed is prima facie inefficient; we are wasting the valuable 
resource of fully human beings who are capable of productive, meaningful labor.  And if 
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the end we seek is a fully human world populated by fully human beings developed in 
terms of species-being, then it becomes clear that labor-saving technology isn’t always 
“efficient.”  It does not ensure we produce our end, nor does it keep us from wasting 
some precious resource in the process.  Our current level of labor-saving technology is 
actually inefficient, not in the sense that we are wasting material goods, but insofar as we 
are wasting human beings.
37
         
 Thus we need to rearrange the place of labor in production so as to make it 
actually “efficient” in human terms.  To do so, we will end up seeking out technology 
that will create meaningful labor, and decrease involuntary unemployment.  If we are 
able to create an environment where all have access to productive meaningful labor, we 
will undercut the very foundations of poverty, and allow for all people to develop 
themselves as fully human.  Developing species-being in the interests of bringing about a 
fully human world has much to offer everyone, not just the poor. 
In order to address the problem of global poverty in the most efficacious way (that 
being a way that moves us in the direction of a truly human world), our technologies, 
economic structures, and governmental policies should be systematically oriented, not 
towards consumption or more labor-saving technology, but rather towards providing 
meaningful labor for all.  In and of itself, this goal might not take us beyond capitalism, 
but it no doubt points to a different type of world in terms of labor. 
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E.F. Schumacher and “Intermediate Technology” 
To move towards a new and more appropriate approach to global poverty (one in 
line with our nature as species-being and the concerns above), we must re-examine and 
re-humanize our conception of the place of labor in human life and society.  Labor is of 
central importance to our species-being; good work is a fundamental human need.  At the 
same time, our current economic system is organized in such a way as to minimize the 
role of actual human labor involved in production.  It is this trend that must be 
restructured for the sake of the world’s poor – and for the rest of us as well.  Only when 
labor is appropriately valued and promoted (through appropriate levels of technology) 
will the poor be able to not only overcome their squalor, but also begin to truly develop 
themselves in accordance with their species-being.   
 In order to provide a technical framework for the ethical position that I have 
developed above, I appeal to the two seminal works of E.F. Schumacher: Small is 
Beautiful and Good Work, both written in the early 1970s.  Today, some forty years later, 
Schumacher’s work has seen significant resurgence among many groups: Economists, 
philosophers, and activists alike view his work as particularly relevant to anti-poverty 
initiatives today.  (While Schumacher is technically an economist, he takes an overtly 
philosophical approach to economic problems in areas of poverty, the environment, and 
politics.) 
 E.F. Schumacher was born in Bonn, Germany in 1911.  The son of academic 
parents, he spent years being educated in Germany, Oxford, and New York, before 
returning to Germany in 1934, during the rise of the Nazis.  Increasingly anxious about 
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the party’s agenda and actions, he and his family left for England.  There, as a result of 
increasing anti-German sentiment, he was relegated to the country to work as a farm 
laborer, even being interred in a detention camp for a few months.  These experiences 
greatly influenced his intellectual development and his sense of the importance of labor. 
During his time on the farm, he began to write widely on economic issues, which 
brought him to the attention of John Maynard Keynes.  Keynes lobbied the British 
government to release Schumacher from his labor, and involved him in economic 
discussions regarding British economic policy, and later German postwar reconstruction.  
As a result of his experiences on the farm during the war, Schumacher began to utilize a 
sense of “appropriateness” in reference to technology and industry (a point which will be 
extremely important to my argument going forward). 
In the 1950s, Schumacher became increasingly influenced by Gandhi and by 
Buddhist thought, spending time as an economic consultant (through the United Nations) 
in Burma and then in India.  As a result he not only was moved by the Buddhist rejection 
of materialism, but also by the abject poverty that he experienced.  He came to believe 
that the root cause of such rampant misery was the impact of Western levels of 
technology and industry on smaller, traditionally self-sufficient cultures.  Late in his life, 
influenced by reading Aquinas and seeing a convergence between his idea of the 
importance of labor to human beings and the socioeconomic teachings of the Catholic 
Church (specifically Pope John XXIII’s encyclical on “Christianity and Social Progress” 
in 1961), Schumacher converted to Catholicism.       
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Schumacher’s work fits in perfectly with the ethical approach I have developed, 
and provides a solid backing for my Marxian claim about the nature of work and its 
centrality to a fully human existence, and for my assertion concerning the need to 
develop an alternative view of economic activity that has at its core the value of 
meaningful labor, rather than consumption.  Drawing upon Buddhist and Christian 
worldviews, Schumacher echoes Marx’s claim about the central importance of labor for 
human beings.  He takes the function of work to be threefold: “To give a man a chance to 
utilize and develop his faculties; to enable him to overcome his ego-centeredness by 
joining with other people in a common task; and to bring forth the goods and services 
needed for a becoming existence.”38  While work is no doubt necessary for our continued 
survival (thus meeting our natural needs, as Marx has it), meaningful work for 
individuals involves satisfying a human need to develop ourselves and create 
relationships with other human beings.   
 Schumacher, like Marx, connects work to a conception of human nature that 
highlights human potential: “How does work relate to the end and purpose of man’s 
being?  It has been recognized…that every human being born into this world has to work 
not merely to keep himself alive but to strive towards perfection.”39  While he does not 
explicitly utilize Marx’s argument, there is a clear link present between Marx and 
Schumacher.  In order to develop ourselves into fully human beings, people must be able 
to labor in some way that develops their creative faculties.   
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 But, as Schumacher indicates, our current economic climate views labor in an 
altogether different way:  
A fundamental source of wealth is human labor.  Now, the modern economist has 
been brought up to consider ‘labor’ or work as little more than a necessary evil.  
From the point of view of the employer, it is in any case simply an item of cost, to 
be reduced to a minimum if it cannot be eliminated altogether, say, by 
automation.  From the point of view of the workman, it is a ‘disutility’; to work is 
to make a sacrifice of one’s leisure and comfort, and wages are a kind of 
compensation for the sacrifice.  Hence the ideal from the point of view of the 
employer is to have output without employees, and the ideal from the point of 
view of the employee is to have income without employment.
40
 
 
 Everyone (the employer/capitalist and the worker alike) tends to view labor as only a 
means to end (profit or consumption), and thus it is at best tolerated.  Labor is not 
considered a human need; society does not view it as something that is intrinsically 
necessary for human beings.  We work begrudgingly, and try to avoid it whenever 
possible.  According to Schumacher, this can clearly be seen in the fact that modern 
economists measure a given group’s ‘standard of living’ in terms of consumption and 
buying power.
41
  
Thus labor’s place within society and an individual human life has been altered to 
be as follows: it is to be minimized at every turn.  In fact, this approach to labor is worn 
proudly on the sleeve of our economic system: “The basic aim of modern industrialism is 
not to make work satisfying but to raise productivity; its proudest achievement is labor 
saving, whereby labor is stamped with the mark of undesirability.”42  As I argued above, 
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cost efficiency sets a standard whereby production should involve the lowest possible 
cost expenditure, and, since labor is a cost, the least amount of human labor possible.   
“Modern” Technology 
To aid us in this escape from work, technology has become our “savior” insofar 
as it allows us to minimize the amount of labor necessary to produce what meets our 
natural needs.  Here Schumacher’s position diverges from Marx.  Marx did not 
necessarily critique labor-saving technology as undermining human nature; in fact, he 
saw it as a good thing.  The utilization of labor-saving technology could mean, in 
principle, that it would require less labor time on the part of an individual to produce 
objects to meet his needs, and thus he could spend the remaining time engaged in 
leisure.
43
  The problem, according to Marx, was that capitalism had not spread the leisure 
time around to all people (the worker in particular).     
  Schumacher’s view of labor-saving technology, however, is quite different from 
Marx’s.  According to Schumacher, labor has become perhaps a tolerated natural need, 
rather than a truly human need; we can escape labor in proportion to the level of 
technology that we can employ.  It is the promulgation of this minimizing view of labor 
that Schumacher sees as one of the biggest factors in the rampant utilization of labor-
saving technology.  It’s important to note that he does not damn technology in and of 
itself; rather, the problem is with the unquestioning, one-directional implementation of 
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technology, at all costs.  The societal mantra has become: “Whatever becomes 
technologically possible – within certain economic limits – must be done.  Society must 
adapt itself to it.  The question whether or not it does any good is ruled out.”44  In the 
productive process, the desire to minimize labor has developed with such zeal that no one 
pauses to consider the possibility that some technological development may make people 
worse off, rather than better; even posing such a question brands one as against the 
“progress” of society.    
In this way, Schumacher remarks that “technology recognizes no self-limiting 
principle – in terms, for instance, of size, speed, or violence.  It therefore does not possess 
the virtues of being self-balancing, self-adjusting, and self-cleansing.”45  It is this lack of 
a limiting principle that I argue best embodies the role of technology within the 
“efficiency quest” of modern capitalist production.  Instead of critically examining the 
effects of a given technological innovation on the laborers it will affect, such technology 
is unquestioningly embraced and implemented.  If something is technologically possible 
(provided that it lowers costs), it should be done; the possibility that such technology may 
not actually make human lives better (or that it could make them worse!) does not enter 
into the picture.  As such, more “advanced” technology is always better, and there is 
never any question that new technologies which make production cheaper are a good 
thing.
46
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 The counterargument, as I’ve mentioned, is that implementing new technology in 
the productive process makes for less necessary human labor time, which in turn begets 
more leisure time for workers.  If a new machine can produce ten shirts per hour (under 
the eye of a human controller), this is better, according to the efficiency minimalist, than 
having the same worker labor to make three shirts in the same amount of time.  Labor-
saving technology will necessarily increase leisure time and thus technological 
developments that actually hurt workers (long-term) are unimaginable; labor is “saved” 
from being wasted.   
But, as Schumacher points out, leisure time appears not to have entered into the 
picture as presupposed: “Paradoxical as it may seem, modern industrial society, in spite 
of an incredible proliferation of labor-saving devices, has not given people more time to 
devote to their all-important spiritual tasks.”47  Given the concern for efficiency, there is 
no real incentive to provide increased leisure time for workers.  If technology can be 
implemented to increase profits, it does not matter whether or not this actually increases 
the leisure time of the laborers who are affected.  Instead of producing leisure, this 
unbridled implementation of labor-saving technology has only led to a growth in the 
scale of productive endeavors.  A new wrinkle has emerged, wherein the picture of scale 
has been grossly distorted, insofar as bigger is now necessarily better.  Again, this 
indicates the level to which efficiency has become the guiding economic principle; the 
reason such mass production is employed is because of the efficiency of economies of 
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scale.  The more technology one implements, the more goods are produced faster and 
more cheaply, leading to greater profit margins.
48
  There is a double dimension at work 
here: in order to remain competitive, either a business must lay off workers (and thus do 
the same amount of work with less laborers), or it must grow the output of its enterprise 
(by getting more out of the same amount of workers).  Either way, in doing so, the 
enterprise can and does replace workers with labor-saving technology.   
In addition, the scale of technology itself has grown; the labor-saving 
technologies that are widely implemented require a great deal of up-front capital to 
implement, and this means that many times only large producers are able to muster the 
capital required.  As Schumacher argues, “Modern technology, generally speaking, 
makes good shoes only for big fellows.  It is geared to mass production; it is highly 
sophisticated and enormously capital-costly.”49  Thus modern industry with its 
technological zeal has trended towards ever-increasing size and complexity, along with 
being more and more capital intensive.  To have any chance to survive as a producer in 
the global economy, advanced labor-saving technology must be the core of a productive 
business, and such technology involves a great deal of up-front capital.  From the 
efficiency standpoint, this is acceptable as it ends up keeping production costs low.  But 
from the standpoint of small producers in developing countries, they have no means to 
obtain the capital necessary to implement this level of labor-saving technology.  As such, 
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they are quickly squeezed out of the possibility of sustainable living through their own 
labor.           
 The ever-increasing utilization of labor-saving technology in production feeds 
industrial growth measurable by G.N.P., which our efficiency-craving and labor-
minimizing economist always sees as a good thing.  But this positive view holds, 
“irrespective of what has grown and who, if anyone, has benefitted.  The idea that there 
could be pathological growth, unhealthy growth, disruptive or destructive growth, is…a 
perverse idea.”50  In fact, Schumacher’s main claim is that the growth that has occurred at 
the feet of technology is unhealthy, disruptive, and destructive.  What it has destroyed is 
the importance of labor for human beings.
51
   
 This destruction of labor as an important facet of human beings has horrific 
practical implications.  According to a short talk Schumacher gave the day before he died 
entitled “On Technology for a Democratic Society,” labor-saving technology has come to 
constitute “a force that forms society, and forms it so that fewer and fewer people can be 
real people [emphasis added].”52  One of the ways in which such technology robs human 
beings of “real” lives is involuntary unemployment on a very large scale; much of the 
world’s poor are unable to find any avenue to labor, since machines perform more and 
more of the unskilled labor tasks.  In addition, what labor has remained after the 
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technology boom in industry has been altered to the level of meaningless, degrading 
activity, hardly worthy of being called “work.”  We have minimized the amount of 
creativity and actual labor put into the productive process.  This means that raw materials 
go into the factory and come out improved, while human beings go into the factory as 
people and come out “corrupted and degraded.”53  Lastly, even if poor individuals are 
able to find some way to labor (such as poor subsistence farmers), they run up against the 
issue of scale, as they are unable to compete in the market, and thus cannot make a living 
for themselves.   
Underlying all of these causes of poverty is a sense that we have lost what labor 
means for human beings; it has instead come to be devalued and discarded.  Thus it is 
that Schumacher offers perhaps his most damning statement on modern industrial 
society: 
How could we explain the almost universal refusal on the part of the rulers of the 
rich societies…to work towards the humanization of work?  It is only necessary to 
assert that something would reduce the ‘standard of living’ and every debate is 
instantly closed.  That soul-destroying, meaningless, monotonous, moronic work 
is an insult to human nature which must necessarily and inevitably produce either 
escapism or aggression, and that no amount of ‘bread and circuses’ can 
compensate for the damage done.
54
 
 
He argues that we are at a point of crisis in terms of labor.
55
  A majority of the world’s 
population is either unable to find work, or the work they end up with is utterly 
dehumanizing.  Still others toil ceaselessly, only to be unable to overcome the 
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discrepancies in scale of the economic playing field.  Yet any attempt to question the role 
that technology has played in this devastation, or the implication that perhaps we should 
“take a technological step back” to move forward, is met with skepticism and scorn; to do 
so would be inefficient.   
Something doesn’t fit; a once-round peg has become square and been crammed 
into a round hole, while the hole is merely being whittled away to try to make the fit 
palatable.  Schumacher offers two possibilities: either our technology is “brilliant” yet 
our economic system is otherwise poorly constructed, or the technology itself does not fit 
the realities of the present day, including our human nature.
56
  Using the metaphor of a 
moving train, he phrases the issue this way: 
In short: [perhaps] we have a splendid train but a bad track or a rotten driver or a 
lot of stupid, unruly passengers.  Maybe all this is quite true, except that we do 
not have such a splendid train at all.  Maybe what is most wrong is that which has 
been and continues to be the strongest formative force – the technology itself.57 
 
There is something problematic with the level of technology that we currently employ in 
production, insofar as it tends to generate both unemployment and work which is 
dehumanizing and meaningless, and thus is ill-suited for our human nature as species-
being.   
Intermediate, Appropriate (and thus Human) Technology 
Instead of a level of technology that de-humanizes workers, the short and simple 
answer is to develop and implement technology on a level that does fit with the nature of 
human beings.  From the standpoint of the poor of the world, mass factory production 
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and large-scale farms are wholly inappropriate; they directly create high levels of 
unemployment, and encourage those unemployed workers to migrate to urban centers, 
where the few outlets for labor involve only drudgery.  Schumacher claims that “Western 
technology has been devised primarily for the purpose of saving labor; it could hardly be 
appropriate for districts or regions troubled with a large labor surplus.”58  As producers 
have attempted to “modernize” through the adoption of new labor-saving technology, all 
they have actually succeeded in doing is extinguishing old labor opportunities faster than 
they have created new ones.  This creates a new group of unemployed workers who, 
seeing that there are now less opportunities for labor, inevitably migrate to metropolitan 
slums looking for work.
59
 
In order to put these unemployed people back to work in meaningful ways, 
Schumacher argues that we must find a level of technology that is somewhere in between 
the archaic and the overzealous; it must be “appropriate,” and thus is “intermediate.”  
Such “intermediate technology” will no doubt involve more labor than the current 
productive process does, but that’s exactly the point: there will be more labor involved, 
and the quality of such labor will be more in line with our humanity.  As a result more 
people will be able to labor, an outcome that benefits both the individuals and society as a 
whole.   
 To begin with, Schumacher turns the current adages of development (in terms of 
scale, complexity, and capital-intensiveness) on their heads: “Let’s begin with basic 
human requirements…and there I can’t see anything that man really needs that cannot be 
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produced very simply, very efficiently, very viably on a small scale with a radically 
simplified technology, with very little initial capital, so that even little people can get at 
it.”60  While complex items such as jet engines may require equally complex technology, 
the production of basic foodstuffs can be done on a small scale with varying degrees of 
technology, including many low-level technological processes.  To allow for the poor to 
have a chance at development, Schumacher claims that they must be able to have access 
to an appropriate and feasible level of production.  This approach is not a Luddite 
attitude, whereby any new technology is inherently bad and must be thrown out at all 
costs; technology is not always the sole problematic factor.   
The history of productive enterprise and technology has much to offer by way of 
ideas.  To develop intermediate technology, we must seek out “methods and equipment 
that are (1) cheap enough so that they are accessible to virtually everyone, (2) suitable for 
small-scale applications, and (3) compatible with man’s need for creativity.”61  In this 
way, intermediate technology offers a way for everyone, the poor of the world in 
particular, to labor meaningfully.  As I’ve argued in the preceding pages, our human 
nature is such that for people to be fully human, they must labor and feel that they are in 
some way productive beings, engaging in stimulating, “sensuous” activity that is worthy 
of human time and effort.  By altering the scale of production to be much smaller and to 
make the process itself more labor-intensive, we are making such labor much more 
available to individual people all over the world, especially those in impoverished areas.  
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Furthermore, by utilizing small-scale applications and technology that do not usurp 
human creativity, the quality of such labor is much more in line with what I’ve been 
calling meaningful labor.  The level of technology that is implemented is governed by a 
sense of what is appropriate in light of its effects on the quality of labor, as opposed to its 
effects on how quickly or cheaply a commodity can be produced.  Production that 
involves more labor than is perhaps technically necessary will in fact be seen as 
appropriate, even if it isn’t “economically efficient.”  Since meaningful labor is 
something of value for human beings, it is appropriate to promote it, rather than forcing 
poor people to try to survive without it.         
Thus I argue, with Schumacher, that a sense of appropriateness must replace the 
current worship of cost efficiency in production.  The appropriateness of any possible 
intermediate technology depends upon the scale of a given project and the environment in 
which production to take place (both in terms of the natural environment, as well as the 
culture).  This shift in the focus of productive enterprises has at its base a concern for the 
humanity of the laborers, and the ways in which technology will actually improve (or 
destroy) such humanity.  As Schumacher states: 
[Individuals] first need is to start work of some kind that brings some reward, 
however small; it is only when they experience that their time and labor is of 
value that they can become interested in making it more valuable.  It is therefore 
more important that everybody should produce something than that a few people 
should each produce a great deal.
62
 
 
Given an opportunity to engage in labor that has value and involves creativity and 
attention to detail, poor people will be able to experience themselves and their abilities as 
fully human, and in turn create both new needs and new opportunities for themselves and 
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others to labor.  Intermediate technology can make work more interesting and 
imaginative, which introduces a “re-skilling,” rather than deskilling, of labor.  Again, this 
gives more people the chance to labor in some aspect of production, rather than a smaller 
number of people the chance to control machines that produce “efficiently.”   
So how can this change take place?  How can we develop and implement 
intermediate technology?  It’s important to note that for Schumacher intermediate 
technology is not a “thing” in and of itself; rather it is a guiding vision that can be 
brought to bear on individual situations.  On this view the concept of appropriateness 
functions as a directing principle which can be applied in individual circumstances.  
Overall, what will be appropriate to allow for meaningful human labor in production is 
not large labor-saving technological production, nor simple primitive production.  
Instead, intermediate technology is superior to the latter but much simpler, cheaper, and 
less capital intensive than the former.  Within the context of agriculture, for example, we 
aim for something between the archaic, impractical hoe and the expensive, labor-
reducing tractor.   
 Schumacher claims that seeking out intermediate technology can happen in three 
distinct ways: upgrading low-level technology to a level that isn’t wholly inefficient but 
still involves a significant amount of human labor, downgrading machine processes that 
are in place solely to save labor (especially pertinent for poor countries), or developing 
new scientific technologies from scratch (which can be difficult for individuals in poor 
countries who lack technical education and time to spend on “innovation”).63  The first 
two options are the ones he sees as the most viable within the context of developing 
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countries.  By adjusting technology upwards or downwards as circumstances demand, we 
can provide more meaningful labor for people, while at the same time producing 
commodities that can be sold in the marketplace.   
 What makes this approach so controversial and pertinent today is the possibility 
of downscaling technology in many productive arenas.  As I have made clear to this 
point, labor-saving technology is seen as inherently beneficial for production, and thus it 
is unquestioningly incorporated and developed if it is possible to do so; rarely, if ever, do 
producers ask if more technology in production will make their workers better off.  Yet 
Schumacher leaves no doubt that in many cases goods can be produced with much less-
sophisticated technology, and with less capital involved (thereby making it accessible to 
the poor of the world).  He points out the example of the process of bending steel as an 
area where intermediate technology can be applied.  Years before the giant machines 
used in Pittsburgh steel mills were invented, steel was bent by hand around the world.  
While the machinery makes the process faster and (obviously) much less labor-intensive, 
in can no doubt be done with smaller and more individualized tools and technology (and 
relatively cheaply) within the developing countries themselves.
64
 
 In response, the “efficient economist” may respond that this is clearly a Luddite 
move; why try to produce this locally by hand when it can be bent in Pittsburgh and then 
cheaply exported to anywhere in the world?  The answer, as we’ve seen, is that such an 
approach is not appropriate.  It may provide cost efficiency, but it offers nothing in terms 
of meaningful labor for local workers; in fact, it completely eradicates the potential for 
such labor in the local arena.   
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 Another key point here is that bending the steel by hand minimizes the 
infrastructure and capital requirements for starting up such an enterprise locally.  The vast 
implementation of labor-saving, capital-intensive technology in production, according to 
Schumacher, stands as a huge roadblock to the poor starting up such businesses.  They 
have virtually no access to the capital and liquidity which is required up front.  Even if 
they are able, they must spend most (if not all) of their money on such correlative aspects 
of production, rather than on production itself.  By altering the role of technology in 
production, such issues of access are quickly allayed. 
Schumacher provides another example: the “walking mini-tractor” (called the 
“Snail”).  This instrument is not feasible for plowing large amounts of acreage, but in 
developing countries it is perfect, as farms have been traditionally a few acres in size.  In 
addition, the fuel and capital costs are 1/100 of a tractor, and thus the Snail is easy to 
adopt by those in developing countries.  It does not usurp human labor, as it must be 
controlled and commanded, but it still allows a farmer to increase his productivity.
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 In order for his approach to be effective in attacking conditions of poverty as they 
are generated through mass unemployment and mass migration, Schumacher proposes 
four criteria for what he called an “agro-industrial culture,” focused on agricultural labor 
and an appropriate level of technological utilization: 
1. Workplaces have to be created in the areas where the people are living now, 
and not primarily in metropolitan areas into which they tend to migrate; 
 
2. These workplaces must be, on average, cheap enough so that they can be 
created in large numbers without this calling for an unattainable level of 
savings and imports; 
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3. The production methods employed must be relatively simple, so that the 
demands for high skills are minimized, not only in the productions process 
itself but also in matters of organization, raw material supply, financing, 
marketing, and so forth; 
 
4. Production should be largely from local materials for local use.66 
    
 With the implementation of intermediate, appropriate technology, we increase the 
amount of labor in production.  In turn, since this technology has been incorporated (or 
re-incorporated) because it requires direct and creative human labor, it provides the 
workers with an opportunity to fulfill their human need for meaningful labor, or “Good 
Work,” as Schumacher has it.  Making a greater amount of labor necessary for production 
means more labor available for more people (certainly at least a step in the right direction 
of full employment).  This is a return to a more appropriate paradigm of production, 
rather than merely a regression to primitive productive methods.  In developing countries 
around the world, more labor-intensive production means the poor who were driven into 
massively overcrowded urban areas are able to return to the land from whence they came.  
Couple this “Good Work” with making such small-scale agricultural viable (and perhaps 
an emphasis on local production, rather than ever-increasing trade), and we have reduced 
the need for exploitative drudgery in sweatshops, which in turn increases the availability 
of good work for more of the world’s poor.  Schumacher invokes Gandhi in seeing this as 
giving us a sense of “production by the masses,” rather than “mass production.”67 
 Notice here that applying Schumacher’s approach would do more than simply 
eradicate unemployment by giving everyone a job; it would provide meaningful human 
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work for the poor, whether they are poor subsistence farmers in a developing country, or 
those begging on the streets of Chicago because they are unemployed.  They will now 
have the opportunity to not only rise out of their conditions of physical poverty, but also 
the “human poverty” of which Marx speaks. 
 Notice also that the “aid” provided to the poor comes not in the form of 
philanthropy or donations, but rather in a form that provides what David Ellerman calls 
“autonomy-respecting assistance.”  In his book Helping People Help Themselves, 
Ellerman (an economist, philosopher, and former economic advisor to Joseph Stiglitz 
during the latter’s tenure as chief economist of the World Bank) argues that most kind of 
aid/help that is offered to developing countries ends up undercutting their ability to 
effectively move forward.  Citing Schumacher approvingly, he points out that an 
approach of Intermediate Technology provides aid and direction to the poor “in such a 
way that respects, fosters, and sustains the autonomy of the doers [the poor]…When the 
doers have the will, there is a way; the best role for the helpers is to indirectly enable and 
expedite that way, not try to substitute their will for that of the doers.”68  This is precisely 
Schumacher’s point: that, given an appropriate level of technology, poor people can again 
produce in ways that allow them to make a living, while at the same time allowing them 
to utilize technology so as to keep themselves actively in the productive process (rather 
than removing themselves from it).  Intermediate Technology works along the lines of 
Ellerman’s concern for an indirect approach, where the objective is “not to supply 
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motivation to the doers but to find and start with the existing own motivation of the doers 
and to supply help on that basis.”69   
 Schumacher’s approach promotes the possibility for all individuals to engage in 
meaningful labor by altering the level of labor-saving technology in production.  In this 
way, technology is appropriate for creating “real” human beings.  As Schumacher argues, 
“I have no doubt that it is possible to give a new direction to technological development, 
a direction that shall lead it back to the real needs of man, and that also means: to the 
actual size of man.  Man is small, and, therefore, small is beautiful.  To go for giantism is 
to go for self-destruction.”70 This statement signifies an approach which is overtly 
focusing in on human needs that must be developed in accordance with species-being, 
rather than seeing production and labor as merely meeting our natural needs of survival.     
 I argue then that a conception of a fully human world has at its core the kind of 
good work that Schumacher’s view offers.  As meaningful labor is a human need, 
developing Intermediate Technology is a practical way in which meaningful labor can be 
developed for those who do not currently have access to it.
71
  Again, this approach moves 
clearly in the direction of a world without poverty by attacking one of the root causes of 
such poverty.  At the same time, the growth of opportunities for meaningful labor pushes 
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our world to not only eradicate poverty, but also allow all individuals to develop 
themselves in terms of species-being and becoming fully human.   
 As I find Schumacher’s approach as elegant as that of Marx, I will let him have 
the final word here:    
If we can recover the sense that it is the most natural thing for every person born 
into this world to use his hands in a productive way and that it is not beyond the 
wit of man to make this possible, then I think the problem of unemployment will 
disappear and we shall soon be asking ourselves how we can get all the work 
done that needs to be done.
72
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CONCLUSION 
 Let me conclude by examining three specific objections to my argument, ones 
which resemble those I have leveled against the approaches of Singer, Pogge, and Held, 
and by offering some suggestions for practical action. 
Counter-Arguments 
“What If I Do Not Care?” 
 Given that my project is an attempt to provide a compelling moral motivation, the 
first objection comes from a person who tries to resist the force of my argument by 
claiming that he feels no human impulse to help poor people that he encounters.  Simply 
put, this interlocutor asks: “What if I do not care about the beggar who approaches me?” 
 Looking back over the other approaches to poverty that I have considered, our 
stubborn interlocutor has tried to deny the motivational argument in each case: To Singer, 
he claims that he should not have to give money to the poor just because he has the 
means.  To Pogge, he resists the argument that he, personally, is any way causally 
implicated in the exacerbation of poverty around the world.  To Held, he denies that he is 
connected to the global poor, and thus he has no responsibility to do anything to aid them.   
 Thus in the face of my argument, he asserts that he feels no human impulse when 
presented with the neediness of other human beings that he passes by on the street.  It 
would seem then that my argument can be seriously undercut at this early stage.  And yet, 
when asked as to why he gave nothing to the person he passed by, the interlocutor readily 
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provides the kind of responses that I argue are clear examples of self-deception: “She 
would just buy drugs,” “I work hard for my money, and I do not want to give it to lazy 
people who refuse to get a job,” and so on.   
 Taking these retorts into account, I argue that it is clear that this person does have 
a human impulse to help, but that he is actively working to deceive himself.  We all 
recognize that unmet human needs are inappropriate within our world, and we wish that 
this state of affairs was not the case; this recognition creates in us a distinctive human 
response.  Even if our interlocutor does not want to admit the existence of such impulses, 
the evidence for them lies in the types of responses he provides when explaining his 
passing by a poor person.  He is already trying to convince me (and himself) that his 
inaction was justified for some external reasons.  As I argued in Chapter Four, these 
explanations that he readily conjures up are examples of self-deception; he tries to get 
himself to believe that those excuses are true, and thus he is “off the hook,” so to speak.  
The existence of self-deception betrays the existence of a human impulse to help others in 
need.  Our interlocutor does have a human impulse to help, and he is covering it up via 
self-deception. 
“Why Resist Self-Deception?” 
 But even if he may admit that he has such an impulse, there is a second objection 
that our interlocutor could raise: why should he resist the temptation to self-deception?  
Why not just go on covering up the impulse to help? 
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 The reason that we must resist self-deception and provide aid to those in need, as I 
discussed before, is that self-deception harms us, as well as the poor.  We are forced to 
stifle our human impulses, and this is a very real phenomenological harm to ourselves.  
So when he walks by a poor person and resorts to self-deception, our interlocutor is doing 
something that is directly harming himself, as he hardens his heart to other human beings 
and their neediness.  He is acting contrary to his human nature – his full human potential.  
At the very least, even if he does not directly act on this impulse and provide aid, he must 
be reflective about his humanity and the humanity of those people whom he passes by, 
whether they are beggars on the street, or poor people around the world that he 
metaphorically “passes by” when he refuses to donate to aid agencies. 
 The interlocutor may not agree that such harms are evident, or that they are as 
severe as I argue.  As a result, he may refuse to acknowledge that he must avoid self-
deception for his own sake (let alone for the sake of those persons in need).  In one sense, 
I cannot force him to accept my conclusion; it is his choice to continue hardening himself 
and sequestering his human impulses.  In the interim, he will continue to be harmed.  Yet 
this does not mean that I must remain silent; I can repeatedly try to convince him of the 
existence of self-deception in his life, and how it continually harms him.  Merely because 
our interlocutor does not readily accept my conclusions does not mean that he is not open 
to the cajoling and criticisms of others like me who try to help him to understand and 
heed his human impulses.   
 John Stuart Mill makes this point clear in “On Liberty,” when he argues that a 
robust freedom of speech in society means not only that one has the freedom to hold 
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whatever opinion one chooses, but also that one must endure the opinions of others who 
may disagree.  As Mill puts it, “We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our 
unfavorable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the 
exercise of ours.”1   
 The world will not change so as to make self-deception less necessary for all of 
us, including our interlocutor (thus pushing us in the direction of a fully human world), 
unless people recognize the harms it begets, and begin to heed their human impulses to 
help others.    
“What (and How Much) Do I Have To Do?” 
 Perhaps I succeed in convincing our interlocutor of the harms of self-deception, 
and he agrees that he must work to change our world into a more fully human one.  This 
brings up a critical concern, one that has been a stumbling block for the approaches to 
poverty that I considered in earlier chapters: the question of “How much do I have to 
do?”  The inability to answer this question satisfactorily is a critique that I leveled 
strongly against Singer, Pogge, and Held.  Whereas Singer’s argument demands that we 
give of ourselves to an almost impossible level, Pogge and Held leave open the question 
of exactly what one must do in order to meet one’s moral obligations or responsibilities, 
and because of this, their respective arguments are weakened.  Even if I accept some 
causal implication in the promulgation of global poverty, it is thoroughly unclear as to 
how far I have to go in order to provide recompense, or to stop being a beneficiary, or to 
live up to my responsibility to help.   
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 In response to my own argument, this concern can be phrased a bit more 
specifically: “How do I, as one individual, go about changing the world, making it more 
fully human?  This is surely an impossible task for one individual.”   
 There is no doubt that the problems of global poverty are large, and that no single 
contribution in and of itself can “fix” the problem.  That being said, the only way to 
develop a more fully human world at a practical level is through individual action.  
Keeping in mind the realities of global poverty (by these I mean things like distance and 
scale), individuals need to become involved in organizations and social movements that 
are working to eradicate global poverty along human terms.  Working together with other 
individuals through such social action, change can be feasibly achieved.  I agree with 
philosopher Iris Marion Young, who argues that our social connections are a key element 
in changing global institutions:  
Our forward-looking responsibility consists in changing the institutions and 
processes so that their outcomes will be less unjust.   No one of us can do this on 
our own.  Even if it were possible to do so, a single shopper would not change the 
working conditions of those toiling in sweatshops by refusing to buy all items she 
had reason to believe were produced under unjust conditions.  The structural 
processes can be altered only if many actors in diverse social positions work 
together to intervene in these processes to produce different outcomes.
2
 
 
 Thus my answer to the question of “How much do I have to do?” is to argue that 
you should heed your human impulses.  Notice, however, that my answer to this concern 
may not satisfy our interlocutor.  He still may be left with a critical concern: “But you 
have only given possible suggestions as to what one might do.  You have not detailed 
precisely what one must do.  What ‘counts’ as heeding one’s human impulses?” 
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 My response to this objection is straightforward: “It depends.”  I admit that there 
is a certain level of subjectivity in my answer, and in this part of my argument in general; 
and yet, I claim that this is not a weakness of my position.  For the other approaches to 
global poverty that I have examined, this subjectivity is problematic: if we are causing 
poverty or are responsible for the poor, we must be able to say precisely what we must do 
in order to stop causing it, or how much we must do in order to pay sufficient reparations.   
 But in the case of my argument, not detailing exactly what one must do is a 
strength, rather than a weakness.  Our human impulses are generated in response to the 
different situations in which we find ourselves.  The diversity of such circumstances, 
coupled with the diversity of human needs, means that what we must do to heed our 
impulses will also vary.  In short, I cannot know what will satisfy a person’s human 
impulse to help another person, because it depends greatly on the subjective factors I 
mention.   Only you can say how much action you must undertake in order to feel that 
you are helping the other person and heeding your impulse.  Simply saying “I do not feel 
that I have to do anything” is not a sufficient response, as it does nothing to stop the harm 
being inflicted upon you by the neediness of the other person (and certainly does nothing 
to stop the harm her poverty is inflicting upon her).  The only way to stem the tide of 
these harms and begin to correct their causes is to take individual action. 
 You don’t have a duty to do so; you need to do so, for your own sake.  Only by 
acknowledging the pleas of those in need and actively responding can you avoid 
hardening your heart, making yourself less human.  Given how interconnected our world 
has become (and is still becoming), neglecting the pleas of those in need ends up harming 
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all of us in a multitude of ways, not the least of which is that it impoverishes our species-
being. 
Practical Action 
Movements and Organizations: Support Inefficiency! 
 There are, of course, multiple organizations and movements in which one can get 
involved in order to help bring about a more fully human world.  Here I suggest at least a 
few organizations that focus on making meaningful labor for all a reality. 
 One notable example of an organization which functions to provide opportunities 
for poor individuals to labor is the Grameen Bank, founded by Muhammad Yunus.  
Yunus argues that the key to eradicating poverty is putting poor people to work in 
productive industrial projects at small, local levels.  In his personal life and travels, he 
found that many people in poverty were seeking avenues to labor and meet their needs, 
but traditional subsistence farming was becoming increasingly impractical, while cities 
were becoming overcrowded and offered only sweatshop employment.  In addition, the 
prospects for these people to set up small businesses were drastically reduced, as banks 
were particularly hesitant to provide them small start-up loans (as the loans offered little 
profit through interest, and a high risk of default).  As a result, the poor turned to local 
moneylenders whose usurious practices kept them from being able to turn any profit from 
their labor.  Thus the problem was not only that the poor were unable to obtain capital, 
but even if they could get a loan, they fell into a trap whereby they could in no way earn a 
sustainable income on which to survive. 
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 Believing that the poor would repay their loans if given the chance, Yunus 
worked to set up the Grameen Bank through which the poor could receive “micro-credit” 
loans, or small loans (often only a few dollars) for smaller-scale productive projects.  By 
way of example, Yunus tells the story of a young woman named Sufiya Begum in his 
native Bangladesh who made small stools out of bamboo.  In order to obtain the raw 
materials needed, she borrowed the required twenty-two cents from moneylenders, who 
then bought her completed stools back from her, providing her a profit of just two cents 
per stool.  As Yunus noticed, the woman could “only survive in a tight cycle…her life 
was a form of bonded labor, of slavery.  The trader made certain that he paid Sufiya a 
price that barely covered the cost of the materials and was just enough to keep her 
alive.”3  While simply handing her the money would provide a one-time solution to her 
problem of capital, Yunus decided to work towards an institution whereby Sufiya and 
others like her could obtain small loans in order to make such small-scale productive 
enterprises viable.  As a result, he argues, more people will be able to find small business 
and agriculture feasible, which means they will not need to migrate to urban areas and 
become the “urban poor,” crowding into sweatshops and slums. 
 Clearly such small enterprise isn’t the most “efficient” way to produce goods 
worldwide.  (These small individual producers operate within local niche markets where 
larger producers have not penetrated.)  But the human gains from such projects are clear: 
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meaningful labor, significant income, and the emotional benefits of being able to provide 
support for oneself and one’s family.  Thus by focusing on micro-finance, Yunus and the 
Grameen Bank have put the concept of labor at the center of their attempt to combat 
poverty, and aided people (a large majority of which are women) in starting endeavors 
which provide them with appropriate avenues to labor, obtain income, and provide for 
their families. 
 Another organizational example comes directly out of the legacy of Schumacher 
and his life’s work.  While still alive, Schumacher founded the Intermediate Technology 
Development Group (ITDG), which has since grown into Practical Action, and spawned 
similar organizations, such as the New Economics Institute (formerly the E.F. 
Schumacher Society).  Taking the four criteria for development of intermediate 
technology (discussed in Chapter Five) as their base, the ITDG set out to put a “regional 
approach” to development into action. They began by developing a catalogue of small 
agricultural tools and implements that depended upon human manipulation and direction, 
and were relatively cheap.  The ITDG was first able to distribute the catalog and products 
to farmers in Nigeria, after which their work quickly spread across several other 
developing nations, connecting with farmers and agricultural producers who eagerly 
purchased and utilized the ITDG’s technological products. 
 From there, they expanded to develop a series of programs on all aspects of 
technology that are basic to rural life in developing countries, such as agricultural 
implements, water supply, energy, transportation, and small manufacturing.  
Schumacher’s fingerprints are clearly evident in the focus of the group, as they work with 
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small, rural producers to provide solutions and technologies that are easily accessible, 
labor-intensive, and affordable.
4
 
 My intention here is not to offer an exhaustive list of candidates worthy of 
support; I have no doubt that there are many groups and organizations that work towards 
meaningful labor.  I simply offer the Grameen Bank, Practical Action, and the New 
Economics Institute as a few examples worthy of support.   
 There is, however, a practical concern here that must be addressed: if enterprises 
aren’t economically efficient, how will they survive in competition with those that are?  
While such small-scale agricultural enterprises may allow for more human labor, can 
they provide a living for their workers?  My answer to this concern is a qualified “yes,” 
provided that that the governments of developing countries are guided by a vision of a 
fully human world in terms of developing economic policies, rather than monetary cost 
efficiency.  This means that they must emphasize meaningful labor nationally, focus less 
on competing internationally (which is oftentimes the advice of the IMF when offering 
structural adjustment loans), and more on protecting and encouraging labor-intensive 
domestic industries.  Opening one’s markets without restrictions has wrought disastrous 
consequences for developing countries (i.e. NAFTA’s effects in Mexico, where cheap 
corn imported from the United States has completely undermined the ability of local 
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producers to compete).
5
  Countries should have an eye towards protecting small 
producers and making more amounts of labor necessary, rather than on competing 
internationally.  Government measures may take the form of subsidizing agriculture, not 
by acre (as the U.S. has done, resulting in the negative consequences that Pogge 
discusses), but rather by directing subsidies towards smaller producers to allow them to 
avoid being put out of business, or avoid being forced into being “efficient” by adopting 
labor-saving technologies. 
 There are grounds for hope: The U.N. has declared 2012 the “International Year 
of Cooperatives.”  Producer cooperatives are definitely examples of enterprises that 
function more along the lines of producing and protecting meaningful human labor, 
rather than merely maximizing profits for shareholders.  While cooperatives compete in 
the marketplace and strive to turn a profit, they don’t do so by slashing labor costs 
(replacing workers with technology) at all turns, nor by deskilling labor.  There is an 
overarching concern for the quality of labor and the ability of workers to labor 
meaningfully.  Thus if governments in developing countries can work towards providing 
support for enterprises such as cooperatives and small-scale agriculture to flourish, it 
seems all the more likely that meaningful labor for all within the context of a fully human 
world can come to pass. 
On the Street: Be Selfish! 
 Supporting such global initiatives is one way that we can heed our human 
impulses, and work to make this a more fully human world, but it is not the only way.  I 
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want to return to an image from the beginning of Chapter Four: the beggar on our street.  
“Global poverty” is not just an issue that happens on the other side of the world; in our 
daily lives, we also encounter human beings in need, perhaps all too frequently, asking us 
for assistance.  The problem presents itself to us in small situations, ones wherein the 
actions of an individual can make a substantial difference.  To avoid repeating our past 
mistakes of self-deception, and to move towards a more human world, we must respond 
to these pleas.  When presented with situations of poverty, resist the temptation to turn 
away, and provide aid to the person in front of you who is in need.  In other words, the 
next time you come upon a needy person who asks for aid, stop and take out your wallet.   
Whether that means you pass over money or buy the person an apple, you are acting in 
accordance with our human nature as species-being, rather than against it.   
 This does not mean that we give every time we are asked; I may not have any 
money in my wallet, or I may choose a different avenue from which to use my resources 
to combat poverty.  But in the instant that we are asked, stopping and acknowledging the 
pleas of the other person involves a truly human response.  We humanize the other and 
his neediness, and allow ourselves to be guided by our human impulse.   
 While providing aid will cost you something, you gain something in return!  You 
gain the satisfaction of helping another person meet their human needs.  And even 
beyond that, you are actively working to make this a more human world, not only for 
others, but also for yourself.  This individual interaction also functions as a reminder that 
one is part of a larger project, involved in combating poverty and bringing about a human 
world. 
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Final Summation 
 In conclusion, I have argued that current approaches to global poverty focused on 
utility, human rights, or care are inadequate because of their respective inability to 
answer particular objections.  I am not arguing, however, that these approaches are 
wholly unsound (from a philosophical standpoint), or that they must be entirely 
disregarded.  Rather, I argue that the weaknesses I have exposed give rise to a need to 
develop an approach that overcomes these objections, and to do so I argue that we must 
posit an alternative conceptual framework with which to understand the issue of poverty.  
Through this framework, based in Marx’s conception of species-being, a more persuasive 
argument for our moral motivation develops.  Our motivation to act comes out of a 
concern for our own humanity, and a desire to avoid the ravages of the self-deception that 
we are forced to put ourselves through when faced with poor people.  In order to make 
this a more human world and to more fully develop our species-being, we must act to 
help the poor. 
 I am sympathetic to Peter Singer, especially in virtue of the simplicity and 
directness of his argument; it is a worthy goal to try to cajole people into giving up even a 
small amount of money.  That being said, his approach still runs up against significant 
philosophical critiques (the “utilitarian paradox” and the two critiques of Singer’s logic 
that Gomberg offers).  Most importantly, however, Singer’s neglect of the causes of 
poverty is very troubling.  I argue that an effective approach to poverty must be 
concerned with what (and who) is causing the impoverishment of millions.  Without 
critically investigating the causes, any attempts to aid poor people can and will be 
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undercut.  We cannot continue trying to bandage the wounds of the poor across the globe; 
we need to stop them from being wounded in the first place. 
 Thomas Pogge’s human rights approach makes strides in the right direction by 
focusing explicitly on causes.  I am sympathetic to his claim that we are morally 
implicated in causing harm to the global poor (a violation of our negative duties).  I agree 
with Pogge’s argument that the international economic order is a major cause of 
impoverishment, and since we are morally implicated in the perpetuation of such policies, 
we have a moral responsibility to do aid.  But his answer to what exactly each individual 
must do is particularly diffuse: it is not at all clear what I (as an individual) must do in 
order to satisfy my negative duties.  Even if Pogge’s proposed structural reforms are 
enacted (i.e. rescinding the resource and borrowing privileges, putting in place the Global 
Resources Dividend), I am unconvinced that the global poor will be therefore given 
sufficient opportunity to have better lives. 
 Virginia Held offers another important perspective on the problem of poverty, 
especially given her insistence that we must reflect on our interdependency and our 
connection to the global poor.  They are not merely strangers on the other side of the 
world, but fellow human beings to whom we are connected, and whose lives are affected 
in various (often negative) ways based on how we act.   
 But her ethic of care argument falls short of providing sufficient motivation to act 
because it relies on a tenuous appeal that people should care about the harms of poverty 
on the global poor merely in virtue of what it does to them (the poor).  It is too easy to 
argue that I am in no way connected to people on the other side of the earth.  Even if I 
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accept such a connection, I can similarly deny that I have any moral responsibility to 
provide aid (especially if I do not think that I am causally implicated in the existence of 
such poverty).  Held does not go far enough in establishing the connection between us 
and the global poor.   
 My own approach that I have developed here contains four key (interconnected) 
elements: 
 To begin with, I argue that we must step back and reflect upon our responses 
when we encounter a poor person.  Such reflection allows us to realize that poverty is not 
just doing something to “them,” it is doing something to “us” (both “them” and “me”).  
Conditions of poverty around the world are not just harming the poor by materially 
impoverishing them, but such conditions are harming all of us by impoverishing our 
species-being and our sense of humanity.  We harden ourselves in the face of poverty, 
and try our hardest to suppress our human impulse to help.  This reaction is 
dehumanizing not only to the poor person we encounter, but also to us.   
 Secondly, we must recognize that in order to deal with the dehumanization of 
suppressing our human response, we resort to self-deception, and try to explain away 
why we should not have to respond to the needs of the person in front of us.  This 
reaction, I argue, is harmful to all of us.  Given this connection of harm, we have a 
serious interest in acting to end poverty, insofar as we seek to end the harm that such 
poverty does to our humanity.  We want to preserve our humanity, and avoid the negative 
harms of self-deception.  We must resist the temptation to self-deception, and instead 
recognize the harms that poverty does to both the poor and us. 
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 But we are not only motivated by a desire to stave off self-deception, but also by 
another, more positive dimension: a vision of a fully human world.  This vision provides 
us with a sense that we do not have to live in a world where such rampant poverty exists.  
It connects us with the poor of the world, insofar as this is an image of a world that is 
much more than just “a world without material poverty.”  It is a world without the human 
poverty that we all experience in the face of neediness.  Thus our moral motivation to 
provide aid to the other person comes out of a desire to make the world a more human 
one, wherein we celebrate our neediness and interdependence, and heed our human 
impulses to help other people who are in need. 
 Lastly, given this vision of a fully human world, we must question how such a 
world could be brought into being.  We also must think about what is currently impeding 
the development of this kind of world, and it is here that we turn to the causes of poverty.  
Such reflection begets a realization of precisely how important labor is for all human 
beings, and that it is currently being denied to those who lead severely impoverished lives 
(and, in fact, to most of the world’s population). 
 At the philosophical level, I argue that in order to remedy the harms of poverty 
and create a more human world, a significant shift in our view of labor and economics 
must occur.  This change can happen in three major steps: first, we must see the value of 
labor for individual human beings in terms of their species-being.  Secondly, due to our 
connectedness and dependency upon others, we must see the importance for all people to 
labor for the development of their species-being.  Finally, this begets a realization that in 
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order for species-being to develop we must alter our economic organization and 
principles in order to provide opportunities for good work for all people. 
 In more detail, these alterations can begin by revisiting the role that labor-saving 
technology plays in the productive process.  Because of the overzealous pursuit of 
efficiency, labor has been devalued and (often) replaced by a level of technology that, 
while it produces cheaper objects for consumption, degrades and dehumanizes workers in 
a myriad of ways.  In essence, the results of such labor-saving technology are that we are 
wasting human beings, all in an effort to make goods faster and cheaper. 
 We must change our concepts of efficiency and labor-saving technology by 
focusing on trying to provide what Schumacher calls “Good Work” through 
“Intermediate Technology.”  In doing so, we will utilize technology only insofar as it 
allows for truly meaningful labor, and creates opportunities for more people to labor, 
rather than trying to take human labor out of the productive process. 
 My goal in this dissertation is not only to set forth a compelling philosophical 
argument that grounds our moral motivation to act, but also to provide some clear links to 
practical actions that individuals can undertake, insofar as they may be moved by my 
above argument. 
 It is important to note that my argument is not based on a strict moral obligation.  
In contrast to the arguments of Singer, Pogge, and Held, I am not trying to ground a 
distinct “must” or dutiful imperative to act to end poverty.  These approaches are all too 
often seen (justifiably or not) as trying to give people a “guilt trip,” and thus they get 
pushed aside or ignored.  My argument instead relies on something of a moral desire; 
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given their reflection on human nature and self-deception, people will be moved to act 
because they do not want to live in a dehumanizing world with poverty anymore (both in 
terms of material and human poverty). 
 In our current society and discourse, the explanatory burden has been put on those 
who say we should do something about poverty.  When we talk about whether or not to 
give something to a beggar we encounter on the street, we oftentimes first ask: “What 
will happen if I give this person money?”  I argue that this is the wrong question to ask; 
the burden of motivational proof should not be placed here.  Instead, we should be 
asking: “What am I doing if I turn away?”  Changing this mindset is a very important 
first step in the direction of a human world. 
 I have no pretense that giving some change to a beggar on the street is going to 
“solve” global poverty, or that it will even “solve” that person’s material poverty.  Even 
by getting involved with organizations like Practical Action or the Grameen Bank, one 
will not succinctly accomplish such goals.  But by acting when asked, rather than turning 
away, we are reinforcing a commitment to creating a better world.  The only way that we 
will be able to bring this better world into being is by doing whatever we can when we 
have the opportunity.  We must be actively involved, in some meaningful way, in the 
project of creating a fully human world. 
 When faced with poverty around the world, support “inefficiency.”  And when 
faced with poverty in the form of the person in front of you, be “selfish.”  You do not 
have a “moral obligation” to do so; rather, you should want to do so.  It is the best way to 
help them, yourself, and us. 
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